Problems of Communism

MAY-JUNE 1972

VENTURES IN SOVIET DIPLOMACY

Japan in Siberia
Kiichi Saeki

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ITALIAN COMMUNISM

Donald L. M. Blackmer

SOLZHENITSYN

Donald Fanger

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3

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Ventures in Soviet Diplomacy

1 Toward Japanese Cooperation in Siberian Development
by Kiichi Saeki

12 Moscow and South Asia
by William J. Barnds

32 The Persian Gulf—Cradle of Conflict?
by D. C. Watt

41 Italian Communism: Strategy for the 1970's
by Donald L. M. Blackmer

57 Solzhenitsyn: Art and Foreign Matter
by Donald Fanger

64 Political Science in the USSR
by Rolf H. W. Theen

BOOKS

71 Soviet Dilemmas in the Middle East
by Robert O. Freedman

74 The Cost of Soviet Aid
by Janos Horvath

77 Analyzing Soviet Affairs: Methods and Myths
by Harvey Fireside

80 Models of Conflict in Chinese Politics
by Andrew J. Nathan

83 Romania and a Theory of Progress
by R. V. Burks

NOTES & VIEWS

86 Correspondence

* * *

Cover Photo: Soviet surveyors in Siberia. From *Soviet Life* (Moscow and Washington, D.C.), No. 1, January 1969.

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Ventures in Soviet Diplomacy

EDITORS' NOTE: During recent years, analysts and scholars have discerned a growing disposition on the part of the USSR to operate in world affairs primarily as a state with global interests and concerns. This approach has involved the Soviet Union with an expanding spectrum of international forces and has greatly increased the complexity of its dealings with the outside world. The three articles that follow discuss aspects of this evolving situation. Mr. Saeki describes the protracted negotiations between Moscow and Tokyo looking toward cooperation in Siberian economic development. Mr. Barnds explores the USSR's emergence as a major factor in South Asian affairs and its likely future course on the subcontinent. And, finally, Mr. Watt examines the dilemmas that confront Moscow in the Persian Gulf area as British power recedes from there—dilemmas born of both local conditions and Sino-Soviet rivalry.

Toward Japanese Cooperation in Siberian Development

By Kiichi Saeki

Since 1959 the Soviet Union has been engaged in a broad-scale development of its Siberian and Far Eastern territories.[1] The Brezhnev-Kosygin leadership which succeeded First Secretary Khrushchev in the autumn of 1964 has, if anything, accorded still higher priority to this program within the overall Soviet economic strategy. In January 1966, an important new element was introduced into these plans when talks began between Japanese and Soviet interests concerning the possibility of joint exploitation of the natural gas resources of the northern portion of the Soviet island of Sakhalin. Since then, the two sides have come to specific agreements on joint development of Far Eastern forest resources and reciprocal trade exchanges involving lumber and a combination of machinery and consumer goods, and on development of port facilities in the Bay of Wrangel geared to expanded

Mr. Saeki is President of the Nomura Institute of Technology and Economics (Kamakura) and former President of the National Defense College of Japan (1961-64). He is author of Nihon no anzen hoshō *(The Security of Japan), 1966, and co-author of* Kyotō no anzen hoshō *(The Security of the Far East), 1968.*

[1] It should be noted that the eastern reaches of the USSR comprise three major regions: West Siberia, stretching from Tyumenskaia Oblast in the West to Tomskaia Oblast in the East; East Siberia, from Krasnoiarskii Krai to Chitinskaia Oblast; and the Far East, embracing all territory to the east of and including the Yakutskaia Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic.

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Japanese-Soviet trade. Other proposals, in some cases involving more than one billion dollars of Japanese investment, have been tabled by the Soviet Union and Japanese firms and are still under consideration and negotiation. The present study attempts to determine the various factors bearing on this bilateral economic relationship and to assess the potential for expanded Japanese cooperation in the mammoth Soviet undertaking.

To understand the nature of present and envisaged Soviet-Japanese cooperation, it is useful to examine the scope of the Soviet objectives in these regions. Based on plans developed during the 1954-58 Five-Year Plan period, the USSR concentrated during 1959-65 on the construction of ferrous metallurgy plants, large thermal-power stations, and chemical plants, and on the development of oil- and gas-extraction industries. In the following five years (1966-70), the Soviet Union continued to invest heavily in its eastern regions, devoting 50.9 billion rubles—or 16.2 percent of a total investment budget of 312 billion rubles—to development of Siberia and the Far East.[2] The result was that for this period industrial production increased at an average annual rate of 8.8 percent for West Siberia, 9.6 percent for East Siberia, and 8.6 percent for the Far Eastern Economic Region—compared with an increase in total Soviet production of 8.6 percent.[3] In this expansion, priority was given to the exploitation of fuel resources, to the production of power, and to the development of nonferrous metallurgy, the chemical industry, and the timber-processing industry (all requiring large volumes of power). Particular emphasis was given to the creation of industrial complexes in West Siberia geared to utilization of newly-discovered oil and gas reserves and existing forest resources.

The Ninth Five-Year Plan (for 1971-75), building on the achievements of the previous periods, has reaffirmed the Soviet determination to carry on the development of Siberia and the Far East, with particular emphasis on exploitation of energy resources. Highest priority among programs for the eastern regions is given to development of the oil and gas fields of West Siberia and related industrial facilities. As for East Siberia, the emphasis is on development of ferrous and nonferrous metallurgy, forestry, pulp-and-paper manufacturing, and electric power generation, with particular stress on the creation of industrial complexes in the southern portion of the region. For the Far East, the emphasis is on development of the necessary infrastructure (*i.e.*, manpower, housing, water supply, telecommunications, roads, and other transportation facilities) for electric power generation, mining, timber processing, pulp-and-paper manufacturing, and fishing, in addition to construction of oil refineries and improvement of harbor facilities.[4]

In examining the Soviet development effort in Siberia and the Far East, one can discern several major motivations. First, the USSR seems determined to develop giant, continuous economic complexes stretching from European Russia to the Urals and on into Siberia. Second, the Soviet Union desires to assure its industry the needed fuels and raw materials by exploiting the resources of Siberia on a broader scale. Furthermore, the export of Siberian and Far Eastern resources promises to earn the Soviet Union significant amounts of foreign currency or reciprocal imports of advanced machinery and consumer goods.

Rationale for Cooperation

In its development of West Siberia, the USSR can rely, at least in part, on the industrial might of Moscow and Leningrad as well as on imports from Western Europe or even the United States.[5] It is a far different matter to develop projects in East Siberia and the Far Eastern territories because of the extremely high costs involved in transporting from European Russia the machinery, construction materials, and consumer goods required for development of these remote regions. Thus, it is natural that the USSR has sought to introduce Japanese industrial strength into the picture. Moscow apparently envisages a scenario in which the Soviet Union exports a portion of its rich raw material resources to Japan in return for Japanese exports of machinery and consumer goods for the development of Siberia and of the transportation infrastructure of the Soviet

[2] *Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1970 g.* (USSR National Economy in 1970), Moscow, Statistika, 1971, p. 478; and *Narodnoe khoziaistvo RSFSR v 1970 g.* (RSFSR National Economy in 1970), Moscow, Statistika, 1971, p. 320.

[3] *Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1970 g.*, p. 139.

[4] See the Directives of the 24th Soviet Party Congress on the 1971-75 Five-Year Plan, *Pravda* (Moscow), April 11, 1971.

[5] For example, *The Wall Street Journal* (New York), Dec. 1, 1971, p. 18, reported that contracts totalling $125 million were signed between US companies and Soviet foreign trade officials involving Soviet export of $60 million in nonferrous metals in return for $65 million of US mining, oil-drilling and other equipment.

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

Siberia—stretching from the Urals to the Pacific—encompasses many Soviet administrative and territorial divisions, but for purposes of economic planning, it is divided into three huge regions. The inset shows major ice-free ports of the USSR on the Sea of Japan.

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Table 1: Growth of Soviet Foreign Trade
(millions of rubles)

	1965	1970
Total Turnover	14,610	22,085
With socialist countries	10,050	14,410
With other countries	4,560	7,675

SOURCE: *Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1970 g.* (USSR National Economy in 1970), Moscow, Statistika, 1971, p. 615.

East. Furthermore, she hopes to parlay Japan's thirst for additional raw material and energy resources into the extension of huge Japanese credits for the development of Siberia and the Far East. Through economic cooperation, the Soviet Union hopes to establish stable, permanent markets for the resources of the area. In return, it can gain the payoff of imports of advanced Japanese technology, so vital to economic growth, and also ease pressures on its own consumer-goods industries by importing Japanese textiles.

Dmitri Petrov, of the Institute for International Relations and the World Economy, USSR Academy of Sciences, delineated just such a Soviet rationale for developing a close economic relationship with Japan in a lecture delivered in Tokyo in May 1970. Noting the potential for complementary trade based upon each country's comparative advantage, Mr. Petrov foresaw a great potential for boosting Japanese-Soviet trade markedly above the three percent it presently represents in the total trade of the two countries. He painted a glowing picture of the market for textiles and other consumer goods which would emerge in a developing Soviet Siberia and Far East. He also noted the transportation advantages of dealing with Japan—it takes ten days by rail from European Russia to the Far East compared with only a day and a half by ship to Nakhodka from the port of Niigata, centrally located on the Japanese coast of the Sea of Japan. In promoting the concept of expanded Soviet-Japanese relations, Mr. Petrov also alluded to the common interests of the USSR and Japan in relaxing tensions in the Far East and Asia.

For its part, Japan is drawn to participation in the Soviet economic plans by two primary motives—a desire to expand Japan's export trade and the need for access to reliable and economical supplies of industrial raw materials and energy resources. Expansion of export trade is of critical importance to the Japanese economy if it is to sustain a high rate of growth while maintaining a favorable balance of payments. Especially, amid the uncertainties of the international monetary system, Japan must seek to diversify its export markets. The evidence of recent years shows that the Soviet Union is increasing its foreign trade activity and is thereby becoming an increasingly attractive target for Japanese trade expansion. Between 1950 and 1965, the foreign trade volume of the USSR increased fivefold compared to an increase of 3.5 times in Soviet gross social product.[6] As Table 1 indicates, Soviet trade has continued to expand since 1965, and the most rapid growth has been with countries outside the socialist camp. The successes of Great Britain, Finland, France, Italy, and West Germany in penetrating the Soviet market (see Table 2) lend particular impetus to the Japanese effort. Cooperation in the development of Siberia can be seen as a good basis for opening or expanding access to the entire Soviet market, and as we shall see below, Japanese trade with the Soviet Union has indeed expanded considerably since 1966.

Inextricably linked with economic growth and expansion of exports in the case of Japan is the matter of ensuring a steady supply of raw materials and energy. Japan depends on overseas supply for

[6] *Yearbook of International Trade Statistics 1969*, United Nations, New York, 1971, p. 848; and *Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1965 g.* (USSR National Economy in 1965), Moscow, Statistika, 1966, p. 55.

Table 2: Soviet Trade Partners
(in percentage)

	1965	1970
Total trade turnover	100.0	100.0
With socialist countries	68.8	65.2
With capitalist countries, including:	31.2	34.8
Britain	2.7	2.9
Japan	2.2	3.0
West Germany	1.7	2.5
France	1.4	1.9
Italy	1.5	2.1

SOURCES: *Vneshniaia torgovlia SSSR v 1965 g.* (USSR Foreign Trade in 1965), Moscow, Mezhdunarodnie otnosheniia, 1966, p. 16; and *Vneshniaia torgovlia SSSR v. 1970 g.* (USSR Foreign Trade in 1970), Moscow, Mezhdunarodnie otnosheniia, 1971, p. 16.

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nearly 90 percent of basic industrial resources. The nation's need for iron, copper, nickel, tungsten, tin, manganese, molybdenum, oil, and gas will increase dramatically as the Japanese economy expands in the future. For example, it has been estimated that Japanese oil consumption will rise from 230 million kiloliters in 1970 to 800 million kiloliters in 1985. This dependence on external supply sources makes the Japanese economy highly susceptible to the impact of international tensions and hence makes it essential for Tokyo to maintain friendly relations with all countries supplying critical resources and to develop supply channels which are unlikely to be disrupted by international disputes.

Japan's vulnerability to the vicissitudes of the international supply situation can be demonstrated by the examples of coking coal and oil. Over time, the Japanese iron industry has come to rely on shipments of bituminous coal from the mines of West Virginia in the United States. However, the possibilities of increasing exports from these areas have dimmed in light of the new American concern with pollution and the fact that West Virginia coal is a promising low-pollution fuel for power plants in the United States. Consequently, the price charged to Japanese importers for this coking coal has risen substantially, and Japanese iron manufacturers finally had to advance the West Virginia mining firms $25 million to induce them to expand production of coal.[7] In the case of oil, Japan was essentially helpless in the face of the 1971 price-raising offensive of OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries).

As a result of these and similar problems, the Japanese financial world has become increasingly aware of the necessity to diversify the source of supply of essential resources in the coming decades. Of course, there is also a constant search for means to reduce costs of such materials by procuring them at lesser distances from the Japanese islands. The importance of the geographical factor is demonstrated by the fact that it costs Japan about eight dollars a ton to transport coal from the United States, compared with an estimated cost of only three dollars a ton for shipping coal from the Soviet eastern regions. It is therefore natural that keen interest has centered on the prospect of cooperation in the development of the resources of Siberia and the Far East as a promising means of assuring long-term and stable sources of many critical supplies at favorable prices.

[7] Nippon Steel Corporation loaned $25 million through the Hisho-Iwai Trading Company to the Island Creek Coal Corporation of West Virginia. The loan was at 6.24-percent interest, with repayment through the export of 30 million tons of coal at a rate of two million tons a year for 15 years.

Institutional Framework

It is in the context of the broadly congruent Soviet and Japanese motivations described above that one must examine the developing Japanese-Soviet economic relationship. Shortly after the initial talks in January 1966, an institutional framework was established for further examination of possible joint economic undertakings—the Joint Japan-Soviet Economic Committee.[8] At its first meeting in March 1966, this body of Japanese businessmen and representatives of Soviet planning and trade agencies discussed the North Sakhalin project, development of West Siberian oil and gas reserves, construction of pipelines, development of Soviet copper deposits, expansion and consolidation of port facilities in the Soviet Far East, and development of the forest resources and pulp industry in the Far East.[9] Although the session failed to produce any concrete agreements, it saw the Soviet Union solicit substantial Japanese participation in a broad range of Siberian projects, a pattern which has persisted in subsequent meetings.

At the second session of the Joint Committee, held June 12-14, 1967, both sides reached general agreement on development of forest resources in the Soviet Far East.[10] The agreement was finalized on July 24, and KS Industrial Co., Ltd. was estab-

[8] The Joint Committee was organized as a result of trade talks between Soviet agencies and Japanese business in June 1965. Members of the Japanese side are top managerial personnel, most of them members of the Federation of Economic Organizations (*Keidan-ren*). Although no Japanese government officials had served on the Committee through 1971, the Japanese Government has provided advice and consultation. The Soviet-Japanese Committee (the Soviet counterpart of the Japanese group) is headed by Ivan F. Semichastnov, First Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade of the USSR, and it comprises high-ranking officials in ministries involved in trade and industrial exploitation of Siberia. See *Nihon Kogyo Shimbun* (Tokyo), March 17, 1966, for a discussion of the origins of the Joint Committee.

[9] For accounts of Soviet and Japanese objectives at this first joint session—which ran March 14 through 23—see *Mainichi Shimbun* (Tokyo), March 13, 1966; *Nihon Kogyo Shimbun* March 17, 1966; and *Nihon Keizai Shimbun* (Tokyo), March 23, 1966.

[10] The session also examined Japanese participation in the development of pipelines from West Siberia to the Far East and cooperative development of Soviet Far Eastern ports. See *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, June 15, 1967, and Jan. 12, 1968.

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Soviet technicians lay pipelines to carry oil from the Tyumen oilfields.

—From *Soviet Life* (Washington, DC) No. 4, April 1968.

lished and capitalized by 14 Japanese trading firms to act as party to the contract and as liaison for the Japanese side of the project. The agreement set a precedent for bilateral cooperation in Siberian development and also established a production-sharing formula which is expected to serve as a model for future joint projects—the so-called "KS formula."[11] It stipulated that: (1) Japan was to supply the USSR with a total of $163 million worth of materials for development and consumption over a period of three years, and in return the Soviet Union would ship to Japan 8 million cubic meters of timber equivalent in value to the aforementioned sum; (2) the Soviet Union was to pay a 20-percent deposit on the $133 million worth of machinery included in the total $163 million imports from Japan, with the balance to be paid over a five-year period at 5.8 percent interest; (3) in return for Japanese exports of $30 million in consumer goods, the USSR would pay $15 million in 1969 and the remainder four years afterwards; (4) the Soviet timber was to be priced at a figure of $21 a cubic meter (based on 1968 prices) in 1969 and 1970, with an increase equal to one percent of the base price in each year beginning in 1971. The agreement was to run from 1969 through 1973, and discussions concerning an extension were to be held at the end of 1972.

The next two sessions of the Joint Japan-Soviet Economic Committee were held in December 1968 and February 1970, and various subcommittees continued to negotiate on a number of specific proposals for joint undertakings. The February 1970 Moscow session arrived at an agreement on the following steps: (1) to speed up negotiation of contracts concerning cooperation in designing and supplying equipment and materials for construction of a new harbor in the Bay of Wrangel; (2) to expedite technical and economic research for development of natural gas resources in the Yakutskaia Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic and in Sakhalin; (3) to accelerate the preparation and exchange of information aimed at early resolution of problems of the supply of coal and iron ores to Japan; (4) to expedite negotiations on commercial and technical matters regarding development of the production of chips, pulp, and timber from broadleaf trees and

[11] The term "KS formula" derives from the initials of the surnames of the late Mr. Ryosei Kawai (former Chairman of the Komatsu Manufacturing Company, Ltd.) and of Soviet official I. F. Semichastnov. These two were instrumental in negotiating this first cooperative Japanese-Soviet venture in Siberia. See *Sankei Shimbun* (Tokyo), July 25, 1968.

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their supply to Japan; and (5) to encourage scientific and technical exchange through inspections by experts and through exhibitions of techniques in woodworking and in the production of iron and steel, tractors, construction machinery, heavy electric equipment, and household appliances.[12]

Rapport on Ports

This agreement yielded concrete results in at least one area—the matter of Soviet port development. Since March 1966, there had been discussion of Japanese participation in the modernization or construction of Soviet Far Eastern ports as a logical contribution to expanded Soviet-Japanese trade. During 1968, attention focused on potential Japanese participation in the construction of a new Soviet port on the Bay of Wrangel capable of handling annually 10 million tons of coal, 800,000 tons of wood chips, and various other cargo. At the December 1968 meeting of the Joint Committee, a Harbor Transport Committee was established to pursue negotiations on this matter.[13] Basic agreement on the Wrangel Bay project was reached on December 18, 1970.[14] According to this agreement the Japanese are to supply equipment and machinery for Soviet construction of the planned coal and wood-chip facilities, plus container-handling facilities with an annual capacity of 120,000 to 140,000 units. The Japanese will extend a credit of 80 million dollars, repayable in cash over seven years at six percent interest. The arrangement got an official stamp of approval on September 22, 1971, when the Japanese Foreign Ministry and the USSR Ministry of Foreign Trade exchanged notes supporting the project.[15] Although the two governments simultaneously initialed a new five-year trade agreement which set total trade between the two countries at 51.6 billion dollars over the period 1971-75,[16] there have been no concrete agreements on joint Japanese-Soviet economic projects in Siberia.

A fifth session of the Joint Japanese-Soviet Economic Committee scheduled for April 1971 was twice postponed. Some attributed the delay to Soviet vexation over Japanese caution in concluding sizable contracts for the joint development of Siberia. Japanese firms have indeed been reluctant to advance the enormous credits sought by the Soviet Union without any firm guarantees of repayment or assurance of oil delivery, and have also desired very detailed technical data before proceeding on such proposals as participation in the development of West Siberian oil fields and the construction of pipelines from that region to the Far East. When the fifth session finally convened on February 21-24, 1972, there were indications of some progress. According to a communique released at the end of the meetings,

Japan and the Soviet Union will appoint working groups respectively to work on formulating draft agreements acceptable to both sides on the construction of an oil pipeline and terms of Japanese credits with which the Soviet Union will purchase steel tube and other equipment and materials from Japan.[17]

Further, the USSR agreed to permit a Japanese survey mission to visit the Tyumen oil fields of West Siberia, and the Japanese Government responded by sending to the meeting high-ranking officials from the Foreign Ministry, the Finance Ministry, and the Ministry of International Trade and Industry—an unprecedented acknowledgment of the importance of the discussions.

Bargaining over Oil and Gas

As suggested above, examination of the progress to date in negotiations on the West Siberian scheme as well as on other projects considered by the Joint Committee is instructive both with regard to the potential for Japanese-Soviet cooperation in Siberian development and with regard to the obstacles lying in the path of such cooperation. The proposals concerning Japanese participation in the development of the Tyumen oil fields and construction of a 6,660-kilometer pipeline from Anzhero-Sudzhensk to the port of Nakhodka was tabled by the USSR at the

[12] *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, Feb. 16, 1970. During the Moscow sessions, Japanese delegation head Shigeo Nagano, President of the Japanese Chamber of Commerce and Industry, had an interview with Premier A. N. Kosygin in which the Soviet leader stated that natural gas reserves of North Sakhalin were insufficient (16 billion cubic meters against an originally-estimated 60 billion cubic meters) to justify exploitation. *Ibid.*, Feb. 19, 1970.

[13] *Mainichi Shimbun*, Dec. 12, 1968.

[14] See *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, Dec. 19, 1970.

[15] *Ibid.*, Sept. 29, 1971.

[16] *Ibid.*

[17] *The New York Times* (New York), Feb. 25, 1972.

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first session of the Joint Committee, in March 1966. The project envisaged a Japanese credit of 1.45 billion rubles (or better than $1.5 billion, assuming an exchange rate of 1.11 dollars to the ruble), with repayment of principal and interest over a 20-year period through the export of 10-12 million tons of Tyumen oil annually to Japan.[18] At the second meeting of the Joint Committee (in June 1967) an experts' conference was established to investigate the project further. In the meantime, Japanese circles evinced a desire to limit involvement to construction of the pipeline and the wish to establish a shorter term for repayment. Although the West Siberian oil scheme was apparently shelved at the third session of the Joint Committee, it has remained a prime target of Soviet negotiators. In October 1971, V. Spandarian, a member of the USSR State Planning Committee, attempted to rekindle Japanese interest by stating:

Japanese business circles are devoting special attention to prospects for cooperation with Soviet organizations in the construction of a petroleum pipeline that would ensure the transportation of Tyumen petroleum to the Far East and its export to Japan. The interest of Japan's business circles in this problem is explained not only by the enormous importance of petroleum to the Japanese economy but also by concern over the dominance of foreign oil monopolies over the Japanese market.[19]

The measures agreed upon at the February 1972 session of the Joint Committee indicate progress, but they still leave many issues subject to further negotiation.

Another matter which has been under discussion since 1966 is Japanese participation in the exploitation of natural gas resources in North Sakhalin. The talks have been between the Marubeni-Iida and Teikoku Oil group on the Japanese side and representatives of the USSR Ministry of the Gas Industry on the Soviet side. The initial proposal was for construction of a 1,000-kilometer pipeline between Okha and Krilon, with the capacity to supply Japan with 2-2.4 billion cubic meters of natural gas annually. Five rounds of negotiation failed to bring agreement on price or on the target date for commencement of gas supply. In November 1967, the Teikoku group announced that it had decided to shelve the negotiations due to these uncertainties.[20] Nevertheless, at the third session of the Joint Committee, in December 1968, the Japanese announced establishment of an expert committee on North Sakhalin natural gas, and there was discussion of a plan to bring the gas directly to Hokkaido.[21]

Since 1968 nothing further has been resolved concerning the North Sakhalin project. The USSR has attempted to shift Japanese attention to the exploitation of gas supplies in the Yakutskaia Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. The latter would involve construction of a 2,000-kilometer line from Yakutsk to either Okha on Sakhalin or to Khabarovsk, either of which would reputedly provide Japan 10 billion cubic meters of gas annually. In February 1970, Soviet Premier A. N. Kosygin reportedly entered the picture by downplaying the reserves of North Sakhalin and urging the Japanese to consider participation in exploitation of the Yakut depos-

[18] See *Mainichi Shimbun*, March 13, 1966, and *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, March 23, 1966.

[19] *Pravda*, Oct. 20, 1971.

[20] *Nihon Kogyo Shimbun*, Nov. 25, 1967. During a January 1968 visit to Japan, N. K. Baibakov, Chairman of the Soviet Gosplan (State Planning Committee), noted that the Japanese had terminated negotiations on North Sakhalin just before they were concluded, and he also noted the growing interest in Indonesia as an investment alternative among Japanese. See *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, Jan. 19, 1968, and *Nikkan Kogyo Shimbun* (Tokyo), Jan. 17, 1968.

[21] *Mainichi Shimbun*, Dec. 12, 1968.

THE SOVIET SALES PITCH

The Soviet Union is consistently carrying out a policy of the accelerated development of the productive forces of the country's eastern regions, in particular the economic potential of the Far East. The development of the enormous fuel, power and raw-material wealth and the industrial and agricultural resources of these vast areas of the Soviet Union is of serious national-economic importance. At the same time, this can facilitate the development of trade with the countries adjacent to the Pacific basin, including our neighbor Japan.

The most farsighted representatives of Japanese business circles have long appreciated the possibilities that will open up for Japan in connection with the successful development of the economy of the USSR's eastern regions both from the standpoint of obtaining large orders for the delivery of Japanese equipment, machinery and industrial materials and from the standpoint of the expansion of purchases in the USSR of types of raw materials and fuel for which Japan has a great need.

—V. Spandarian, member of the USSR State Planning Commission, in *Pravda* (Moscow), Oct. 20, 1971.

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its.[22]. But the Japanese side has continued to balk at this idea, particularly concentrating its criticism on differences in quality standards. Recently, as noted above, the Soviet emphasis has centered on West Siberia.[23]

Another early proposal was the Japanese suggestion to participate in development of the Udokan Copper Mine, some 600 kilometers northeast of Chita. The Japanese envisaged a contribution of some 100 million rubles ($111 million) toward an estimated development cost of 400 million rubles.[24] The Soviet side countered with the proposal that Japan provide 800 million rubles toward an estimated development cost of 1.2-1.5 billion rubles. A joint experts' conference was scheduled but was never held. Of lesser scope were projects in the exploitation of coal and iron ore deposits in the Yakutskaia ASSR. The Japanese side has manifested an interest in coking coal, and the matter continues to be discussed by a Japanese-Soviet Raw Material Coal Expert Committee.[25]

A final matter—related to the Wrangel Bay port development—is the so-called NS Project (the initials are from the surnames of K. Nanba, President of Oji Paper Co., Ltd., and V. N. Sushkov, Chief of the Main Administration for Import of Machinery from Capitalist Countries, USSR Ministry of Foreign Trade) for the manufacture and export to Japan of pulpwood and chips from broadleaf trees of the Soviet Far East. At the December 1968 session of the Joint Committee, an expert committee was established to pursue negotiations on this project.[26] Although agreement was reached in December 1970 for Japanese export of 45 million dollars worth of equipment on a credit basis of six years and six percent (to be paid by shipment of 8.05 million tons of industrial chips), the deal has apparently not been finalized.

[22] See footnote 12 above. In a commentary of Sept. 24, 1971, *Asahi Shimbun* (Tokyo) suggested that North Sakhalin natural gas exploitation had been a Soviet decoy. It was noted that Soviet gas industry officials broached development of Yakut natural gas with Mr. S. Nagano during the December 1968 Joint Committee meetings.

[23] In September 1971, USSR Foreign Trade Minister Patolichev told interests in Tokyo that the North Sakhalin project was not economically feasible. He also noted that the Yakut gas project was a long-term matter and suggested that priority be placed on the Tyumen oil pipeline.

[24] The initiative for this project seems to have come from the Japanese side. See *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, March 23 and 24, 1966.

[25] *Nikkan Kogyo Shimbun*, Dec. 9, 1970. This account noted that a Japanese technical inspection team had visited some Yakut coal mines during August 1971.

[26] *Mainichi Shimbun*, Dec. 12, 1968.

THE JAPANESE INTEREST

For our country, the economic significance of the development of the Tyumen Oil Fields is extremely great. This will make it possible to diversify sources of oil imports and secure low-sulphur crude oil, which is indispensable to cope with pollution problems. In addition, it will be possible to export machines for development use, including steel tube for pipelines and related materials. With this as pump priming, it will also become easy for the pending development of coal, natural gas, and other resources to be put on the right track.

—Unsigned commentary in *Sankei Shimbun* (Tokyo), Feb. 25, 1972.

Although there is still much uncertainty about future joint projects, the impact of the agreements to date on trade volume has been impressive. In the four years since the KS formula was established, trade between the two countries has almost equaled the total for the decade preceding 1968, and the expansion is expected to continue through at least 1975. Prior to the KS production-sharing formula, two forms of commercial relations had characterized Japanese-Soviet trade: (1) transactions between individual Soviet public corporations on the one hand and individual Japanese trading firms on the other, and (2) coastal trade between individual Soviet cooperative associations and operators of smaller Japanese enterprises located on the coast of the Sea of Japan. Obviously, the KS formula has produced a new large-scale pattern of trade based on Japanese-Soviet cooperation in Siberian development. Whereas most Japanese-Soviet trade in the past had been with European Russia—with the exception of some timber and coal—the trade resulting from Siberian and Far Eastern development is bound to predominate in the bilateral trade of the future. Clearly, the development projects currently under study—with their gigantic scale and enormous requirements for machinery and credit—provide conditions which might result in rapid expansion of bilateral trade.

On the other hand, there are certain factors which clearly inhibit a rapid expansion of this cooperative relationship. The Soviet Union has high expectations concerning the scale of development of its eastern regions. However, the total amount of investment required and the amount of capital and material expected from Japan are beyond the invest-

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ment and financing capacity of the private Japanese enterprises concerned. This was demonstrated in the case of the Udokan Copper Mine project, where the Japanese anticipated an investment of 100 million rubles in contrast to Soviet hopes for Japanese investments of 800 million rubles. Furthermore, the envisaged projects require dispersion of capital over wide geographical areas. Considerable investment in roads, power transmission and other aspects of the economic infrastructure is also needed, and is complicated by extreme cold in many of the regions in question. As a result, capital efficiency is bound to be low, and the return of capital slow. The current Soviet emphasis on West Siberia within its eastern program also acts to dampen Japanese enthusiasm.

Areas of Friction

The most troublesome subject currently under negotiation is the Soviet effort to have Japanese firms extend credit on a "bank-loan basis."[27] Under this system the Soviet Union has a currently outstanding debt of $300 million to Italy (with a 10-percent deposit and payment of the remaining 90 percent over 10 years at six percent); $345 million to West Germany (12 years at six percent); and $800 million to France.[28] In contrast to such relatively low-cost, long-term arrangements, the Japanese firms would prefer to extend credit to the Soviet Union under the suppliers' credit system," which would set a maximum repayment period of five years and no grace period.

The Japanese are sensitive to the Soviet demands for credit for a number of other reasons. They argue that Japanese-Soviet trade has consistently exceeded negotiated levels and has shown a consistent excess of Soviet exports over imports, *i.e.*, has represented an implicit Japanese extension of credit. Secondly, Japan suffers from a persistent capital shortage in its rapidly growing economy, and while Japan does export capital to less-developed countries, it sees no need to do so in great quantities in the case of the advanced Soviet industrial economy. Furthermore, while Japan does have a favorable balance of international payments, it does not have a reserve capacity to grant credit. As it is, Japanese firms have borrowed large amounts of money from Western countries on 3-to-5-year terms at 9 percent interest. Service on this debt totals some $500 million annually. Hence, there is little inclination to offer Soviet agencies more lenient terms. Finally, it is impossible for the city-bank system of Japan to loan money on the conditions requested by the USSR. Thus it would be necessary for the Export and Import Bank of Japan to provide the funds should a transfer to the bank-loan approach be agreed upon.

Another source of disagreement in negotiations on Japanese-Soviet cooperation in Siberian development is the matter of pricing. The Soviet side has proposed that trade be carried on at international prices. The Japanese wish to adopt a new production-sharing system under which jointly-developed Siberian raw material resources would be imported to Japan at prices sufficiently below world market prices to reimburse the Japanese developer for his development costs (investment, depreciation, and interest) as well as to provide a small margin of profit to the developer when measured against the cost of alternative sources of these materials.

Cooperation in Siberian development is also clouded by ambiguous technical and economic information. Numerous questions remain to be resolved. For example, if the Soviet Union is to export coal and ores to Japan, cargo-handling and land-transport capacity must be provided for an annual movement of some 2 million tons of these commodities. Likewise, research has not been completed on the comparative cost of transport of Soviet natural gas by pipeline or by LNG (liquified natural gas) tankers; nor do the Japanese know in what year supply would begin. There are also considerable problems involved in the industrial application of a large volume of natural gas: *e.g.*, is it profitable to operate on this basis? How much oil, natural gas, or other resources can be reliably counted on and for how long? Even if all projects could be profitably operated at the time of construction, would they

[27] Officials of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Trade and of the Soviet Foreign Trade Bank visited Japan early in April 1971, seeking long-term, low-interest bank loans with the participation of Japan's Export-Import Bank and the city banks. Their failure to get a positive response may have been an important factor in postponement of the fifth session of the Joint Committee.

[28] Soviet attempts to pressure Japanese business and government officials into competing with Western Europe in credit terms is evidenced by an article by Yurii Khukov in *Pravda*, Dec. 5, 1970: "Japanese with whom we spoke often told us that they have been reading with great interest reports on the USSR's far-reaching, comprehensive agreements with France, Italy, Britain, and the Federal Republic of Germany, based on the extension of long-term loans, especially those by which the country interested in receiving a particular type of Soviet item furnishes the equipment for building plants and then receives their output in payment for this equipment."

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remain profitable when the FOB price of imported raw materials from the Soviet Union rises markedly with a possible rise in international prices?

Another obstacle is the matter of the development-cooperation formula to be applied. The Japanese are inclined to favor the formula they use in relations with developing countries—*i.e.*, cooperation is extended on the spot, with Japanese participation in every phase of development from pre-investment investigation right through implementation of the integrated project. The Soviets reject this method and prefer to handle their own preinvestment surveys and project management. In short, the problem of cooperation between two radically different economic systems is also a major obstacle at present.

In addition, Soviet priorities in the development of the eastern regions do not necessarily mesh with Japanese priorities. This was seen in the case of the North Sakhalin and Yakut natural gas negotiations, and it is also implicit in the emphasis which the USSR is placing on development of West Siberia, with a population of better than 12 million people. East Siberia and the Far East combined only number some 13 million people, and these regions lack attractiveness as a market today.

Prospects for Siberian Cooperation

In light of such obstacles to cooperation, what indeed is the prospect for further Japanese-Soviet cooperation in the development of the Soviet eastern regions? Clearly both sides have disagreed on calculations and expectations, thus hindering coordinated planning for development projects. The Soviets are vexed by the cautious or negative attitude of the Japanese, yet they also recognize Japan's usefulness to Soviet development and continue to seek fruitful economic relations with it. Japan is aware that construction of the infrastructure of the Siberian and Far Eastern regions will require a long time and a large-scale investment of capital and manpower. To Japan, Siberia may be more significant in the 1980's than in the current decade. She is also afraid that once industrial complexes are completed, it will be difficult for Japanese enterprise to reap profits under the production-sharing formula and that the developed resources will largely go for the use of the Soviet side. Therefore, Japanese interests and the Japanese government have moved cautiously and gradually toward cooperating in Siberian development. Stimulated by the competitive extension of bank loans to the USSR by members of the European Economic Community (virtually ignoring the COCOM [29] list and even extending government guarantees), Japan can be expected to extend increasing amounts of credit for Siberian development.

For the future, one can anticipate slow, steady progress in Japanese-Soviet cooperation despite the many roadblocks. Both sides recognize the concrete economic advantages of joint ventures and also appear to recognize the advantages of political and military tolerance. This comes in part as a result of the move toward some sort of rapprochement between the United States and the People's Republic of China. This initiative has destabilized the quadripolar balance among the USSR, the US, the PRC, and Japan. Thus, the Soviet Union and Japan may be expected to establish closer ties in the future to improve their respective bargaining positions vis-à-vis China and the United States. Of course, the Soviet Union continues to be cautious and sensitive about the possible diversion of Japanese economic growth into military might, though Moscow attaches greater importance to the potential benefits of utilizing Japanese capital and technology for Siberian and Far Eastern development. Japanese claims to four islands to the south of the Kuriles (including Habomai and Shikotan) occupied by the Soviet Union as a result of World War II and Tokyo's fears of the powerful Soviet naval and air presence in the Sea of Japan and other areas contiguous to Japan are also likely to hinder cooperation. Furthermore, Japan can hardly be expected to promote its ties with the USSR at the expense of weakening its established, economically-justified ties with the United States or at the expense of a possible detente with the PRC. One can only predict that Japanese-Soviet cooperation in Siberian development will undergo subtle changes in the coming years in response to a fluid political, military and economic milieu.

[29] Coordinating Committee for Export to the Communist Area—a 15-nation body established in 1949 with headquarters in Paris to restrict export of strategic goods to the Communist bloc. In 1957, a number of items were removed from this strategic embargo.

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Moscow and South Asia

By William J. Barnds

The Indian subcontinent has over the years presented the Soviet Union with a unique combination of opportunities and dilemmas, and this condition persists—albeit in a dramatically different context—despite the Indo-Soviet treaty and the division of Pakistan as a result of the third Indo-Pakistani war. However, the nature of the barriers to further Soviet gains in the area has changed substantially. The barriers, at least for a time, will stem more from the inherent limitations confronting any external power and possible Soviet reluctance to assume the heavy burden of supporting countries as large as India and as poor as Bangla Desh than from a Soviet desire to balance India and Pakistan or the influence of other major powers.

These represent important changes. For many years, the centrality of the deeply-rooted antagonism between Hindus and Muslims in the political life of the subcontinent prevented Moscow from developing firm ties with India and Pakistan simultaneously, but the recent defeat of Pakistan and the emergence of an independent Bangla Desh friendly to India have reduced, though they have not eliminated, this obstacle. Moreover, the alienation of the United States from an India now dominant within the subcontinent greatly diminishes the competition facing the Soviet Union. Until the United States began its effort to reduce its Asian involvements while establishing a new relationship with China, South Asia was a key area in the postwar great-power struggle for influence. Although for the USSR the area is of less direct importance than Europe or East Asia, Moscow could hardly enjoy the coveted status of a global power without having a strong position in the lands stretching from the Eastern Mediterranean through the Indian subcontinent. Neither Western nor Chinese influence in the subcontinent ever posed a critical threat to the USSR, but the fears as well as the aspirations of Soviet leaders made it impossible for them to view any such influence with equanimity. India and Pakistan sought to prevent *any* outside power from acquiring a dominant position and were prime examples of how countries dependent on outside help were able, by virtue of skillful leadership, to benefit from, as well as be buffeted by, great-power rivalries.

Soviet activism in the subcontinent, of course, is a relatively recent development, dating from 1955 in India and 1965 in Pakistan. Prior to the mid-1950's, the Soviet Union was conspicuous by its absence from the South Asian scene. British control of India until 1947, Soviet weakness before World War II, and Stalin's disdain of bourgeois-nationalist governments in the early postwar years all contributed to this lack of involvement. But Nikita Khrushchev and his successors assigned a higher priority to, and adopted a less doctrinaire outlook and policy toward, the subcontinent than Stalin. As a result, they made extensive gains.

The cornerstone of the Soviet Union's South Asian policy since 1955 has been the forging of a strong and broadly-based relationship with India as the key power in the region. Initially, the Soviet effort was designed principally to counter US efforts in the Middle East and South Asia; more recently, its main aim has been to counter China. Moscow-New Delhi relations have not been free of strain. Soviet links to the Communist Party of India (CPI), Soviet ties to Peking in the early years of the Sino-Indian dispute, and Soviet aid to Pakistan in the late 1960's periodically created problems. But the USSR's willingness to deal with such issues to India's satisfaction and New Delhi's determination to support Soviet foreign policy whenever it could —and to speak softly when it could not—have

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enabled the two governments to surmount their difficulties. Moreover, Soviet attempts to establish a position in India's smaller neighbors—Afghanistan, Ceylon, and Nepal—have been carried out in a manner that New Delhi has regarded as compatible with its basic interests.

Moscow's achievements are obviously a source of satisfaction to the Soviet leaders, who now see opportunities for further advances as a result of the upheaval in East Bengal, growing pressures for radical change throughout the subcontinent, and declining US interest and involvement in the area. However, if Moscow is to take advantage of these opportunities, it must assume new responsibilities and burdens in a turbulent area at a moment of increasing fluidity in world politics. In the past, Moscow has at times moved boldly forward but has at other times given priority to consolidating its gains —thus suggesting its full awareness of the obstacles that it confronts and its uncertainty of the benefits that might flow from a more ambitious policy. Whatever course the USSR pursues in the period just ahead, then, will doubtless reflect not only its current appraisal of the situation in Asia generally and the subcontinent specifically, but also the assets and liabilities it has acquired over the years of its involvement in the affairs of the South Asian region.

The Soviets on the Sidelines

Soviet activities during the past 15 years—trade and aid agreements, political initiatives, arms deliveries, and cultural programs—have afforded the USSR a significant position on the subcontinent, but one ought to recognize that the USSR's emergence as a major power in the area came only after many years of Soviet inactivity there. While Soviet absence from the South Asian scene was a consequence of certain circumstances which are unlikely to recur, tne legacy of that period affected the relationship that developed between the USSR and the nations of the subcontinent, and to a degree it continues to condition the attitude of key leaders even today. For this reason, a brief examination of the record of those years of noninvolvement is essential.

From the days of the Bolshevik Revolution until after World War II, the men who ruled Russia, preoccupied with more pressing problems and handicapped by their lack of knowledge of the subcontinent, paid little heed to the area. Lenin's theory of imperialism assured them that it was European control of the colonial world that enabled the capitalist states to delay the inevitable socialist upheavals, and that colonial revolutions would undermine imperialist strength. But faced with British control of India and lacking national power to project into the area, the Soviet state could do little. Marxism provided certain insights into social forces at work in Asia; however, it also produced distortions in Soviet perspective, especially in regard to the strength of Asian nationalism. Moreover, debates in Moscow about whether to support or oppose the Indian nationalist movement would remain abstract theoretical affairs until a Communist party was established in the colony. Accordingly, Moscow gave top priority to the arduous task of party building during the 1920's and 1930's. Yet progress was slow and uneven, and as late as 1939 the CPI had only about 5,000 members.[1]

Soviet interest in South Asia did increase temporarily during the Soviet-German negotiations concerning spheres of influence after the signing of the 1939 Nazi-Soviet pact.[2] But the negotiations came to naught because of the German attack on Russia, and Moscow's preoccupation with survival during World War II left it with little concern about the subcontinent. The CPI's support of the Allied war effort after Germany invaded the USSR, it is true, led the British Indian government to legalize the party, which also benefited from the proscription of the Congress party and the imprisonment of its leaders for their nationalist activities. By 1946, CPI membership had grown to more than 50,000, and the party had won control of many mass organizations. However, its subordination of nationalistic considerations had alienated Congress leaders.

The story of Soviet and CPI policies and behavior toward the newly independent Indian government is a dismal one from the Soviet viewpoint, for efforts

[1] The development of Indian communism and the relations between Moscow and the CPI are traced in Gene D. Overstreet and Marshall Windmiller, *Communism in India*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1959.

[2] The negotiations dealt primarily with the future of Eastern Europe, but the German draft agreement contained a clause stating that the USSR declared "that its territorial aspirations center . . . in the direction of the Indian Ocean." Soviet leaders demanded more, including a provision "that the area south of Batum and Baku in the general direction of the Persian Gulf is recognized as the center of the aspirations of the Soviet Union." *Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-1941: Documents from the Archives of the German Foreign Office*, Washington, D.C., Department of State, 1948, p. 257. The postwar discovery of such documents probably led some Western officials to view Soviet aspirations as markedly similar to those of the Tsars.

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to sweep aside the Nehru government by sparking revolutionary upheavals brought disaster to the CPI and frustration to Moscow. Soviet and CPI leaders alike were initially confused about how to interpret and react to the historic changes attendant upon the British departure. This uncertainty, combined with the onset of the Cold War, caused both groups to follow an erratic course, though one which became increasingly radical. The position of radicals within the CPI was strengthened by Moscow's adoption of a more militant policy toward non-Communist states and forces in 1947. Soviet leaders foresaw an intensifying global conflict, with the world divided into two camps. Stalin was unable to accept the fact that Asian countries were winning independence through nationalist parties with bourgeois leaders. To him, the British officers in the new Indian and Pakistani armed forces, the British businessmen operating in both countries, and the membership of the two nations in the British Commonwealth made it obvious that London was merely altering rather than abandoning its control.

In this atmosphere of an intensifying Cold War and sharp Soviet antagonism toward Asian nationalists, the CPI adopted a policy of orthodox urban revolution in February 1948. The party succeeded in fostering widespread labor unrest and violence, but it lacked the organization and resources for revolution against a determined government. However, neither Moscow nor the CPI was ready to admit failure. A group within the CPI had been leading an agrarian revolt in the Telengana area of Hyderabad, where local conditions had enabled the revolutionaries to seize many villages. These elements persuaded the CPI to adopt a Maoist strategy of agrarian revolution against large landlords (but not wealthy peasants) as one suited to Indian conditions.[3] In January 1950, an article in the official Cominform journal approved such a shift in strategy by endorsing the claims of the Chinese Communists that their experience provided an example for other Asian parties.[4]

The resort to guerrilla operations proved a disaster, for such a strategy was little better attuned to general Indian conditions than was the earlier orthodox strategy. New Delhi contained and then suppressed the revolt. The party, confused and disorganized, was unable to pursue any policy effectively, and the moderates who had argued against such adventurism slowly began to work their way back into leading positions.

Two conclusions emerge from this period. First, both Moscow and the CPI badly misjudged conditions and basic power relationships in India. They gravely overestimated the party's strength and the popular appeal of revolution in the years 1948-51, and they underestimated the government's capability to suppress such violence. Adventurism cost the CPI dearly—membership declined from about 90,000 in 1948 to 20,000-30,000 in 1951. Indian nationalists were further alienated. Indeed, the government concluded that the party was a competitor for power as well as a threat to the country and that henceforth it must be repressed or neutralized, or both—strategies that New Delhi is still pursuing even today.

Second, Soviet leaders saw that the CPI was a weak reed upon which to rely if they wanted to influence events in South Asia. Part of the CPI's problem was sporadic and ineffectual Soviet guidance, but perfect guidance would not have overcome its basic weaknesses—the concentration of its strength in just a few states (none of them in the Hindi-speaking heartland), its reliance on caste and linguistic grievances in the absence of any nationalist appeal, and the endemic personal and ideological factionalism in its ranks. (The situation in Pakistan was even worse, for the party was virtually nonexistent in the West and weak and disorganized in the East.) Thirty-five years had been devoted to the building of a party, yet this endeavor had yielded little in the way of results. Hence, a completely new strategy was necessary if the future was to be other than a dreary replay of the past.

From Animosity to Friendship

Soviet realization of this fact coincided roughly with a major shift in the focus of the Cold War struggle. With the situations in Europe and East Asia more or less stalemated, the main locus of contention moved to the vast arc of nations along the southern periphery of the USSR and China. The United States began establishing military, political, and economic positions as British and French power receded. Stalin's successors, for their part, were quick to seize the opportunities available to mini-

[3] Since the Communist party in this part of India was under the control of wealthy peasants of the dominant Kamma caste, it found Maoist acceptance of wealthy peasants particularly attractive.

[4] "Mighty Advance of the National Liberation Movement in the Colonial and Dependent Countries," *For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy!* (Bucharest), Jan. 27, 1950, p. 1.

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mize the danger that a successful US effort would represent.[5]

The new Soviet leaders, particularly Khrushchev, recognized the importance of the tensions between many Asian states and the West. They understood that such countries as India and Egypt, far from being "lackeys of the imperialists," were strongly opposed to Western policy in the area. Neutralism or nonalignment not only was genuine but could be usefully exploited. Moreover, by supporting one side in the quarrels between various Asian nations—the Arab states and Israel, India and Pakistan, Pakistan and Afghanistan—the USSR could help keep neutralism alive, increase the problems facing the West, and establish a position of its own in the region. Such a course meant abandoning for a time any hope of a role in the countries opposed, but a partial position was preferable to none at all.

Furthermore, by the mid-1950's the Soviet economy was capable of providing arms and industrial equipment for Asian countries. Military equipment that was becoming obsolescent for Soviet needs could be supplied at limited cost. Economic aid was more of a sacrifice. However, the Soviet economy was growing rapidly, and commitments would not need to be redeemed by deliveries for several years.

It is easy to overlook the ideological element in Soviet policy, for Soviet moves were clearly aimed at advancing the USSR's national interests and were dependent upon the conventional tools of contemporary statecraft—military and economic assistance and diplomatic support. Nonetheless, such an element was present. Soviet leaders, convinced that Asia's bourgeois-nationalist rulers would be unable to promote social reforms and economic development by evolutionary means, believed that the nationalist tides had a revolutionary potential. According to Soviet calculations, the growing difficulties that these rulers would experience in trying to carry out nationalist objectives, combined with the attractiveness of the Soviet model and with increased Soviet influence, would prompt the rulers to become more radical and, ultimately, to choose the socialist (Communist) path.

This view, however, was probably not universally accepted in Moscow. In all likelihood, Communist officials with long memories (and a more orthodox cast of mind) were skeptical about the new policy, since Asian nationalist leaders had turned on their Communist "supporters" in years past. But advocates of this policy could argue that world conditions were different: the Soviet bloc was stronger, and local nationalists would be wary of risking Soviet displeasure. Finally, the alternatives were unattractive. Local Communist parties had been unable to seize power through revolutionary struggle, and Soviet hostility toward nationalist regimes might enable the United States to become firmly entrenched in the area. National interest and a more sophisticated ideological approach both called for a more flexible policy.

New Delhi, on its side, was waxing increasingly receptive to possible Soviet overtures. Indian foreign policy had suffered a defeat with the formation of the US-Pakistan alliance, and Soviet support would serve as a warning to Pakistan that India also had a powerful friend—and, as events demonstrated, one willing to back India on the crucial Kashmir issue. Moreover, in 1955 the Congress party had adopted a program calling for a "socialist pattern of society" and a considerable expansion of the public sector of the economy; the Second Five-Year Plan drawn up to implement this program required more than $1 billion in foreign aid. But some Western donors—particularly the United States—were not inclined to help to build state-owned industrial establishments. Hence, New Delhi found itself in need of alternate sources of financing for such projects. India's move to the left was hardly designed to please the USSR;

A BASIS FOR COOPERATION

The peoples of India and the USSR do not have the same state systems. They have different social-political systems. But the Soviet and Indian peoples have much in common; they are peace-loving peoples. Throughout the Soviet Union and the Republic of India, factories and plants are being constructed, dams are being erected, electric power stations are being built, and barren deserts are being transformed into fertile lands. Peace is essential if construction is to continue. Our common desire is to live in peace and friendship with all peoples. Both our countries are actively fighting to preserve and strengthen peace and are advocating the settlement of disputed international issues by peaceful means, through negotiation. This unites the Soviet and Indian peoples.

—*Pravda* (Moscow), June 7, 1955, on the occasion of Jawaharlal Nehru's visit to the USSR.

[5] Stalin himself was becoming aware of the need for a less hostile approach in his last year or two, but Asian countries were more receptive to a friendlier attitude on the part of the new leaders than they would have been to a similar change in policy by Stalin.

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nevertheless, this move probably made it easier for Communists skeptical about aid to non-Communist governments to accept Moscow's new policy.

India also believed that the Soviet Union's post-Stalin policies reduced the danger of war. The attention and praise that Moscow was beginning to bestow on Indian leaders persuaded New Delhi that its prospects for playing a moderating and mediating role between East and West were increasing. Jawaharlal Nehru hoped that more contacts between the USSR and countries like India would indirectly foster liberalization within the Soviet bloc and would gradually turn the CPI into a more normal political party.

Events moved quickly in this atmosphere. In February 1955, the USSR extended a $112-million loan to New Delhi for the construction of a one-million-ton-capacity steel mill. Symbolic of developing Indo-Soviet cooperation was the exchange of numerous cultural, trade, agricultural, industrial, and parliamentary delegations. Soviet books and periodicals were made available at low prices in India, and Soviet radio broadcasts (in a variety of Indian languages) were stepped up.

Equally spectacular were the visits of Nehru to the USSR and of Khrushchev and Bulganin to India. Nehru traveled extensively in the Soviet Union in mid-1955 and became the first non-Communist leader to address the Soviet people directly. Still more dramatic, however, was the Khrushchev-Bulganin tour of India (plus Burma and Afghanistan) in November and December, 1955. The warm response of the Soviet leaders to the tremendous crowds disarmed even skeptical Indians: these men clearly were not from the Stalinist mold. Indian embarrassment over Khrushchev's extravagant denunciations of Britain and America was temporary; moreover, in New Delhi's eyes Soviet support on the Goa and Kashmir disputes more than offset his breach of decorum. CPI leaders, bitter at the praise showered on the Congress leaders, had to content themselves with the hope that they could ultimately turn the increased respectability of communism to their own advantage.

In line with evolving Soviet policy, the CPI gradually revised its attitude toward the Nehru government, and the party shifted from advocacy of armed struggle toward a concept of "constitutional communism." This difficult change was accompanied by fierce disputes involving both ideological convictions and personal struggles for power. The key issues were whether the government was progressive or reactionary and whether the needs of international communism should take precedence over local requirements. Giving Soviet requirements priority would force the party to uphold Nehru's opposition to US foreign policy and thus would render challenge of the Congress party within India harder. The CPI tried for a time to avoid a clear choice. Ajoy Ghosh, the CPI Secretary General, upon returning from a trip to Moscow in December 1954, said: "The internal policy of the Nehru Government does not suit the interest of the masses, while the foreign policy does."[6] But Khrushchev's revelation of Stalin's crimes and the Soviet destalinization campaign during 1956 demoralized the CPI. Soviet acceptance of Nehru's "socialist pattern of society" as a progressive policy had a further debilitating effect. Battered and confused, the CPI felt it had no choice but to accept the favorable Soviet judgment of Nehru.

The Moscow-New Delhi relationship, to be sure, was not entirely devoid of tension. Events in Eastern Europe in 1956, particularly Soviet suppression of the Hungarian revolution, dismayed Indians. While India, alone among the nonaligned states, voted with the Soviet-bloc countries in the United Nations against a resolution calling for the removal of Soviet forces from Hungary and for elections there under UN supervision (in order to avoid establishing a dangerous precedent for the handling of the Kashmir dispute), Nehru soon became more critical, though not until the issue had been settled by Soviet troops. In turn, Indian attempts to promote liberalization within the Soviet bloc by urging a generous policy toward Tito annoyed the Soviets. Moreover, in 1958 Nehru wrote an article attacking political dogmatism in general and communism in particular.[7] This article was apparently designed to assert the validity of India's moderate course at a time when some Indians were impressed by the economic progress of the USSR and the People's Republic of China. However, Moscow felt called upon to denounce Nehru's critique, and Nehru then let the subject drop quietly.[8] Nonetheless, such matters proved but temporary irritants and did not destroy the new links.

Moscow's endeavors to establish a position in India were relatively easy during the years of Sino-

[6] "Ajoy Ghosh Answers Questions on Communist Policies," *New Age* (New Delhi), Vol. 2, Dec. 12, 1954.

[7] Jawaharlal Nehru, "The Basic Approach," *AICC Economic Review* (New Delhi), Vol. 10, Nos. 8-9, Aug. 15, 1958, pp. 3-6.

[8] P. Yudin, "Can We Accept Pandit Nehru's Approach?," *World Marxist Review* (Toronto and London), Vol. 1, No. 4, December 1958, pp. 42-54. (This publication is the English-language edition of *Problems of Peace and Socialism*—Prague.)

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Indian friendship and US-Indian estrangement, but by the late 1950's both of these conditions were changing. A more forthcoming US policy toward India in itself posed a problem for the USSR, since it meant that the Soviets would have to expend greater effort in order to hold on to and enhance their position; the outbreak of the Sino-Indian border dispute in 1959 brought with it major dangers for Moscow.[9] India, if faced with a united Communist stand, might abandon its nonaligned policy and turn to the West for support. In addition, the USSR's automatic backing of its Chinese ally might raise serious doubts in other neutralist countries about the dependability of Soviet support of them. Yet any wavering in Moscow's commitment to its socialist ally could only exacerbate Sino-Soviet relations, already undergoing considerable strain over such basic issues as the locus of authority in the Communist movement and the appropriateness of Khrushchev's policy of "peaceful coexistence."

Whatever its doubts, the USSR adopted a neutral policy, thus refusing for the first time to take the side of a Communist state in a quarrel with a bourgeois government. The evenhandedness of its call for a settlement raised Indian hopes of active support, which materialized over the next few years in the form of increased economic aid and military aircraft. In Indian eyes, Moscow's actions demonstrated the many advantages of the Soviet tie: it forced the West to compete with the USSR; it increased India's military strength; it served as a warning to China; and it kept India from having to reach an accommodation with Pakistan in order to face China.

As long as the Soviet leaders hoped to avoid a complete break with China, their policy toward India was necessarily ambivalent. This ambivalence became especially clear after Soviet attempts to promote a Sino-Indian settlement failed in April 1960 and border clashes of growing frequency and scope finally culminated in war late in 1962. China, in the wake of its initial victories, proposed an armistice on terms unacceptable to India. New Delhi, counting on continued Soviet support, was badly shaken when Moscow, then deeply embroiled in the Cuban missile crisis, endorsed the Chinese position.[10] Although Moscow faltered only briefly and quickly sided with India once the Chinese renewed their attack, the USSR's vacillation contrasted sharply with the West's prompt extension of aid to India.

With the Chinese threat the overwhelming preoccupation of Indians, Nehru was pressed hard to abandon Moscow in favor of the West. His unwillingness to cast India's lot completely with the West represented a shrewd assessment on his part that Indian and Western interests still diverged and that their policies would again come into conflict. Events quickly bore out his judgment, for the West urged Nehru to negotiate (*i.e.,* compromise) with Pakistan on the Kashmir dispute. Once this issue came to the fore, the value of the link to Moscow became apparent to more Indians. Moscow's wavering during India's moment of peril was not forgotten, but Indians demonstrated greater understanding of the Soviet dilemma in late 1962.

Toward a Balanced Policy

While the Soviet Union and India were weathering their rift, Pakistan was going through a crisis because of the West's provision of arms to India. Rawalpindi's delight at seeing India suffer the humiliation of having to turn to the West for help was offset by fear that India's new defense buildup would adversely affect the balance of power on the subcontinent and force Pakistan to face India without Western support. Hence, Pakistani policy now moved along several lines. Pakistan began to put direct pressure on India, especially along the cease-fire line in Kashmir. It also took steps to strengthen its links with China in view of their mutual hostility toward India—but without cutting its own links with the United States.[11] President Ayub was slower to cultivate the USSR, for in 1963 and 1964 it seemed unlikely that Pakistan could make headway with the Soviets and Chinese simultaneously. Moreover, the special US intelligence facilities at Peshawar, which were directed chiefly against the USSR, circumscribed Ayub's maneuverability vis-à-vis Moscow, though they constituted a potentially useful bargaining tool. By 1965, however, Ayub was in Moscow exploring the possibility of a new relationship.

[9] Peking's suppression of the Tibetan revolt in early 1959 severely strained Sino-Indian relations and brought many Chinese military units to the undemarcated border area. Although the USSR supported the Chinese move, Moscow was not directly critical of India.

[10] *Pravda,* Oct. 25, 1962, in *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (New York), Vol. 14, No. 43, Nov. 21, 1962, p. 17.

[11] Pakistan also re-entered the mainstream of Afro-Asian politics, a move which won it considerable domestic popularity and eventually widespread support in the United Nations during the 1971 Indo-Pakistan conflict.

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The Soviet response to Pakistan's overtures is best understood in the context of Moscow's more general effort to pursue a new strategy toward its southern neighbors. Soviet policy since the mid-1950's had given the USSR a position in the neutralist Arab states, Afghanistan, and India; but its continued attacks on the three CENTO countries—Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan—had failed to undermine their ties to the West and had prevented Moscow from making headway in any of them. But as the Cold War eased in the mid-1960's, their fear of the USSR declined, and their desire for a more independent stance grew. Thus, Moscow shifted from threats to enticements. The USSR extended aid to Turkey and Iran, and it seemed logical to Soviet leaders to direct their attentions to Pakistan as well. This judgment seemed strange to Western leaders, who were more and more frustrated by their vain attempts to maintain good relations with India and Pakistan simultaneously. Nevertheless, Moscow was ready to experiment with such a policy, even though it might require consolidation of past gains in India rather than efforts to make new advances there.

However, Pakistan's policy of forging links with Peking while pressuring India brought about an increasingly tense situation on the subcontinent in 1965 and finally compelled the USSR to make a difficult decision. Moscow, greatly concerned about China's expanding role in Pakistan, began to disengage itself from its previous partisan stance on local Indo-Pakistan quarrels. It adopted a neutral position during the Indo-Pakistani clash over the Rann of Kutch in April 1965. A more serious problem arose in August, when Pakistani infiltration of guerrillas into Kashmir led to a step-by-step escalation of fighting until the two countries' armies were locked in battle on the plains of the Punjab. On August 24, *Pravda* published a commentary which shunted aside the matter of responsibility and made clear Moscow's determination not to let its ties with India prevent it from improving its relations with Pakistan:

Strengthening the ties between the USSR and Pakistan must be regarded as a part of a general policy aimed at ensuring peace in Asia and throughout the world. We would like Soviet-Pakistani relations, like our traditional friendship with India, to be a stabilizing factor . . . in Asia and to contribute to the normalization of relations between Pakistan and India.[12]

[12] *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, Vol. 17, No. 34, Sept. 15, 1965, pp. 15-16.

Chinese policy immediately became a cause of grave concern. Peking on September 7 pledged full support for Pakistan and condemned India for "criminal aggression." On September 17, Peking accused India of intruding into Chinese territory from Sikkim and erecting fortifications in Chinese territory; it demanded that India pull back within three days or face "grave consequences." US and Soviet warnings against Chinese intervention prompted a furious retort from Peking that accused the two superpowers of collusion in their support of India and in their opposition to China.

China's stand created an agonizing dilemma for the USSR. If the West responded to a Chinese attack by coming to India's aid, Moscow would have to do the same or see its position in India undercut or even destroyed. On the other hand, such an action would greatly exacurbate Soviet problems with China. Hence, Soviet leaders gave top priority to the achievement of a cease-fire, and Moscow's policy

STRIKING A BALANCE

There is no doubt that the armed conflict in the region of Kashmir can benefit neither one side nor the other—neither India nor Pakistan. The present development of events in this area is only playing into the hands of those external forces striving to disunite and counterpose one to another the states that have freed themselves from the colonialist yoke. These forces have also tried several times in the past to use the Kashmir question in order to prevent the establishment of good-neighbor relations between India and Pakistan, striving to embroil them in conflict. Peace is necessary for the peoples of India and Pakistan in order to solve many complicated and important problems of the development of their states. . . .

The military conflict between India and Pakistan is causing serious concern in the Soviet Union, for whom the cause of preserving peace is always dear. This concern is intensified still more by the fact that the conflict is taking place in an area directly contiguous to the borders of the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union has favored and now favors the settling of disputed questions among sovereign states through negotiations and by peaceful means. Realizing all the complexities of the situation that has evolved in the Indo-Pakistani conflict, the Soviet people believe it is possible to find a solution to the disputed questions between India and Pakistan by peaceful means if the statesmen of both countries display realism, restraint, and an understanding of the grave consequences that the development of the armed conflict might have.

—TASS statement, Sept. 7, 1965.

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paralleled similar Western efforts in the United Nations. On September 7, Moscow issued a statement calling on both sides to halt military operations and carry out an immediate mutual withdrawal, offering its own good offices to help bring about these ends.[13]

By late September, the combination of external pressure and local military stalemate had induced the two countries to agree to a cease-fire. But the United Nations could only end the fighting; arranging troop withdrawals and a new *modus vivendi* was beyond it. The USSR then invited President Ayub and Prime Minister Shastri, Nehru's successor, to meet in Tashkent to negotiate a peace settlement. By November, it had secured the agreement of both men to come to the USSR early in 1966. *The Times* (London) caught the irony of the situation on January 3: "How strange and intolerable it would have been to Curzon that the affairs of the subcontinent he ruled should be taken to Tashkent to be settled under the patronage of a Russian."

With Kosygin taking an active role in the negotiations, India and Pakistan were able to work out, not a basic settlement of their differences, but a return to the *status quo ante.* Even this was a diplomatic triumph for the Soviet Union. As Edward Crankshaw commented,

Mr. Kosygin, whose ideology demands the fostering of chaos and disruption in non-Communist lands, finds himself doing his level best to calm down a Hindu under direct threat from China and a Muslim supposed to be on friendly terms with Peking, embroiled in a quarrel over the possession of the mountain playground of the late British Raj.

And, except for China, nobody minds.[14]

Furthermore, even though China branded the Tashkent meeting a joint U.S.-Soviet plot to help India, Peking did not attack Pakistan for attending. In fact, China commenced to supply arms as well as political support to Pakistan—one of the few Chinese policies that survived the Cultural Revolution.

The Soviet success at Tashkent, together with the United States' growing disenchantment with India and Pakistan and rising preoccupation with Vietnam,[15] offered the USSR new opportunities and a wider range of policy options on the subcontinent. Khrushchev's less flamboyant successors showed no inclination to abandon his policy of support for India. Indeed, arms shipments to India increased sharply, and Moscow agreed to provide a total of some $1 billion in economic aid for the 1966-71 Five-Year Plan. But the USSR also became more responsive to some of Pakistan's needs in order to ensure that Rawalpindi did not simply move from the American camp to the Chinese camp—hardly an improvement from the Soviet standpoint.

Pakistan's aims in reaching toward the Soviet Union were threefold: to keep Moscow neutral in Indo-Pakistani disputes; to obtain Soviet arms so as not to be dependent on any single source, whether Chinese or American; and to reduce Soviet arms deliveries to India.[16] (Pakistan's desire for more trade and economic aid was subsidiary, though Moscow's increasing forthcomingness on this score—particularly after Premier Aleksei Kosygin's visit to Pakistan in April 1968—was welcome.) Ayub had no success regarding Soviet arms for India: Moscow made clear that Indo-Soviet relations were none of Pakistan's business. However, the USSR did remain neutral in Indo-Pakistani disputes, and in 1966 and 1967 it did provide military vehicles and then helicopters to Pakistan.

Pakistan's announcement in May 1968 that the US lease on the important electronic-intelligence facilities in Peshawar would be allowed to expire in 1969 was a signal of bigger changes in the wind. In July, Rawalpindi scored a major success with the announcement of the first significant Soviet-Pakistani arms agreement.[17] Although New Delhi was bitter about Soviet willingness to enter into such an agreement, India's need to retain the goodwill of the Soviet Union caused it to mute its protests—at least publicly.

The Soviet decision to move toward a balanced policy on the subcontinent, while understandable in terms of the increasing complexity of international

[13] See *ibid.*, No. 36, Sept. 29, 1965, p. 12.

[14] *The Observer* (London), Jan. 10, 1966.

[15] It should be noted that rising Congressional opposition to funding arms races, as well as the Johnson administration's unhappiness with India and Pakistan, led the United States to terminate arms aid to both countries during the war. Economic aid was only temporarily suspended.

[16] Soviet-Pakistani relations are discussed more fully in Zubeida Hasan, "Pakistan's Relations with the USSR in the 1960's," *The World Today* (London), January 1969, pp. 26-35, and in S. P. Seth, "Russia's Role in Indo-Pakistan Politics," *Asian Survey* (Berkeley, Calif.), Vol. 9, No. 8, August 1969, pp. 616-24.

[17] The actual amount of arms provided before the outbreak of the 1971 Pakistani civil war was only $10 million, but in 1968 the Indians—and perhaps the Soviets—were uncertain what the ultimate size of the program would be. Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, "Communist States and Developing Countries: Aid and Trade in 1970," RECS-15, Sept. 22, 1971.

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politics in the area, was reinforced by Moscow's discouragement over trends within India (including those within the Indian Communist movement) and over India's growing dependence on the West.

Reappraisal of India

In the mid-1960's, India was undergoing its worst period since independence: inadequate monsoon rains brought on near-famine conditions in 1966-67, the Congress party did poorly in the 1967 national elections, and the future of the country appeared more uncertain than ever. Under such circumstances, India was a less attractive partner than Moscow had anticipated a decade earlier. Some observers thought that they detected not only Soviet frustration but also a fear that the nation might crumble. Adam Ulam remarked in 1968:

In analyzing Soviet policy toward India in recent years, one receives a strong impression that it is dictated by a fear lest the vulnerable fabric of Congress rule in India disintegrate under the impact of overwhelming domestic and foreign problems and lest a Communist-dominated left-wing regime emerge as heir ot the anarchy. . . . The neutralist government in India, unlikely to do any harm to the Soviet Union, though equally incapable of doing much good, is better than a leap in the dark.[18]

Furthermore, by the early 1960's Khrushchev's argument of the late 1950's that Soviet support would induce a strengthened India to move toward socialism at home and toward closer links with the USSR abroad had begun to be questioned by Soviet analysts, and their doubts had increased as the volume of Western aid to India enlarged and as the Congress party refrained from carrying out meaningful land reforms or curtailing its private sector. Was India drifting to the right domestically and into the Western camp internationally? One of many indications of concern was a 1964 *World Marxist Review* article by G. Adhikari, a leader of the CPI. Adhikari admitted that Indian Communists had been too sanguine in thinking that Soviet aid would push India to the left. He opined:

. . . the planning under the present government is leading to a growth of monopoly. . . . This creates the soil for the growth of reaction and for their attempt to subvert national policies—those of independent development and nonalignment.[19]

Similar misgivings were expressed periodically by Soviet commentators in a variety of journals.[20]

This concern mirrored a broader Soviet anxiety about trends in Asia and Africa generally. Soviet frustration at the complexities of Third World politics and dissatisfaction with the effects of foreign aid were becoming increasingly clear. As Philip Mosely commented at the time,

The Soviet leaders are discovering that the effects of external aid are slow, diffuse, complex, and unpredictable, and that, once begun, an aid program cannot be cast off without cancelling out any accumulated gratitude for sacrifice previously made by the donor.[21]

But Soviet worry regarding India was especially acute because of the nation's size and importance, and because of the USSR's large investment there.

Also vexing to Moscow were developments within the Indian Communist movement—developments reflecting in part problems inherent in the nature of the CPI and its position in Indian political life, and in part the emerging split within the world Communist movement. The gains made by the CPI in the 1950's—a several-fold rise in membership, a doubled vote, and control of the state of Kerala—persuaded most Indian Communists that a bright future beckoned under the policy of constitutional communism. More states would fall under their sway in the 1962 elections, they thought, and power in New Delhi would follow in due course. However, dramatic shifts in the domestic and international environment first destroyed these dreams and then shattered the precarious unity that the party had achieved.

[18] Adam B. Ulam, *Expansion and Coexistence: The History of Soviet Foreign Policy—1917-67*, New York, Praeger, 1968, pp. 709-10.

[19] G. Adhikari, "The Problem of the Non-Capitalist Path of Development in India and the State of National Democracy," *World Marxist Review*, November 1964, Vol. 7, No. 11, p. 39.

[20] See, for example, P. Nikolsky, "Nehru's Party Without Nehru," *New Times* (Moscow), Aug. 11, 1966, and M. Savelyev, "Monopoly Drive in India," *International Affairs* (Moscow), April 1967.

[21] Philip E. Mosely, "Communist Policy and the Third World," *The Review of Politics* (South Bend, Ind.), Vol. 28, No. 2, April 1966, p. 234. As Elizabeth Kridel Valkenier has pointed out, the complexities of life in the Third World became increasingly manifest to Soviet scholars as they were permitted to do more empirical research on conditions there. See her "Recent Trends in Soviet Research on the Developing Countries," *World Politics* (Princeton, N.J.), Vol. 20, No. 4, July 1968, pp. 644-59.

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New Delhi's removal of the Communist government in Kerala in 1959 dismayed moderates but came almost as a relief to leftist elements. Here, the leftists held, was proof that political participation was a snare and delusion rather than the road to power.

A more critical challenge arose with the simultaneous development of the Sino-Indian and the Sino-Soviet disputes. With respect to the former, Soviet and CPI leaders alike feared that India would turn to the West for support against China. Moscow's neutrality and then support for India enabled New Delhi to adhere to its policy of nonalignment; it also permitted the CPI officially to adopt a patriotic stance on the border controversy with China.[22] But CPI leftists saw the party in grave danger of becoming the tail to the Congress kite if it fully supported India against China, and they urged a compromise border settlement.

These differences within the CPI were exacerbated rather than eased by the strategic formula adopted at the Moscow meeting of 81 Communist parties in December 1960. The concepts of "national democracy" and the "non-capitalist path" embodied in the formula were seized upon by opposing elements in the party to reopen old controversies as to who was the most dangerous enemy. B. T. Ranadive and other leftists, citing the concept of a non-capitalist path, argued that the bourgeoisie should be the CPI's key target—meaning that the party should pursue all-out opposition to the Nehru government. Rightists led by S. A. Dange called for the CPI to adopt a "national-democratic" approach, involving a struggle against the "big bourgeoisie" and "imperialists" and some cooperation with progressive Congress elements. E. M. Namboodiripad tried to bridge the gap between the two positions by urging both—a non-capitalist path within a democratic political context.

Under these circumstances, Moscow felt it necessary to send its top ideologue, Mikhail Suslov, to guide the 1961 party congress at Vijayawada; however, the divisions were too wide to be more than papered over. The party did well to hold its own in the 1962 elections, and the border war with China late in 1962 ended whatever chance there was of preserving party unity.

Although the emergence of the Sino-Soviet dispute created major dilemmas for Communist parties everywhere, the problem that it posed for the CPI was critical, for the party's precarious unity was dependent on the external pressures for cohesion that a united and accepted international Communist authority provided.[23] The CPI had avoided the open splits that the diversity of India had fostered in other Indian parties, but it had never been able to surmount its origins as an amalgam of semi-independent units. Party leaders acted more like representatives of the diverse forces upon which their power rested—competing regions, groups, and castes—than as lieutenants of a centralized political party. (Indeed, what led the various factions to espouse "pro-Soviet" and "pro-Peking" attitudes was more the diverse bases of their support—combined with judgments as to whether the Soviet or Chinese approach to winning power was most feasible—than affinity for the USSR or China *per se*.)

With the replacement of a united international Communist movement by alternative Communist power centers and models, the leftists initially looked to Peking as a new source of inspiration and potential support instead of fashioning a radical policy tailored to Indian conditions. (The habit of seeking inspiration from abroad dies hard; and the need for official guidance outweighed the attractions of using nationalist appeals—even though Asian Communists have succeeded only when they seized the nationalist banner.) As Sino-Indian relations deteriorated and war finally broke out, leftist elements assumed a "pro-Peking"—*i.e.*, an antinational—stance. Such a stance inflamed public opinion and invited government repression. The government crackdown, in turn, heightened intraparty strife, for CPI leftists bitterly charged that party rightists had connived with the government to bring about the imprisonment of leftists in the wake of the China war.

In this atmosphere, the party moved inexorably toward a split, which was formalized in 1964 when the "rightist" CPI and the "leftist" CPI (Marxist) held separate congresses, each claiming to represent 100,000 of the previous 178,000 members. Most party leaders and parliamentarians went with the

[22] The widespread public attacks on the CPI when it had supported China's suppression of the Tibetan revolt in March 1959 had increased the party's fear of placing itself outside the mainstream of Indian nationalism once again.

[23] In a 1950 inner-party document, Dange described the need for firm external guidance graphically: "Everyone began to feel that somewhere things were wrong, but none could say it correctly and some would not say it—until the Cominform spoke. And the whole party felt relieved. Is it not good that we have a Cominform to tell us things and is it not good that we at least bow to the Cominform . . . ?" Cited in Overstreet and Windmiller, *op. cit.*, p. 353.

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CPI, while the CPI(M) retained the bulk of the party's assets in the strongholds of Kerala, West Bengal, and Andhra Pradesh.[24]

The 1964 split in the Communist movement confronted the Soviet Union with hard choices. Moscow needed the backing of at least one wing of the Indian movement to bolster its claims to be the fountainhead of international communism, especially since it had lost the allegiance of most Asian Communist parties.[25] Moreover, because the Soviet regime's legitimacy at home derived from its ideological claims, it could hardly justify its policy of supporting the Indian government wholly on practical geopolitical grounds. Therefore, the Soviet rulers were forced to accept the CPI's new assertions of independence and even the party's occasional criticism of the USSR. Moscow was also circumspect in its comments on the CPI(M). In the spring of 1967, the USSR hinted at a desire for unity of action by the two parties,[26] and it was strongly critical of the dismissal of the CPI(M)-dominated government in West Bengal late that same year—despite the fact that the CPI was involved in the agitation that precipitated the government's removal.

Events in West Bengal, however, soon demonstrated the CPI(M)'s limited value from the Soviet perspective. Ultraradical elements within the CPI(M) regarded participation in government (and even in elections) as a betrayal of the revolution, even though the party's position at first enabled it to prevent the police from suppressing the direct attacks on bourgeois elements and landlords that soon occurred. During 1967, Maoist elements in the CPI(M) began to incite peasant insurrections and guerrilla operations—the Naxalite movement. This course won China's approval, but when the CPI(M) finally acquiesced in police action against the Maoists, Peking harshly attacked it.[27] The CPI(M)'s decision also prompted many dissident members in West Bengal (and some in other states) to leave the party in 1967 and 1968. In 1969, they organized a third party, the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist), which was likewise soon plagued by factional disputes.[28]

In sum, then, Moscow was faced during the 1960's with an Indian government beset by internal problems and moving somewhat to the right and toward the West, and at the same time with a stagnant and splintering Indian Communist movement. Yet neither Soviet nor CPI leaders could do much more than call for cooperation among progressive forces. Under these circumstances, Moscow made the difficult decision that its stake in India required continued aid to the Indian government lest New Delhi slide even closer to the West, but Soviet leaders had no desire to take over the full economic burden of supporting India and deemed that a careful policy designed to consolidate their gains was appropriate until they could better appraise trends in the area. Such thinking colored the behavior of Soviet officials toward their Indian counterparts—behavior which generated strong resentment. One observer described the Soviet attitude in 1968 as that of an imperial power dealing with a dependency.[29]

Impact of a Balanced Policy

Predictably enough, Moscow's switch to a more balanced approach toward the subcontinent produced new complications in its relations with the area—especially with India. While New Delhi had no recourse but to accept the Soviet agreement to furnish arms to Pakistan, it initiated steps to increase its maneuverability. In August 1968 and January 1969, for example, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi made overtures to Peking about a normalization of relations, though Peking, caught up in the Cultural Revolution and spewing forth virulent propaganda against India in this period, ignored the Indian signals. Moreover, New Delhi opposed or registered displeasure at a number of Soviet moves. Despite strong Soviet attacks on countries unwilling

[24] These events are described in detail in John B. Wood, "Observations on the Indian Communist Party Split," *Pacific Affairs* (Vancouver, Canada), Vol. 38, No. 1, Spring 1965.

[25] Robert Scalapino, "Moscow, Peking, and the Communist Parties of Asia," *Foreign Affairs* (New York), Vol. 41, No. 2, January 1963, pp. 323-43.

[26] A. Maslennikov and I. Serebryakov, *Pravda*, May 5, 1967, in *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, Vol. 19, No. 18, May 24, 1967, p. 15.

[27] See Bhabani Sen Gupta, "A Maoist Line for India," *The China Quarterly* (London), January-March 1968, No. 33, pp. 3-16.

[28] These developments are analyzed in Marcus F. Franda, "India's Third Communist Party," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 9, No. 11, November 1969, pp. 797-817. The Bengali elements of the party in time shifted their operations to Calcutta. That hapless metropolis was subsequently battered by political gang-warfare between the CPI(M-L) and the CPI(M), in which hundreds of the latter's cadres were killed and its formerly strong position in the city was undermined before the police were able to bring the terrorists under control in 1970.

[29] Harish Kapur, "India and the Soviet Union," *Survey* (London), Vol. 16, No. 1, Winter 1971.

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to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, India stood its ground. New Delhi insisted that it had no plans to develop such weapons, but refused to tie its hands in the future. It also rejected Kosygin's offer to mediate a dispute over the division of the Ganges waters between India and East Pakistan. Indians complained about the USSR's persistence in publishing maps showing the Chinese version of the Sino-Indian border—a reminder that Moscow had never supported the substance of India's position. To Indians, too, broadcasts from Radio Peace and Progress in Tashkent assailing some Congress leaders gave official Soviet calls for observance of the spirit of Tashkent a double meaning. While Indo-Soviet trade expanded, New Delhi rejected some Soviet proposals on the ground of onerous terms. India (and Pakistan) turned aside Leonid Breznhnev's suggestion regarding the establishment of an Asian collective security system, though New Delhi endorsed Kosygin's proposal for formal economic links between India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan—which Rawalpindi predictably rejected.

Nonetheless, India's need for Soviet support and assistance imposed distinct limits upon its freedom of action. For example, New Delhi felt that it had no choice but to accept Soviet terms for the construction of the giant Bokaro steel mill after the United States refused to build the mill, and the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia drew only mild criticism from Mrs. Gandhi—merely the most dramatic illustration of India's reluctance to speak out against the USSR.

Furthermore, the new balance in Soviet policy turned out to be highly advantageous to Moscow in one important respect, for both India and Pakistan tried to ignore the entry of the Soviet navy, the world's second largest, into the Indian Ocean. Since 1963, the USSR had been building up its Mediterranean fleet, and in the spring of 1968 it deployed a few ships in the Indian Ocean. There were accompanying rumors that Moscow had requested naval facilities, if not formal bases, in India and Pakistan. Both countries denied that such requests had been submitted or granted, although Soviet warships as well as Western vessels now appeared occasionally in South Asian ports. (This Soviet activity, it should be noted, rendered the role of the Indian Ocean a topic of serious discussion for the first time in the 20th century and spurred extensive speculation in the West about Moscow's motives. Was the activity evidence of Soviet expansionist aims or merely an attempt on the part of the USSR to use its recently expanded fleet to counter the Western presence in the area? Indeed, were Soviet leaders themselves clear or in full agreement about the reasons for the new undertakings? [30])

At any rate, Moscow's time of troubles on the subcontinent proved to be temporary, for events soon provided new openings for the USSR. When Mrs. Gandhi, frustrated by the immobilism of Indian political life, forced a split in the Congress party in 1969, the Soviet press and radio supported her against the more conservative Congress leaders whom she was battling. While Soviet attacks on her opponents as representatives of "reaction and imperialism" reflected Soviet fear that India might drift farther to the right and toward the West if her maneuver failed,[31] the Congress split offered a potential opportunity as well as a danger. Lacking a majority in parliament but endeavoring to move to the left, Mrs. Gandhi might conceivably become dependent on the Moscow-oriented CPI to implement her program. Though Soviet hopes on this score were dashed with Mrs. Gandhi's dramatic election victory in 1971, the growing radicalism of South Asian politics was nevertheless welcome in Moscow.

Moscow and the Bangla Desh Crisis

But such considerations were soon overtaken by the outbreak of civil war in East Pakistan in March 1971. Two decades of West Pakistani domination of the East had convinced the Bengalis that the only way that they couid control their own destiny was through complete provincial autonomy—an autonomy so extensive that to West Pakistanis it spelled the end of Pakistan as a state. In this atmosphere, the country's newly-elected political leaders could not reach agreement with Ayub's successor, President Yahya Khan, on the country's political future, and he attempted to suppress the East Pakistanis by force of arms. Hundreds of thousands of Bengalis were soon dead, and millions of refugees

[30] For an interpretation of Soviet actions as essentially a response to earlier Western actions, see Michael MacGwire, "The Background to Soviet Naval Developments," *The World Today*, August 1971, pp. 93-103. For an analysis that treats Soviet actions as more of an independent move forward, see T. B. Millar, *The Indian and Pacific Oceans: Some Strategic Considerations*, Adelphi Paper No. 57, London, Institute of Strategic Studies, May 1969.

[31] *Pravda*, Nov. 14, 1969, in *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, Vol. 21, No. 46, Dec. 10, 1969, p. 15. See also P. Kutsobin, "The Indian Confrontation," *New Times*, No. 47, Nov. 26, 1969, pp. 6-8.

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were in flight to India. The subcontinent thus found itself in the midst of its greatest upheaval since the dismantling of the British Indian Empire.

Indian authorities, who had hoped that an East Pakistani-led government would be friendly to India, now feared that the refugees inundating eastern India would create chaos there. In view of this threat to India's political stability and economic prospects, New Delhi commenced a two-pronged effort to force Yahya Khan to negotiate with the elected Awami League officials under Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in order to create conditions which would permit the refugees to return. It began quietly to support the guerrilla forces that were forming in the East, and it simultaneously sought to persuade foreign governments to pressure Yahya Khan to switch from repression to negotiation.

The Soviet rulers quickly recognized that, with India threatened and Pakistan in turmoil, their policy of maintaining good relations with both was no longer tenable.[32] Turning a danger into an opportunity, President Podgorny spoke out against the West Pakistani army's actions in an April 3 letter to Yahya. Podgorny urged Yahya to halt the "bloodshed and repression" and, while taking no formal position on Pakistan's internal crisis, spoke of the Awami League leaders as having "received . . . convincing support by the overwhelming majority" in the December 1970 national elections.[33] Such a clear rebuke stunned Pakistan, but apprehension that Moscow would line up solidly behind India kept Yahya from striking back. His prudence seemed to pay dividends, for Soviet public statements then became quite restrained for several months.

One reason for Moscow's caution during this period was its fear of Chinese involvement if a new Indo-Pakistani war erupted. China's stance soon added to the Soviets' general anxiety. Peking passed up the opportunity to back the Bengalis and to try to turn an ethnic and cultural struggle into a war of national liberation, choosing instead to support the conservative West Pakistani regime because of that region's traditional hostility to India. In a note to Yahya on April 11, Chou En-lai endorsed Pakistan's efforts to maintain its national integrity and denounced India, the Soviet Union, and the United States for interfering in Pakistani affairs,[34] thus confirming that China's old perception of India as an expansionist power working hand-in-glove with the United States and the USSR remained alive. Peking continued to provide Pakistan with economic and military aid, but largely eschewed public comment, until the outbreak of war in December.

Chinese leaders, however, saw collusion where none existed, for Washington and Moscow were pursuing increasingly divergent policies. While the United States halted most of its arms sales to Pakistan, made no new economic aid commitments, and provided refugee assistance to both India and Pakistan, the Nixon administration refused to cut all its ties to Pakistan. Washington argued that it could not influence Yahya Khan's government if it resorted to public denunciations and ended all arms sales. One reason for this attitude became clear in July, when it was revealed that Pakistan had opened the channel for Sino-US discussions and had arranged Henry Kissinger's dramatic visit to Peking.

Indian leaders, who said that they had been assured that no arms were being sent to Pakistan, felt betrayed by the United States. More ominous from New Delhi's perspective was the apparent American-Chinese rapprochement: Foreign Minister Singh spoke about the danger of the "domination of the two countries over this region."[35] Even had Washington not been friendly toward Pakistan, any American attempt to establish a new relationship with China would have convinced India that it could no longer expect active US support in the event of Chinese intervention in a new war on the subcontinent. And while New Delhi thought that its extensive military buildup during the 1960's had given it the strength to face China, the 1962 debacle was still fresh in its memory; hence, it was eager to deter any Chinese military ventures. Under these circumstances, Soviet arms and cooperation were critical.

Although many aspects of Indo-Soviet diplomacy remain obscure, Moscow's thinking was clearly moving along comparable lines. The announcement that President Nixon would visit Peking surprised and frightened the hypersuspicious Soviet leadership, for the trip seemed to them to portend the transformation of their previous nightmares of Sino-American collusion into reality. Top Soviet leaders

[32] The USSR had continued to cultivate Pakistan after Ayub was overthrown. Yahya Khan had visited Moscow in 1970, and the Soviets had agreed to build a one-million-ton-capacity steel mill in Pakistan.

[33] *Pravda*, April 4, 1971, in *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (Columbus, Ohio), Vol. 23, No. 14, May 4, 1971, pp. 35-36.

[34] *Peking Review*, April 16, 1971.

[35] Radio Delhi Domestic Service, July 20, 1971.

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Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko and India's External Affairs Minister Swaran Singh sign a 20-year treaty of peace and friendship between their countries on Aug. 9, 1971, in New Delhi.

quickly journeyed to a wide variety of countries to demonstrate their own dynamism and to show that their foreign policy had won friends for the USSR. But these were essentially damage-limiting operations; it was in the subcontinent that a chance for positive action existed. By effecting a treaty of friendship and cooperation with India, Moscow might cement ties with New Delhi and at the same time provide a mechanism through which Moscow could urge restraint on the Indians if that appeared appropriate. Moreover, such a treaty could be seen as the first major success in the USSR's campaign to erect a collective security system in Asia.

The 20-year Indo-Soviet pact signed on August 9 and the sharp increase in the flow of Soviet arms to India that ensued did not, to be sure, entirely eliminate discord between the two nations. While India opted to withhold formal recognition of Bangla Desh for the time being, it resented continuing Soviet references to "East Pakistan" and Soviet calls for political settlement satisfactory to "the entire people" of Pakistan, for it recognized that these meant Moscow wanted to limit its losses in West Pakistan. Also, the efforts of Soviet leaders to satisfy other Afro-Asian nations—most of whom were opposed to the division of Pakistan—that the USSR did not favor secessionist movements led to ambiguous Soviet statements that worried New Delhi. Nevertheless, such differences proved relatively minor.

In November 1971, after growing Indian military pressure along the borders of East Bengal prompted the desperate Pakistanis to launch air and ground attacks on western India, the USSR stood firmly in India's corner. Soviet vetoes prevented the UN Security Council from approving any resolution critical of India while the latter rapidly defeated Pakistani forces in East Bengal. Peking vitriolically attacked Indian "expansionists" for trying to dismember Pakistan and establish a puppet state in East Bengal like that which the Japanese had set up in "Manchukuo",[36] and it issued equally scathing denunciations of attempts by Soviet "social imperialism" to start a war pitting "Asians against Asians." [37] But Moscow and New Delhi took such charges in stride, for the Chinese made no serious military threats until the war was all but over—perhaps because Peking had its eye on the large Soviet army on China's northern border. While American accusations that India was principally to blame for the war angered Indians and Washington's dispatch of a carrier task force into the Bay of Bengal infuriated them, neither factor deterred Mrs. Gandhi from her chosen course. Bangla Desh was soon an independent country; West Pakistan was defeated and demoralized; India was dominant on the subcontinent. With Chinese and American ineffectuality manifest, the Soviet Union had achieved its greatest triumph.

Cooperation in a New Context

Having set Soviet policy toward the subcontinent in historical perspective, let us now turn to an assessment of the likely character of that policy in the immediate future. In undertaking such an assessment, one must remember that Moscow's policy toward South Asia does not exist in a vacuum —that its evolution will depend partly on the USSR's general position and outlook in world affairs. A few words on this subject are therefore in order.

Today, the Soviet leaders seem confident that the basic trends in global politics favor the USSR. The heavy investments in military production that

[36] *Peking Review*, Dec. 10, 1971.
[37] Radio Peking, NCNA International Service, Dec. 23, 1971.

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they have made in recent years have enabled the USSR to reach a rough parity in strategic weapons with the United States and have given it the capability of projecting conventional military power into distant areas. While fundamentally conservative and cautious men, they are convinced that military power can be used in peacetime to influence other nations in ways that benefit Soviet foreign policy—especially with the United States reducing its world role.[38] It ought to be added, of course, that although they are probably confident that they have acquired the knack of crisis management, their awareness of the dangers involved in explosive situations and their concern lest their actions stimulate unexpectedly vigorous Western responses cause them to prefer moderate rather than high levels of tension. For example, their support for Ceylon's moderately leftist government against extreme leftist insurgents in 1971 indicates that the chaos and turbulence of revolution hold limited attraction for them.

The leadership's general satisfaction, however, is to some degree offset by specific concerns. All regions present mixed situations from the Soviet viewpoint. In Europe, for example, the advent of the Willy Brandt government has brought about a new relationship between the USSR and the Federal Republic of Germany, but the expansion of the Common Market constitutes a cause for worry. So does continued nationalism in Eastern Europe. The trend of events in the Middle East is both encouraging and somewhat dangerous. As a result of the Arab-Israeli confrontation, the USSR has managed to entrench itself deeply in the Arab world, especially in Egypt; but the deepening Soviet role in the area raises the possibility of direct Soviet involvement in the event of a renewal of Arab-Israeli hostilities. In East Asia, the picture is more somber. Soviet relations with China remain hostile, and Moscow's long-held fears of US-Chinese collusion now seem justified in the wake of President Nixon's visit to China. Moreover, despite the USSR's recent overtures to Japan, Moscow has yet to demonstrate its ability to take advantage of Tokyo's disappointment with the United States.

In light of the East Asian situation, the Soviet rulers recognize that they must have a firm tie with India if the USSR is to participate effectively in the Asian balance of power. (Southeast Asia is only marginally susceptible to Soviet influence; besides, it possesses but limited indigenous strength on which Moscow could build). Thus, the historic Soviet desire to replace the United Kingdom (and more recently the United States) in the lands to the south of the USSR is supplemented by the necessities of current Asian politics.

But this analysis leaves many questions unanswered. What are some of the specifics Moscow desires in its relationships with India and with the other countries in South Asia? How much in the way of resources is the USSR willing to devote to its efforts on the subcontinent? Will it move rapidly to expand its role now that the United States and China find themselves in weak positions, or will it opt for a more cautious and patient pace designed to consolidate its present position?

Apropos of these questions, one thing is fairly clear at this juncture. While the Soviet leaders are pleased with their present status in South Asia, they see a number of potential difficulties and dangers as well as opportunities confronting them. Their wish to limit Chinese influence, largely through close ties with a strong India, tends to make them want stability on the subcontinent—*i.e.*, reasonably good relations between India and Bangla Desh and a muting, if not an end, to Indo-Pakistani hostility. New Delhi has secured Moscow's agreement that Indo-Pakistani problems should be handled by means of direct negotiations between the countries of the subcontinent; however, if there is no progress toward a solution of these problems within the next several months or so, it would not be surprising if the Soviets attempted to arrange a "new Tashkent" meeting between India and Pakistan, both to dampen Indo-Pakistani quarrels and to establish Moscow's role as a mediator in the subcontinent's affairs.

The Soviet leaders are aware, too, of the rising pressures throughout the area for more rapid economic growth and for social and economic reforms —namely, reduced unemployment, land reforms, and reduced income disparities. While they probably welcome these developments in some respects, they seem apprehensive that failure of the local governments to respond to such pressures could create fertile ground for Maoist-type movements—a process already under way in West Bengal and a potential danger in Bangla Desh. At the same time, they must have serious reservations about the ability of Mrs. Gandhi and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman to deal

[38] For general appraisals of Soviet policy, see Andrew J. Pierre, "America Down, Russia Up: The Changing Political Role of Military Power," *Foreign Policy* (New York), No. 4, Fall 1971, pp. 163-87; and Marshall D. Shulman, "What Does Security Mean Today?," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 49, No. 4, July 1971, pp. 607-18.

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with these matters over the long run and may fear a right-wing reaction under certain conditions.[39]

Moscow also displays a measure of ambivalence toward the indigenous Communist forces on the subcontinent. It regards the Indian Communist movement as too weak to be a central element in its strategy, but the Soviet need for the support of some Asian parties in the world Communist movement *renders the Indian parties too important to ignore.* Moreover, Soviet leaders view the Indian parties as useful means of pressuring New Delhi to pursue a more leftist course. Their utility for this purpose would of course increase if the Moscow-oriented CPI and the independent-minded CPI(M) were to move closer together, for the CPI(M) has exhibited greater dynamism than the CPI. On this score, the Soviets may have been encouraged by the CPI(M)'s attacks on China for Peking's support of Pakistan during the Bangla Desh upheaval.[40] However, even if the CPI(M) is no longer vulnerable to charges of supporting India's enemies, it can hardly hope to capture the nationalist banner from the ruling Congress party. Its strength is limited to a few areas, and its recent emphasis on the right of any state to secede from the country suggests that its regional orientation has grown stronger. Furthermore, its stunning electoral defeat in West Bengal in March 1972 has clouded its prospects there, at least for a few years.[41] While the CPI did better in the March 1972 state elections through its electoral cooperation with Mrs. Gandhi's Congress party, it still lacks the strength to give it significant influence. Under these circumstances, good relations with New Delhi are likely to weigh far more heavily with Moscow than other considerations.

Anything else one says about these broad questions necessarily entails some assumptions about the amount of influence that the USSR will be able to wield on the subcontinent. The extent of Soviet influence will inevitably bulk large in Moscow's policy calculations, for it will impose constraints upon what the USSR can do in the area. Yet judgments about such matters are exceedingly difficult to make. While it requires no great wisdom to see that the USSR is the predominant external power in South Asia today, it is far from clear how extensive an influence it commands, much less how great that influence will be in the future. At the moment, there is a widespread tendency in the West to believe *that since the United States failed to establish last*ing influence in much of Asia, the USSR will similarly fail. This may be a valid conclusion, but it is a dangerous assumption. On the other hand, one must not forget that great changes in the pattern of relationships involving South Asia and outside powers have occurred in the past. Though history will not inevitably repeat itself, one should not automatically project the present pattern forward indefinitely.

Perhaps the most useful approach, then, is to endeavor to indicate what the minimum and maximum degrees of Soviet influence might be. With these likely parameters established, an examination of the issues that the parties concerned will face should provide a sense of where, within the range of policies that the parties might follow, things will probably fall.

Likely Soviet Influence

Any look at past Indo-Soviet relations and the basis of present Indo-Soviet ties suggests that they will remain close for a wide variety of reasons. More than 15 years of increasingly close cooperation have convinced both Soviet and Indian leaders that they have a broad range of interests in common and that they know how to work together successfully to achieve their aims—as well as how to keep their differences from getting out of hand. On the Indian side, few persons still cling to the notion that the Soviet Union might have something to offer as a model for India, and cultural differences and lack of personal rapport between Soviets and Indians also create psychological barriers.[42] Nonetheless, Indians now regard the Soviets as part of the South Asian landscape. (Familiarity may in time breed contempt, but for some time acceptance will char-

[39] At the 24th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in the spring of 1971, Brezhnev referred to India as a country which had experienced "progressive social changes," but he omitted it from the list of countries—such as Syria, Algeria, Burma, and the United Arab Republic—which he described as being oriented toward socialism. *24th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, March 30-April 9, 1971, Documents,* Moscow, Novosti Press, 1971, pp. 24-25.

[40] Radio Delhi Domestic Service, Dec. 25, 1971.

[41] For a description of the CPI(M)'s long-range strategy in West Bengal, see Bhabani Sen Gupta, "Indian Communism and the Peasantry," *Problems of Communism,* January-February 1972, pp. 1-17.

[42] India's strong commitment to democracy always limited the attractiveness of the Soviet model to Indians, but some elements in the country have viewed the USSR's social and economic policies as relevant to India's needs.

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acterize Indian attitudes.) Indian leaders are also aware that Soviet arms have permitted them to build up their impressive military establishment, that Soviet vetoes in the United Nations have enhanced their diplomatic freedom, that Soviet economic aid has helped them build cherished (if inefficient) state-owned heavy industries, and that trade with the USSR and Eastern Europe (about one-fifth of India's total trade) has provided them with some of their fastest growing markets for manufactured goods that are hard to dispose of elsewhere.[43]

Finally, the USSR is today the beneficiary of widespread Indian appreciation for its conduct during the recent Indo-Pakistani hostilities. This, to be sure, represents a perishable commodity in international politics. Mrs. Gandhi stressed that point when she commented to C. L. Sulzberger that "we are unable to display gratitude in any tangible sense for anything"[44]—a remark which Soviet leaders could hardly have enjoyed reading in a leading capitalist newspaper. But Indian leaders are not so naive as to think that the Soviet Union expects no return on its investment. They will continue to refrain from opposing nearly all Soviet policies and to back all those that they can; they will likewise consult closely with the Soviets on policies that are of interest to Moscow and accept Soviet advice whenever it does not conflict with what they perceive as India's basic interests.

On the Soviet side, Moscow's ambitions as a great power, its determination to contain Chinese influence and power, and its desire to reduce the Western role in Asia all dictate continued support of India. Such support need not be unlimited or unconditional. Moscow's desire to have fruitful relations with countries wary of India and the pressure of other demands on Soviet resources suggest that the USSR will issue no blank checks. Nevertheless, having advanced so far by backing India, Soviet leaders will see little reason to pull back from such a course.

[43] Manufactured goods now account for nearly half of India's exports to the USSR. See L. N. Raina, "India-USSR: Widening Areas of Cooperation," *Indian and Foreign Review* (New Delhi), Sept. 1, 1971, pp. 9-10; and Lev L. Klochkovsky, "USSR's Trade Partners," *International Trade Forum* (Geneva), December 1970, pp. 17-29. But periodic Indian complaints that the rise in the volume of traditional Indian exports to these countries is offset by the re-export of such goods to hard-currency markets at discount prices indicate that Indians do not view their economic relationships with the members of the Soviet bloc uncritically.

[44] *The New York Times*, Feb. 17, 1972.

FRIENDSHIP AT A NEW LEVEL

The Leninist line of giving all possible support to the peoples' national liberation movement and of friendship and cooperation with countries which have freed themselves from colonial oppression and are consolidating their independence is one of the main trends in the Soviet Union's foreign policy. During the past two decades this policy has been splendidly embodied in Soviet-Indian relations.

An important new step in the development of these relations is the treaty on peace, friendship, and cooperation between the Soviet Union and the Republic of India signed in Delhi August 9. This treaty not only seals what has been achieved thus far but also opens up prospects for the further strengthening of the sincere friendship and neighborly relations between the two peace-loving states and signifies a transition to a higher stage of fruitful cooperation between them. . . .

—*Pravda*, Aug. 11, 1971.

And the Indo-Soviet treaty stands as a formalized expression of the relationship. Though the treaty is subject to different interpretations by the two parties, it would hardly have been signed if it were devoid of meaning.

While a close Indo-Soviet relationship is thus virtually inevitable, one must keep in mind that Indian leaders view Soviet support as extremely important because it helps them further their own goals of becoming the dominant power in the area and acquiring a leadership role among African and Asian nations. India has no intention of becoming a Soviet pawn; indeed, it wants not only to appear but to *be* free of external restraints on its foreign and domestic policies. Nor would a satellite relationship seem possible or desirable to the USSR for the foreseeable future. If Moscow cannot control Romania or the United Arab Republic, how could it hope to control India?

But this situation still leaves room for Soviet advances in India, and there are a number of initiatives which the USSR might reasonably take. It could try to get New Delhi to tie the Indian economy more closely to the Soviet economy. It could press India to assume a strong anti-Western stance—perhaps involving the nationalization of US-owned businesses or a reduction of the country's educational and cultural ties with the West. It could demand facilities, or even bases, for the Soviet navy to use in the expanding Soviet operations in the Indian Ocean. And it might urge India to help

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organize a Soviet-sponsored collective security arrangement in Asia along the lines proposed by Brezhnev in 1969. One ought to underscore, however, that any Soviet attempt to employ India as a proxy against China in Southeast Asia would come up against the harsh reality that even an India dominant within the subcontinent has little capability of projecting its power into an area traditionally suspicious of it.[45] India's recent treaty with Bangla Desh is not likely to be followed by similar links with Southeast Asian nations. Moreover, Moscow's previous experience in trying to work through independent-minded nationalist leaders such as Gamal Abdel Nasser would also likely tend to discourage it from seeking to pursue such a course.

It is, of course, far from certain that Moscow will make the above demands—at least as a package. Soviet leaders probably still have doubts about the wisdom of assuming the responsibilities that India would insist that they should in such a relationship —especially since these responsibilities would undoubtedly include the exceedingly costly burden of supporting Bangla Desh as well as India. Moving forward cautiously, a few steps at a time—rather than attempting great leaps forward—has been the style of the present Soviet leaders in most circumstances.

More critical, Indian leaders would feel highly uncomfortable if forced to rely exclusively on the USSR for backing. Mrs. Gandhi, who emerged as one of Asia's dominant figures in 1971, is a shrewd political strategist as well as a skillful tactician; she knows that Moscow hopes for a normalization of relations with China after Mao is gone from the Chinese scene, and that such a development would decrease India's value to the USSR. In addition, New Delhi is acutely conscious that its aspirations in the Afro-Asian world suffered a setback because of its war with Pakistan and its treaty with the USSR. India's isolated position in the UN General Assembly vote—with even old friends such as Yugoslavia and Egypt opposing it—hurt; so did comments such as that of the radical Libyan President, Muammar al-Qaddafi: "India is not fully free and not neutral after signing a treaty with the eastern camp." [46] It is true that the Afro-Asian states' failure to support India in its conflicts with China and Pakistan has disillusioned some Indians with the country's past emphasis on nonalignment. Yet even those Indians who regard their country as a major power and advocate a hardheaded policy concerned only with India's clear national interests do not want to become completely isolated from Afro-Asian nationalist opinion—a danger that apparently concerns Moscow as well.[47]

Equally important is the need of both India and Bangla Desh for foreign economic assistance. Right now, Mrs. Gandhi, as her party's sweeping victories in the March 1972 state elections attest, is riding the crest of popularity and euphoria stemming from India's military victory over Pakistan. But these will eventually diminish, and the Indian masses will expect her to deliver on her domestic promises. Popular pressures for reducing poverty can be met only if there is greater production as well as a more equitable division of wealth.[48] Achieving this goal, however, will prove highly taxing in light of current conditions. While good monsoons and the "green revolution" have boosted agricultural production in recent years, the rate of industrial expansion has declined. And though descriptions of Bangla Desh as "the dominion of the damned" or a "basket case" are premature and probably overdrawn, India could find the new state a major drain on its own resources unless other powers are willing to help extensively with Bangla Desh's rehabilitation and eventual development.

Thus, foreign aid looms vital for both nations. Yet, foreign assistance to India has gone down over the last few years, and the country's debt repayments have risen. As a result, net aid has fallen from $1 billion to less than $300 million annually. At the moment, New Delhi's repayments on its past loans from the USSR exceed current levels of economic assistance; furthermore, India still owes Moscow about $1 billion for arms. While the USSR could conceivably extend more credits, Soviet aid

[45] For a discussion of the limitations on Indian influence in Southeast Asia, see the author's *India, Pakistan, and the Great Powers*, Praeger, New York, 1972, pp. 338-41.

[46] Radio Bayda Domestic Service, Dec. 17, 1971.

[47] Moscow has attacked China for seeking to generate distrust of India in Asia and Africa. See G. Yakubov, "The Conflict in Hindustan and the Provocative Role of Mao's Group," *Pravda*, Dec. 28, 1971, as broadcast by Radio Moscow (TASS International Service), Dec. 28, 1971.

[48] Some prominent Indians argue that to lay the necessary groundwork for future growth, India must drastically change property relationships and social attitudes. Mrs. Gandhi might opt for this course if a shortage of domestic and foreign resources renders economic development a less promising approach than a "cultural revolution." Some aspects of such a policy would be encouraging to Soviet leaders; but its adoption might increase their apprehensions about turmoil in the country. Moreover, anything labeled a "cultural revolution" would evoke unpleasant memories in Moscow.

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is normally distributed slowly and might not be available for some time. As for Bangla Desh, its needs are very large if not yet clearly delineated, and the commitments that Moscow made to Sheikh Mujib during his March 1-5 visit to the USSR will meet only a small proportion of that devastated nation's requirements. Therefore, despite Mrs. Gandhi's insistence that self-reliance may be necessary, India and Bangla Desh could require extra resources in the near future. All these factors together suggest that India will see certain advantages in restoring its links with the West, especially the United States—provided that the US is still interested in such a restoration of ties.

One must remember, too, that certain factors at least partially under New Delhi's control give India substantial capacity to shape its relationship with the USSR according to its own tastes. Not only has Pakistan's emasculation somewhat reduced New Delhi's need for military support, but India's own defense production has been expanding. Though years, if not decades, may pass before India can manufacture the most advanced military equipment on its own, it will probably be able to turn out a growing quantity and variety of items. Such a capability will limit its dependence on the USSR. In this connection, it is worth underscoring that New Delhi is not likely to be amenable to Soviet arguments against Indian acquisition of nuclear weapons. Economic constraints may cause India to refrain from developing such weapons, but New Delhi will not mortgage what it thinks might become essential to its security even at the urging of as friendly a country as the USSR.

India's relations with China and the United States will also have a major bearing on how much sway the USSR will enjoy over the South Asian power, and New Delhi can seek to mitigate its conflict with both nations. Mrs. Gandhi has indicated on several occasions in recent years that India would welcome a bettering of relations with China, and she probably hopes to negotiate a border settlement in time. Significantly, India reacted with calm verging on indifference to Peking's backing of Pakistan during the recent Indo-Pakistani war—no doubt in part because of New Delhi's increased confidence in its own military power relative to a China faced with a serious military threat along its Soviet border and with armed forces recently purged of their leadership. While a Sino-Indian border agreement would not lead to a new era of good feeling between the two states reminiscent of the 1950's, it would reduce the danger of war with China and thus diminish India's need for Soviet support.

So far, China has not nibbled at the Indian bait. Peking may see the Indo-Soviet treaty as a fresh threat to its uneasy control of Sinkiang and Tibet. Moreover, the division of Pakistan offers the Chinese an opportunity to resolve the dilemma that they faced during 1971. They can now simultaneously support West Pakistan as an irritant, if not a serious counterweight, to India *and* support radicalism in Bangla Desh. Whether they will follow this course probably depends on whether they conclude that India is so firmly tied to Moscow that even a more accommodating policy on their part would fail to weaken Indo-Soviet ties.[49] Peking's attacks on Indian "expansionists" combined with the general restraint that it has shown in its treatment of Mrs. Gandhi personally suggest that it does not now plan to respond to her overtures but wants to keep the option available.

As for the United States, Indian anger over Washington's stance during the Pakistani civil war and the Indo-Pakistani conflict is tempered by an awareness that President Nixon's policy met with widespread American opposition. Indian leaders' efforts to distinguish between the Nixon administration's coolness and the friendlier attitudes of a large number of Americans suggest that they regard the present alienation as temporary. (It is useful to recall here that while New Delhi bitterly castigated President Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles in 1954 for their Asian policies, it hailed Eisenhower as the "Prince of Peace" on his visit to India in 1959.) However, Washington's dispatch of a carrier task force into the Bay of Bengal in late 1971 to pressure India caused Indians to feel threatened by Western sea power for the first time since independence. (Indian leaders are confident that their country —with Soviet backing—can deal with Pakistan and China, either singly or in combination. But their current apprehension about US policy testifies to their concern lest a US-Pakistan-China axis shift the balance of power against India.) Even if New Delhi concludes that this move represented temporary US ire rather than permanent hostility, it may decide that a Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean would hold certain benefits for India. Still, New

[49] The Indian government's endorsement of the Soviet position in the Sino-Soviet border dispute (see the Reuters dispatch from New Delhi, April 8, 1969) and other similar actions probably account for China's tendency to view India as a Soviet tool.

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Delhi wants India, not the Soviets, to dominate the Indian Ocean—which suggests that the most that it might yield to Moscow would be more frequent, but still controlled, use of some Indian naval facilities. Though this concession would constitute no small gain for the USSR, it would not amount to a great leap forward.

The Broad Soviet Course

Given the political environment likely to prevail, Soviet policies toward the three principal countries of the subcontinent will doubtless vary considerably. Even if Indo-Pakistani relations remain hostile, Moscow will want to maintain a position in West Pakistan. This should not be too difficult. All Moscow need do is to continue its trade policies and its economic-aid program—a course which it seems likely to follow as a result of President Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's visit to the USSR in March. Pakistan will have little choice but to accept any help proffered, and as long as the Soviet leaders send no arms, New Delhi will find little reason to object.

While the USSR will want to establish a position in Bangla Desh, it will probably move cautiously until it can judge the stability and orientation of that country.[50] Having supported India's "liberation" of the area, Moscow cannot completely escape responsibility for developments there, but it will in all likelihood be content to see India play the dominant role. The Soviet reluctance to extend assistance for general support of any country's economy, as distinct from aid for specific projects, will reinforce that caution. So also will the knowledge that the USSR could confront difficult choices if the present Bengali friendship for India erodes because of concrete disputes overlaid upon the presently submerged but still powerful communal antipathies.

As long as India faces Chinese hostility and American indifference, New Delhi will have little option but to rely heavily upon the Soviet Union, and Moscow will endeavor to exploit this state of affairs. Consequently, trade and cultural ties between the two nations will continue to expand; Soviet arms shipments will solidify the bonds between the military establishments of the two countries; and Indian and Soviet foreign policies will be strikingly similar on a wide variety of issues—although there will be hard bargaining and give-and-take behind the scenes. But Moscow has already made its big gains in India. India's improved security position probably means that nothing the USSR could or would offer in the way of military support would draw New Delhi into a tighter arrangement than now exists. Private threats to withhold arms or slowdowns in delivery might be marginally effective in influencing Indian policy, but Moscow's long-term need for a friendly India in order to compete in the Asian balance of power makes such moves a risky enterprise. Nor are the Soviet leaders likely to see benefits commensurate with the cost involved in a dramatic increase in aid to India, though they may announce new loans from time to time and may discover it necessary to reschedule the country's repayment of its debts to the USSR.

While one should keep in mind the limits of what the Soviets will probably be able to do, however, it is essential to remember the great gains that Moscow has made in South Asia since 1955 and the major change that its advance represents. In 1971, the USSR, for the first time since the disintegration of its World War II alliances, established formal treaty arrangements with non-Communist states like India—a development which both exemplifies and intensifies the complexities of world politics in a new era.

[50] The Soviet-Bangla Desh joint declaration at the end of Sheikh Mujib's visit to the USSR (Radio Moscow, TASS International Service, March 5, 1972) indicates that Moscow intends to establish a strong position—political as well as economic—in the new state without making major long-term aid commitments, at least at this time.

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The Persian Gulf—Cradle of Conflict?

By D. C. Watt

Thus far the Persian Gulf has not figured in any major way in the struggle between the Soviet Union and China for global power and influence, but there are already indications that this situation has begun to change. The development most responsible for drawing Soviet and, to a lesser extent, Chinese attention to this strategic and politically volatile region is Britain's relinquishment of her traditional role as "protector" of the tiny but (in some cases) oil-rich Gulf states, all of which are now either independent entities or linked together in an independent federation. The Soviet Union, already deeply involved in the other Arab states of the Middle East and now seeking to project its power and influence beyond into the Indian Ocean, has watched these changes in the Gulf with deep interest and with a primary view to assuring that the British withdrawal is total and not replaced by any substitute system of protection under British or US influence. On the other hand, the People's Republic of China has no vital strategic stake in the Gulf comparable to that of the USSR, but it, too, is showing a growing interest in the region, primarily from the standpoint of combating the spread of Soviet ideological influence and winning converts to its own model of socialist revolution. The purpose of this article will be to examine the evidences of Soviet and Chinese interest in the Gulf area as well as the contrasting nature of their attitudes and approaches to the problems of the region.

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Before looking at the manifestations of Soviet and Chinese interest, however, it may be helpful, in view of the extremely complex political and international relationships existing in this relatively obscure corner of the globe, to provide a brief resume of the background.

The Political Setting

Of the littoral countries, Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia were already independent before World War II, while Kuwait gained its independence only in 1961, soon thereafter surviving a crisis that involved British intervention to stand off a long-standing Iraqi claim of sovereignty. The Sultanate of Muscat and Oman also was already independent but maintained no relations with any external power save Britain, on whom it depended for military and paramilitary aid. Traditionally, Iran and Saudi Arabia have been the main recipients of US support and influence in the area, and as the dimensions and effects of British withdrawal have become more apparent, the Shah and government of Iran have come to see themselves as the logical heirs to Britain's former position of preeminence.

As will shortly be seen, various conflicts have existed between the major states bordering on the Gulf, and one of the principal objectives of Britain's diplomacy in preparing for her withdrawal has been to bring about a resolution of these conflicts. The principal focus of British concern, however, has been the future political stability and security of some nine smaller Arab political units hitherto under Britain's protection. They comprise the island of Bahrain, the peninsula of Qatar, and the seven so-called Trucial States—Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Umm al Qaiwain, Ras al-Khaimah, and

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Fujaira (see accompanying map). All are basically hereditary autocracies claiming the loyalties of familial and tribal groups rather than specific, easily delimitable, and geographically definable territories. Bahrain, with some quarter of a million inhabitants, is the largest—but not the richest. The latter distinction belongs to the shaikhdom of Abu Dhabi, with some 40,000 subjects, followed by the rival shaikhdom and "free port" of Dubai, with some 100,000 inhabitants. Qatar, larger than either Abu Dhabi or Dubai, also has oil but not on the same scale as these two. The remaining three shaikhdoms are all minute and—up to now—oilless, although they still nurture hopes for the discovery of oil off their shores.

Britain's solution to the problems of these tiny states was an effort to bring about the creation of a federation with common economic offices, a common bureaucracy, and common armed forces. The British effort succeeded in bringing about the formal establishment in 1968 of what was known as the Federation of Arab Emirates (FAE), linking Bahrain, Qatar, and the seven Trucial States. In practice, however, because of disagreement among the various ruling families over the terms of the federal constitution, the degree of centralism, common finances, and so on, the federation remained pretty much a paper organization except for the establishment, under British auspices, of common development offices largely financed from local oil revenues. In 1970, the British government appointed Sir William Luce, a former governor of Aden, as a special emissary to attempt to make the federation a functioning reality. His activities, however, were regarded with the darkest of suspicions by all the littoral states, as well as by the Egyptians, with the result that little progress was made. Then, in 1971, Bahrain decided to quit the federation, claimed its independence, signed a new treaty with Britain, and was admitted to the United Nations and the Arab League. Qatar soon followed suit. With this, the federation of nine states lapsed, but six of the smaller shaikhdoms, led by Abu Dhabi and Dubai, agreed in August 1971 to set up a smaller federation, which has since acquired independence and joined the UN as the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Of the smaller shaikhdoms, only Ras al-Khaimah remained outside the new federation initially, but eventually joined it in February 1972 as the seventh member.

Parallel with its efforts to create a viable federation, Britain also sought to eliminate by agreement as many local bones of contention as possible. These were, in order of importance: (1) the conflict between Iraq and Iran over their respective Kurdish minorities and over the issue of sovereignty over the mouth of Iraq's great river complex, the so-called Shatt al-Arab; (2) the Iraqi claim on Kuwait; (3) Saudi Arabian claims on Abu Dhabi and the Buraimi oasis; (4) Iranian claims on Bahrain; (5) Iranian claims on three small islands at the mouth of the Gulf, known as Abu Musa and the Tumbs; and (6) internal conflicts in the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman.

Of these, the first lay beyond British control. The second was virtually settled by the outcome of the 1961 crisis and Kuwait's acceptance into the Arab League. The third remained unsettled but dormant, amenable to the same processes as those which protected Kuwait, if only a viable Gulf federation could be established. The fourth was settled in 1970 when the Iranian government agreed to accept the result of a plebiscite organized by the United Nations.

Iran's claims on Abu Musa were resolved in Iran's favor by an agreement between the Shah and the Shaikh of Sharjah two days before the UAE began its existence as an independent state, but the dispute over the Tumbs proved more difficult to settle amicably. When the ruler of Ras al-Khaimah, with an eye to the possible future discovery of oil in the waters around the Tumbs, refused to relinquish his claim to the islands, Iranian troops moved in and occupied them on the eve of UAE independence—this in blunt defiance of Britain's guarantee of the Gulf states and the almost unanimous opposition of all the Arab nations. At the time of writing, the dispute is still unsettled, and the Arab League remains seized of it.

In Muscat and Oman (which in 1971 shortened its name to the Sultanate of Oman), there are basically two separate sources of domestic trouble. The first has to do with the claims of the so-called Imam of Oman on the loyalty of the inland tribes—claims for which his adherents used to obtain military and diplomatic support from Saudi Arabia and Egypt. The Imam and the Sultan of Oman are now reported to be in the process of reconciling their differences. The second is revolutionary unrest caused by outside subversive activity in the southernmost province of Dhofar. This activity has been directed by an organization known as the People's Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arab Gulf (PFLOAG), based in what was formerly the British protectorate of Aden. Since becoming independent in 1967, Aden has been ruled by a succession of increasingly radical left-wing Arab governments, which renamed the

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

The Persian Gulf and adjacent areas: Boundaries are only approximate, as many are undefined or in dispute.

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new state first the People's Republic of South Yemen and most recently the Democratic People's Republic of Yemen (DPRY). (There are other organizations similar to PFLOAG, one based in Syria and another in Iraq, but PFLOAG is by far the best known and most widely supported "anti-imperialist revolutionary movement" outside the Gulf proper.)

Anti-Imperialism and Socialism

The foregoing sketch provides an essential introduction to a survey of Soviet and Chinese attitudes with respect to developments in the Gulf. It should be noted that, apart from a Chinese blast early in 1971 charging the Soviet Union with seeking "hegemonism" in the Arab world[1] and, later, a bitter Soviet attack on Peking's failure to protest the suppression of the Sudani Communist party after the four-day coup in the Sudan in July 1971,[2] the Gulf area has not yet become involved to any substantial degree in the polemics between Moscow and Peking.

Both Soviet and Chinese commentators agree that the situation in the Gulf is a classic example of the "imperialist exploitation and repression" with which the "Arab masses" must inevitably be in conflict. The exploiters are, of course, the international oil "monopolies" and the British "imperialists" who are said to be in alliance with "subservient local feudalist reactionaries."[3] In trying to peddle their respective brands of socialism, however, the propagandists of both socialist camps have to contend with the existence of competing quasi-revolutionary ideologies centered respectively in Cairo, Aden and Baghdad.

This is hardly the place for a discussion of the reality, let alone the metaphysics, of the various brands of Arab socialism represented by these three capitals. The difficulty from the point of view of Peking and Moscow is that, whatever their own convictions may be as to the essentially bogus character of these varieties of Arab "revolutionary socialism," the Arab protagonists of these ideologies have certain firm beliefs in common: that they are established in the Arab lands by right; that Chinese or Soviet socialism has nothing very specific to teach them; that Chinese and Soviet representatives admitted into Arab lands are there only by courtesy of their hosts, who may at any moment turn against local proponents of Moscow's or Peking's ideology—as, indeed, has already happened in the United Arab Republic, Iraq, and most recently in the Sudan as a result of the alleged involvement of the Sudani Communist party in the abortive four-day coup against the government of General Jaafar Nimeri.

Of the Arab governments in the Gulf area, in fact, only that of the DPRY has yet to engage in direct conflict with native Sovietophile and Sinophile elements. In many respects, the DPRY leadership resembles that of Castro, regarding itself, if anything, as more dedicated to the cause of revolution than either Peking or Moscow. This may be seen, for example, in the contrast between the DPRY's flat refusal to accept the successive declarations of independence by Bahrain, Qatar and the UAE and the messages of welcome addressed to the latter by both Peking and Moscow. In the eyes of the DPRY, these states remain feudal tributaries of imperialism and their formal independence is but an imperialist sham. Accordingly, the DPRY strenuously opposed their admission to the Arab League and, through its official Aden News Agency, echoed PFLOAG's denunciation of the UAE, which was coupled with an appeal to "all Arab and world progressives to stand on the side of the Gulf people's just struggle."[4] It is interesting to note that Iraq, the other radical Arab state in the Gulf area, also echoed this denunciation, calling the Union "meaningless."[5] In contrast, Moscow—despite having earlier tried to obstruct Britain's plans for a federation—hailed the UAE's final acquisition of independence as a "great triumph for the patriotic forces achieved after a long hard struggle."[6]

Between Ideology and Realpolitik

To the extent that both Peking and Moscow tend to view even their own short-term interests in the framework of their ideological concepts and commitments, their policies and attitudes toward the contemporary international political situation in the Gulf have been subject to very considerable limitations and discontinuities. This can be seen quite

[1] "Down with Hegemonism," *Jen-min Jih-pao* (Peking), Jan. 16, 1971.

[2] Moscow Radio (in Arabic), Aug. 4, 1971. The broadcast denounced Peking's attitude as "very similar to that of the imperialist-reactionary forces in the world."

[3] *Ibid.* (in Arabic), Oct. 13, 1970.

[4] Aden News Agency, Dec. 4, 1971.

[5] *Ath Thawrah* (Baghdad), Dec. 7, 1971.

[6] Moscow Radio (in Arabic), Dec. 29, 1971.

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clearly in the generally cautious and restrained attitudes they have taken toward Britain's protracted and eventually successful efforts to bring about a federation of the small Gulf states. Both Peking and Moscow have had to reckon with the fact that, with the exception of Iraq and the DPRY, all the Arab states, as well as Iran, were wholeheartedly in support of the projected federation and wished it to become a reality. The Iraqis, moreover, were opposed only because its realization would be a victory for their rivals in Cairo and would establish Egypt's influence in the Gulf in a way that had hitherto been impossible. The only totally intransigent enemies of the federation among the Arabs are to be found in the DPRY, where PFLOAG stands for "liberation" of the whole Gulf and not merely Dhofar or Oman.

The Iranian occupation of Abu Musa and the Tumbs has further intensified the dilemma faced by Moscow and Peking between the conflicting pulls of ideology and *realpolitik*. As noted elsewhere, both the Soviet Union and China have gone out of their way to court the Shah in the increasingly independent course he has been following in recent years, with both voicing particular approval of the lead he has taken in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) against the independent "imperialist" oil companies.[7] However, the conflict now in train between Iran and the Arab states over Iranian seizure of the Tumbs—especially with Baghdad's and Aden's Arab "socialists" vociferously denouncing the Shah—has placed the Russians and Chinese in a difficult position, and at the time of writing both Communist powers were continuing to maintain a cautious silence regarding the conflict. In fact, the only comments from a Soviet source on Iran's claims to the islands came last summer via the Soviet-sponsored Radio Iran Courier, which broadcasts in Iranian from the Soviet Caucasus and serves as mouthpiece of the illegal Persian Communist (Tudeh) party. Statements broadcast by this station challenged the Shah's pretensions to Britain's former role as guardian of stability in the Gulf and, while acknowledging the validity of Iran's claims to the islands, warned against copying British methods of "colonial violence."[8]

In warning the Shah against falling into "the trap of imperialist policies" aimed at keeping the Gulf divided, Radio Iran Courier took about the only line that Moscow could adopt without unduly antagonizing the Shah or compromising relations with the USSR's Arab clients—and indeed the line was later picked up by A. Vasilev, writing in *Pravda*.[9] The same reticence was evident following the Iranian occupation of the islands. With Moscow again remaining silent, the official Bulgarian Telegraph Agency (BTA) was the first to come out with a statement, which took the form of a commentary by D. Ivanov released on December 2. Avoiding a condemnation of the Iranian action, the commentary sought to shift the blame for conflict among the Gulf states to Britain, accusing the latter of "sowing the seeds of dissension" before the UAE came into being in order to counter the possibility that any of the Union's members "might betray the pro-British line." "Neocolonialism," Ivanov concluded, "has made it its aim to secure its old position by using new methods and forms."

Support of Subversion

A number of dominant themes can be distinguished in Soviet and Chinese propaganda relating to the Gulf. The first has been all-out support of PFLOAG. On the Chinese side, the facilities of the New China News Agency have been made fully available to PFLOAG for the dissemination of the latter's somewhat fanciful communiques and claims. NCNA, in fact, was the only news agency to carry a full account of the meeting of the Third Congress of PFLOAG, reportedly held at Rakhyut in Dhofar on June 9-19, 1971.[10] This meeting was reportedly attended by representatives of a rival organization, the National Democratic Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Gulf (originally, it appears, of Syrian inspiration), who joined with PFLOAG in denouncing the projected federation of Gulf states as an "agent federation"—presumably of "Western imperialism." On June 10, while the PFLOAG Congress was meeting, Chou En-lai wrote to President Salim Rubay Ali of the DPRY repledging Chinese support for PFLOAG.[11]

[7] See, for example, a speech made by Chinese Foreign Minister Chi P'eng-fei at a reception celebrating the Shah's birthday at the Iranian embassy in Peking. China, he said, "supports your just cause and the struggle you have waged . . . to safeguard state sovereignty and to protect your national petroleum resources." New China News Agency (NCNA), Oct. 26, 1971.

[8] July 2 and July 27, 1971, attacking statements published in the Iranian newspaper, *Ettala'at* (Teheran), June 16, 1971.

[9] *Pravda* (Moscow), Nov. 3, 1971. Vasilev also accused the BBC of trying to whip up feeling in the Gulf by supporting Arab claims in its Arabic programs and Iranian claims in its Persian-language broadcasts.

[10] The NCNA reports were not issued, however, until July 27, 1971.

[11] NCNA, June 10, 1971.

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The Soviets have not lagged far behind the Chinese in wooing PFLOAG. On June 11, 1971, the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee sent its congratulations to PFLOAG and "all Dhofari patriots" on the sixth anniversary of their armed rising. Since June 1971, *Pravda* has twice carried reports by correspondents on the "armed struggle" in Dhofar, and these reports were given the widest possible circulation by TASS.[12] One of the Russian correspondents, A. Vasilev, claimed to have actually visited Dhofar and to have seen the villages ravaged and destroyed by the British, who—he alleged—were trying "to conceal the real nature of the war being fought to protect the interests of the oil "monopolies, especially Shell." The Soviets have even produced a short documentary film, entitled "The Hot Winds of Freedom," which was allegedly shot in Dhofar in April 1971 and which glorifies PFLOAG's "fight against imperialism."

Moscow Radio later claimed that PFLOAG had decided at its June Congress to set up a revolutionary party to be guided by the principles of Marxism-Leninism. If true, this would have implied that the Chinese would be faced with a pro-Soviet party hostile to their brand of socialism, but the degree of Chinese influence in the DPRY would tend to argue against the truth of the Moscow report. It should be noted in this connection that while Chou En-Lai sent an official message of congratulations to the new DPRY government which took office in Aden at the beginning of August 1971,[13] Moscow remained silent.

Moscow has coupled its support of PFLOAG with denunciations of the young Sultan of Oman, Qabus, whom it accused of sending British paratroopers to attack "the patriotic forces" and of allowing the setting up in Oman of a radio station calling itself "Voice of the Free South" to encourage dissidents within the DPRY.[14] (The latter charge is false, as the radio station in question is almost certainly located in Saudi Arabia.) Soviet propaganda has been particularly sharp in denouncing Qabus for allegedly permitting Britain to build new naval and air bases in Oman to replace those it is evacuating in the Gulf.[15] Moscow endeavors to link this with the establishment of an Anglo-American base at Diego Garcia, in the southern Indian Ocean, in December 1970 and the claimed development of a whole new Anglo-American strategy envisaging the basing in the Indian Ocean area of missile-carrying submarines capable of striking at Soviet Central Asia.[16]

Soviet Accusations

It is no exaggeration to say that the Soviets have been watching US moves in the Persian Gulf area with the deepest suspicion. Discussion in the United States of the "power vacuum" to be created by British withdrawal from the Gulf has been seized upon by Moscow as an excuse for conjuring up the specter of an "imperialist-Zionist-neocolonialist" plot to replace the British by some kind of American presence. The Russians view the small US naval squadron in the Gulf, which will be the only permanent Western unit in the Gulf area after the British withdrawal, with particular suspicion and have charged the squadron—consisting of two old destroyers—with casting an ominous shadow over PFLOAG's activities in Dhofar and trying to set up an aggressive military post in the area.[17] Reports that the United States would take over British naval facilities at Bahrain evoked accusations from Moscow that this would mean the replacement of Britain by "another group of colonialists."[18] And the US Central Intelligence Agency is now being blamed for the activities of armed dissidents within the DPRY.[19]

Some of the more far-reaching Soviet allegations concerning "US oil-imperialist" activities in the Gulf are curiously inconsistent with Soviet denunciations of British policy. The Conservative Heath government which took office in June 1970 announced in March 1971 that it was not intending to retain a permanent British military presence in the Gulf, although British officers would be attached to local forces and the area would be visited by British naval forces from time to time. The announcement also offered a British military training mission to train the forces of the projected new federation. Up to the release of this statement, the Soviet propaganda line was that the British were not serious in their advocacy of a federation and were manufacturing

[12] *Pravda* and TASS, Jan. 3, Aug. 3, 1971.
[13] NCNA International Service (in English), Aug. 8, 1971.
[14] Moscow Radio (in Arabic), Jan. 19, 1971.
[15] *Ibid.* (in Arabic), Aug. 10, Sept. 28, 1971; A. Vasilev in *Pravda*, Nov. 24, 1971. Radio Peace and Progress (in English) to Africa, Sept. 25, 1971.
[16] *E.g.*, see articles by A. Vasilev in *Pravda*, March 4, 1971, and by Yurii Tomikin in *Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnie otnosheniia* (Moscow), August 1971, as summarized by TASS, Aug. 10, 1971.
[17] Moscow Radio (in Arabic), Jan. 26, March 3, March 6; (in Persian) July 25, 1971.
[18] *Ibid.* (in Persian), Jan. 23, 1972.
[19] Radio Peace and Progress (in English) to Africa, Dec. 23, 1971.

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difficulties to prevent its realization so as to provide an excuse for maintaining their own presence in the Gulf. Thereafter, Moscow shifted its attack, rejecting the London announcement as simply a cover-up for British designs to make the federation a tool of colonialism.

Writing in *Pravda* on March 4, 1971, A. Vasilev charged that the British, far from withdrawing from the Gulf, were busy building up bases in Bahrain and Sharjah, as well as at Masirah and Sallaleh in Oman.[20] He described the federation as a "fig leaf" and a "house of cards." V. Kobysh took up the assault in *Izvestia* on March 11, writing of British worries at the signs of impending upheaval "in this preserve of archaic and mediaeval order." The "discontent of the masses is approaching the crisis point," he asserted, and the British were seeking a solution in the "age-old expedient" of "withdrawing while remaining."

Throughout the subsequent negotiations on the projected federation, Moscow continued to trumpet this propaganda line, accusing Britain of blackmail and threats[21] and of planning "to exploit the Arabs' natural desire for unity in order to slant the federation in the direction they required."[22] The decision of Bahrain and Qatar to withdraw from the old federation of nine was triumphantly greeted in *Pravda* of June 10 by Irina Pogodina, who saw it as a natural reaction to the British Tories' addiction to out-of-date "imperialist habits" and denounced the proposed establishment of a successor federation of six emirates (UAE) as simply a "cloak for the retention of military bases by the British." On the occasion of the UAE's formal inauguration two months later, a Moscow Radio commentator expressed "concern for the fate of the Arab emirates, who are weak and alone and dominated by colonialism."[23]

The real core of Soviet objections to Britain's plans for a Gulf federation lay in the projected arrangements for the federation's defense. Of the defunct federation of nine, Qatar, Bahrain and Abu Dhabi had sizable land, sea and air defense forces of their own, mainly officered by attached British military personnel and entirely armed by Britain. Although Bahrain and Qatar remained outside the new six-member UAE, the latter, in addition to the forces of Abu Dhabi, was to take over the Trucial Oman Scouts, hitherto paid for by Britain and commanded and officered entirely by British personnel. (This has since been carried out.) In Moscow's view, these arrangements meant that effective control of the federation forces would remain in British hands and that therefore the federation's independence would be a farce.[24] Whether plausible or not, the Soviet contention sheds revealing light on Moscow's own thinking and ambitions with respect to the Gulf.

After the UAE acquired independent status, Moscow again shifted its propaganda line. As mentioned earlier, Moscow Radio effusively welcomed UAE independence, and there was at least a temporary halt to the barrage of attacks on the federation as a mere sham. A singular exception occurred on the occasion of the assassination of the Shaikh of Sharjah in the course of an attempted coup d'état at the end of January 1972, when a Moscow broadcast spoke of the "frightened Emirs in Dubai" (Dubai is the seat of the new federal government) and of a federation "knocked together under the direct guidance of Britain."[25] It is too early at the time of writing to say whether this portends a new wave of attacks on the federation, but the continuation of Soviet propaganda assaults on Britain, alleging that she has no intention of genuinely withdrawing from the Gulf, suggests that this may well prove to be the case. Meanwhile, by contrast, the Chinese have remained silent regarding recent developments in the Gulf. Chinese Vice-Premier Li Hsien-nien, for example, carefully avoided any reference to the Gulf—a major focal point of current Iraqi foreign policy—in his speech welcoming an Iraqi delegation led by Minister of Trade Abd al Khaliq as-Sammar'i in Peking on December 26, 1971.[26]

Differing Views of the Middle East

The difference between the Soviet and Chinese attitudes regarding the Gulf very much parallels that between the two powers' attitudes toward the Middle East as a whole. The posture of the Chinese vis-à-vis the government and movements native to the area is dictated primarily by their ideological orientation toward a socialist revolution against imperialism.

[20] A similar accusation had already been made by Moscow Radio (in Arabic) on Feb. 23 and was repeated on June 22, 1971. See also the sources cited in footnote 15 above.

[21] Vera Lebedova on Moscow Radio (in Persian), May 15 and May 24, 1971.

[22] Moscow Radio (in Arabic), June 15, 1971.

[23] *Ibid.* (in Arabic), Aug. 10, 1971.

[24] *Ibid.* (in Arabic), March 6, 1971.

[25] *Ibid.* (in Arabic), Jan. 27, 1972.

[26] NCNA, Dec. 26, 1971.

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They see the Middle East as an area in which the indigenous bourgeois-nationalist and mass popular revolutionary movements are engaged in a common struggle to assert their independence against their quondam imperialist overlords, and China is therefore generally on their side. Among the various movements and/or governments in the area, however, Peking prefers those that are actually engaged in revolutionary struggle, such as the Palestinian guerrillas or PFLOAG, or that still maintain their revolutionary élan, as does the DPRY, for example. This preference, however, in the present post-Cultural Revolution era of Chinese diplomacy, does not keep Peking from entering into or maintaining normal state-to-state relations with some Middle Eastern regimes that are neither revolutionary nor socialist. A striking example of this pragmatic approach is Peking's exchange of ambassadors with Kuwait, whose government, in the Chinese scale of values, should be rated as "reactionary-bourgeois" rather than "bourgeois-nationalist"—save for the role it plays against the "international (oil) monopolists" in OPEC, which has won Chinese plaudits.[27]

In contrast to China, as noted at the outset, the Soviet Union has a direct and immediate interest in the whole Middle East area because of a combination of geopolitical and strategic considerations. These considerations have impelled the USSR to build up positions in the United Arab Republic and Syria that are now so vital to Soviet interests that Moscow can no longer afford a breach with the governments of these countries. The Soviet Union not only has naval base facilities in Alexandria but has made very considerable financial investments in the UAR and Syria, as well as in Iraq, whose ports at the head of the Persian Gulf are regularly visited by Soviet warships. Soviet policy with respect to the Gulf is thus governed by something more than the simple desire to interdict the oil riches of the area to Western exploitation. For one thing, Moscow cannot afford to pursue a policy in the Gulf that would alienate its Arab clients, and at the same time it is interested, at least in part, in securing some Gulf oil for its East European associates. Consequently, in matters involving conflict between the states of the area—as, for example, between Cairo and Baghdad or between Baghdad and Teheran—the Soviet Union has to tread extremely carefully. Between Egypt and the DPRY, whose relations even now are brittle to say the least and seem almost certain to give rise to conflict, Moscow will no doubt be forced to support Cairo.

[27] The Chinese have also praised Kuwait's "work against imperialism" in supporting the Palestinian guerrillas (*Jen-min Jih-pao*, March 31, 1971).

Areas of Conflict

So far, we have identified two areas of Sino-Soviet conflict: (1) competition between Moscow and Peking for the loyalties of the Marxist-Leninist party that PFLOAG proposes to establish; and (2) conflict over the orientation of the DPRY in the event of a clash between the latter's emotional revolutionarism and Cairo's more established brand of Arab socialism. Recent developments in the DPRY, where a "Vanguard Marxist party" within the National Front has been spoken of in the last few months,[28] suggests that Sino-Soviet political rivalry could spread to the territory of the DPRY itself. DPRY delegations have recently been studying various aspects of party organization and cadre training in the Soviet-bloc countries of Eastern Europe,[29] while on the other hand Chinese advisers are reported to have already arrived on the spot.[30] Moreover, the emphasis laid in recent DPRY statements on the importance of developing a people's militia within the "people's armed forces" finds a closer parallel in Chinese than in Soviet practice—an affinity buttressed by indications that Chinese teams may be engaged in training the militia units.

A third area of potential Sino-Soviet friction involves the two powers' relations with Iran and their attitudes toward the latter's ambitions to inherit Britain's position of hegemony in the Persian Gulf. Even more than Kuwait, Iran earned the admiration of both Moscow and Peking for its role in the OPEC negotiations at Teheran in early 1971 on oil costs and profit-sharing in Gulf oil,[31] and as a result the Shah has been much courted by both Communist centers. The Chinese have been particularly cordial,

[28] According to Radio "Voice of the South," formation of the new party was announced on December 7, 1971. The emergence of "a vanguard party" from the "national democratic alliance" had earlier been referred to by Abdullah al-Khamiri, the DPRY's Minister of Propaganda, in an interview on the East German Radio on Sept. 2, 1971.

[29] Abdullah al-Khamiri visited Prague and Moscow in January 1972.

[30] Report from Aden, NCNA International Service (in English), Jan. 16, 1972.

[31] Chou En-lai, welcoming Iran's Princess Ashraf to Peking, called the outcome of the negotiations an "anti-imperialist victory."

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reverting to pre-Cultural-Revolution-style diplomacy in entertaining the Shah's sisters, Princesses Ashraf and Fatimah, when they successively visited Peking in April 1971. Formal diplomatic relations were established between China and Iran in August 1971. Moscow abstained from comment on this occasion, preferring to leave that task to the underground Iranian Communist Radio Iran Courier. The radio observed that while China had to be recognized, the "unhealthy games" which accompanied the "recent vast international activity" centering on the PRC did not help but in fact rather harmed "the unity of the anti-imperialist forces of the world." [32]

The Soviet calmness on this occasion was a little surprising when contrasted, on the one hand, with Moscow's continuing hostility toward CENTO and, on the other, with the concerted campaign the Soviet, Hungarian, Polish and East German presses have been waging against the Yugoslav and Romanian governments for the close relations the latter have developed with China. Moscow's apparent lack of anxiety about the growth of Chinese influence in the Middle East, on the USSR's southern flank, can only be temporary. China has now established her presence in Kuwait, Baghdad, Teheran, and Aden, and any serious Chinese moves to develop trade and aid ties with these countries or influence their internal politics are bound to draw the Gulf and Middle East areas into the Sino-Soviet conflict.

In fact, the two Communist powers are already vying with each other in the aid field, most noticeably in the DPRY. The latter has embarked on a development plan designed to end its dependence on a service economy inherited from British rule by building up its agriculture, fisheries, and local industry. In order to do this, the country needs outside aid, and both China and the USSR have proffered their assistance. For the fisheries industry, the DPRY has acquired trawlers and refrigeration equipment from China, and a fish-canning and fish-processing plant from the Soviet Union. Both countries have also provided medical teams and irrigation experts. But the leaders of the DPRY, bearing in mind the lesson of the UAR's excessive dependence on the Soviet Union, are evidently trying to avoid depending too heavily on either the USSR or China. Thus, they have entrusted prospecting for minerals to Romanian experts and have sought advice on farm-machinery repair works from North Korea. China is also beginning to compete with the Soviet Union as a trading partner with Iraq, as the leaders in Baghdad, like those in Aden, seem to be coming around to the realization that their past one-sided reliance on economic ties with the USSR is unwise. Thus Iraq has recently concluded a trade agreement with Peking under which China will purchase 100,000 tons of sulphur from Iraq, representing about one-third of the capacity of a Polish-built plant at Mushraq.

In sum, Sino-Soviet rivalry in the Persian Gulf and the Arabian peninsula is for the moment still subdued and incipient. However, Peking's new forward policy is likely to bring it more and more into the open, and this tendency will probably be intensified as the two powers are confronted with the necessity of choosing between the different brands of Arab revolutionary socialism being peddled and flaunted along the shores of the Arabian peninsula. All this would seem to suggest that the struggle between Moscow and Peking for ideological and political primacy is still far from subsiding and, in fact, is spreading to embrace new areas of the globe.

[32] Aug. 17, 1971.

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Italian Communism: Strategy for the 1970's

By Donald L. M. Blackmer

The moment is opportune for a fresh look at the Italian Communist Party (Partito comunista italiano—PCI), and not only for the formal reason that it has recently been celebrating the 50th anniversary of its founding. The PCI, along with the Italian political system as a whole, is passing through what may prove to be a decisive period of change. The political alignments on which the system has been based for the past quarter of a century are showing severe signs of strain, and it can no longer be automatically assumed that the Christian Democratic Party (Democrazia christiana —DC), despite its extraordinary flexibility and staying power, will continue to maintain its position as the dominant party in a center-left coalition. Although rightist alternatives also exist, the possibility of Communist participation in government, or at least of the PCI's substantially enhanced role in policy formation as a "privileged" opposition party, must be seriously considered for the first time since 1948.

One sign of present uncertainties is that the Communist Party seems to be caught between two more or less plausible images, neither wholly accurate and the two in many respects contradictory. The older image, which is still projected regularly by many of its political opponents and sustained by journalistic and scholarly writings in Italy and abroad, depicts the party as authoritarian, subversive of the system, and basically loyal to a foreign power. In this view, the PCI, despite its surface adaptation to the democratic parliamentary system, is axiomatically unacceptable as a partner in government. During the last decade, and more particularly in the past three or four years, this image of the PCI has begun to lose its effect. In spite of the assiduous efforts of the Italian right to keep alive traditional hostilities, the cautious and persistent participation of the Communists in the political system, as well as their show of independence in conflicts with the Soviet Union, have by now gained them a significant measure of acceptance as a legitimate political force over a wide spectrum of public and elite opinion.

Thus there has gradually emerged a new image, rooted in the undeniable perception that the Communist Party is not subversive or revolutionary in the traditional sense. The argument takes different forms according to the political leanings of its proponents, but the central notion is the same: although the Communists vehemently deny it, the PCI has in fact become, or is fast becoming, a "revisionist" or social democratic type of party which has proved capable of playing a skillful electoral and parliamentary game but which in the process has lost the distinctive organizational and ideological attributes of a Leninist party. Many moderate leftists have applauded, holding that the backwardness and inefficiency of the Italian system can be overcome and a significant reform process begun only when the PCI has finally outgrown its Leninist and Stalinist heritage and become fully integrated into the system. The radicals have bitterly attacked the party for precisely the spirit of accommodation and cooperation that the reformists have praised, accusing it of betraying the interests of the working class and selling out to the system. This ideological and political challenge from the left steadily mounted during the 1960's, reaching its climax

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during the wave of student radicalism and labor upheavals of 1968 and 1969, when the PCI was confronted not only with a prodigious flowering of extremist *"gruppetti"* (small groupings) outside the party but with the first substantial factional dissidence in many years on the part of disillusioned leftwingers inside its ranks.

How is one to find a way through this tangle of conflicting appraisals? It is not enough to acknowledge that each of the competing views is politically interested, colored by the need either to discredit the PCI or to render it more palatable as the object of an alternative alliance strategy. The deeper source of the difficulty lies in the complex and ambiguous nature of the party itself—the root reason why such strikingly divergent interpretations and prognoses are possible. While it is beyond the scope of the present paper to probe this problem in depth,[1] it may be helpful to suggest in shorthand form this observer's particular perspective on the controversial phenomenon of Italian communism.

A Synthesis of Opposites

In contrast to what might be called the "totalitarian" and "revisionist" views outlined above, one of which appears anachronistic, the other at least premature, this perspective would stress the vitality and likely persistence of *both* the elements that implicitly dominate the two images described. What is interesting about the PCI is that it represents a synthesis of elements deriving from its participation in two wholly different political systems and cultures: that of Italy itself and that of the Communist movement. While the same could be said of other Communist parties, ruling as well as nonruling, the PCI stands out as a highly original and conspicuously successful example of this cultural fusion. Moreover, in the case of the PCI, the synthesis is still in the process of developing: there is thus little reason to accept, on present evidence, either that the special "Communist" attributes of the party are dominant and unchanging, or that Italian culture is inexorably absorbing the party, weakening and in the end destroying its Communist attributes. The party will certainly continue to adapt to a changing environment, but the pattern, pace and limits of its adaptation will be strongly conditioned by its identity and heritage as a Communist Party.

It seems useful at this juncture to give particular emphasis to the element of continuity, if only because most analysts (including the writer) have generally—and rightly—focused on the considerable degree of change the party has undergone since the watershed year of 1956. It does not in the least denigrate the significance of these changes to consider their possible limits as well. Why is it that the party dedicates so much effort to reinforcing the beliefs of party elites and militants, perpetuating styles of organization and international allegiances, and preserving other related aspects of the Communist tradition? The reason is not only because these facets of communism are in some respects intrinsically resistant to change and because it would be internally disruptive to challenge them, but because the party leadership continues to regard them as valuable weapons in its political struggle.

The case for this view cannot be made adequately here, but it rests in part on a broad perspective of postwar Italian political history. Despite an impressive level of economic growth and social change, and despite the illusion of constant political upheavals, the structure and basic alignments of the Italian political system have in fact remained remarkably stable. It may seem miraculous, especially to those obliged to follow Italian affairs from afar through occasional and often overdramatized journalistic reports, that the system regularly manages to emerge unscathed from yet another apparently mortal political crisis. This uneasy stability reflects the fact that Italian politics has thus far managed either to resist or to absorb pressures deriving from technological, economic and social developments, without undergoing fundamental change. What this means for the PCI is that it continues to function within essentially the same basic strategic constraints, domestic and international, that have operated upon it during the entire postwar era. These constraints relate directly to its status as a "permanent" *opposition* party whose powers of initiative and intervention in the system are sharply limited.

The Italian Communist Party emerged from the Resistance with the allegiance of large fractions of the urban and rural working populations of northern

[1] The present study focuses primarily on certain aspects of the PCI's domestic strategy in response to the current Italian political situation. Any broad appraisal of the nature of the party, its present strategy and future prospects would have to take into account its international as well as its domestic posture, but to cover this subject adequately would require a separate article.

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and central Italy, and with the bases for a potent organizational network—but in a position of fundamental strategic inferiority at the national political level. For a brief time, during which the PCI participated in the government, this strategic weakness was obscured by a number of factors, including on one hand an economic situation temporarily favorable to the working class and the relative organizational weakness of the party's opponents, and on the other, the many vital concessions made by the Communists themselves. By 1948, however, with the PCI out of the government and the Cold War in full flower, the party's minority status was starkly revealed. It was a Communist Party in a country dominated socially and ideologically by the Catholic Church and politically by the Christian Democratic Party; it was, in ideological and organizational terms, a proletarian party, but it had the support of substantially less than half of an industrial working class that constituted, in any case, less than a third of the electorate; it was, finally, a party firmly tied by organizational and emotional bonds to the USSR in a country just as closely linked to the American sphere of influence. The strategy of the Italian Communist Party, from that time forward, can be seen as an effort to minimize or escape from this position of strategic inferiority. The heart of the strategy has been an attempt to build a system of political and social alliances capable of overcoming the party's minority status.

The Political Strategy of the PCI

For the sake of clarity, it is helpful to differentiate the party's *political* strategy, meaning essentially its actions in the electoral and parliamentary arena and its relations with other parties, from its *social* strategy, meaning its attitudes and policies with respect to social forces, organized and unorganized, not directly represented in parliament. This approach is to some extent artificial since the two aspects of strategy obviously overlap, especially in the search for electoral support, but the distinction is nonetheless useful—and one the PCI itself continually makes. The heart of the party's overall strategy, in fact, can be seen as the search for an effective relationship between these two realms. Internal differences over strategic issues have as a rule focused precisely on the question of whether the "political" aspects of the party's activity were in danger of overwhelming the "social": this is the crux of the longstanding debate between the rightists in the party headed by Giorgio Amendola, who tend to stress the importance of political alliances, and the left wing represented by Pietro Ingrao and, until their expulsion, his former sympathizers in the Manifesto group (on whom more shortly).

The party's political strategy has always been a compound of competition and cooperation. The competitive side is most visibly expressed through elections, in which the PCI has done notably well. By steadily increasing its share of the vote from a low of 18.9 percent in the 1946 election to the Constituent Assembly to a high of 26.9 percent in the 1968 general election, it has given repeated, tangible evidence of its growing power and prestige. But the Communists themselves have never suggested that the road to power in Italy, the *"via Italiana,"* lay through gaining an electoral majority, certainly not by themselves and not even in combination with the socialist forces represented in the Socialist Party (Partito socialista italiano—PSI) and its leftwing offshoot, the Socialist Party of Proletarian Unity (Partito socialista italiano di unita proletaria—PSIUP). Such an outcome would require an electoral shift of such major proportions as to be implausible, given the stability of the Italian electorate. The party's goal since 1948 has been to shift the balance of power away from a centrist or center-left coalition dominated by the Christian Democrats to a leftist coalition dominated by the Communists. Its political strategy, then, has above all involved a search for allies. And since lasting alliances imply cooperation and compromise, it is hardly surprising that these characteristics figure so prominently in any description of the PCI's political behavior.

With the partial exception of the period from 1948 to the mid-1950's, when a uniquely unfavorable set of national and international conditions prevailed, the PCI has consistently sought to create a positive image of itself as a party working within the framework of a democratic, parliamentary system to achieve vital social and economic reforms in the interest of the vast majority of the Italian nation. While this effort has of course been a central part of its appeal to as wide as possible a spectrum of the electorate, it has more specifically been directed toward the political forces regarded as the critical components of the desired "new majority"—the Socialists and the leftwing Christian Democrats. These are the groups presumed to share the PCI's conviction that reforms

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ON THE NEED FOR ALLIES

A lesson which today merits particular reflection, and which comes from the history of all proletarian and popular revolutions, especially those of the last decade, is that not one of these has attained the victory over capitalism and begun the construction of a different society as a working-class revolution—that is, a revolution achieved exclusively by the proletariat. . . . Certain groups fall into the error of maintaining that the revolution should be won solely by the working class, by means of simple growth of a so-called "counterpower from below," which would spring from the factories and affirm itself subsequently in the entire society and in the state. Such positions are the fruit of an illusion, and not a new one either, on the part of the working-class movement and especially of certain petty-bourgeois groups which align themselves with the proletarian cause. The illusion is that such positions, since they are more radical, are also more revolutionary. In fact, however, they forget the element that is always essential—that is, the state-political dimension and the question of alliances, or rather the construction of a bloc of social, political, and ideological forces around the class which is historically revolutionary.

—From Enrico Berlinguer, "Classe operaia e blocco sociale" (Working Class and Social Bloc), *Rinascita* (Rome), Jan. 15, 1971.

are desperately needed and to be open to the argument that Communist participation is crucial to their design and realization.

The PCI's effort to establish its credentials as a respectable and indeed indispensable ally in the reformist coalition has been particularly evident since its Tenth Congress in 1962. Its moves toward this end have been voluminous and can only be illustrated briefly here. The party's long-standing policy of "structural reforms" has been given increasingly more explicit content through detailed legislative and other proposals on issues such as housing and welfare policies, school and university reform, taxation and economic policy. Its positions on these and other issues have been moderate, by contemporary European standards, and its parliamentary behavior for the most part conciliatory, consisting generally of compromises to win small gains in legislative commissions; only rather rarely has it engaged in debates on the floor and open confrontation over government proposals. The logic of its position has been to support even modest reforms, provided it can take some credit for them —and provided their passage heightens tensions within and among the government parties. In the spring of 1971, for instance, the PCI abstained from the vote on a housing bill in the Chamber of Deputies that it had criticized as grossly inadequate (despite the inclusion of some Communist-sponsored amendments), largely because the bill would otherwise have been defeated as the result of the defection of a rather substantial group of rightwing Christian Democrats, who saw certain vested interests being damaged and who broke party discipline to vote against the measure.[2] Although the party found it a bit awkward to explain, amidst the jibes of the radical press, why it should have intervened to save the government from going down to defeat over a bad bill, the vote provided an opportunity to demonstrate that Communist support is indispensable for the passage even of mildly progressive social measures.

The "positive character" of the Communist stance, to use one of the party's favorite self-characterizations, has been even more strikingly demonstrated in its response to Italy's recent economic difficulties. During the spring of 1970, following a year of intense labor struggles which contributed to an already declining level of production and profit in Italian industry, rightwing groups in and outside the government combined to create an atmosphere of sustained tension based on the double threat of a radical economic deterioration and an early general election which might lead to a resurgence of the right. In the midst of this tension, the government unexpectedly resigned. While denouncing the alarmist campaign of the right, and defending the unions against the charge that their economic gains were at the root of the crisis, the party responded constructively and with restraint. It acknowledged the gravity of the economic situation and did not deny that the gains of the working class could present problems for the further development of the economy. Since the primary danger to the economic and political interests of the working class and the entire nation, however, was that of a recession, the first objective must be renewed expansion of the nation's productive capabilities. This did not, the party insisted, mean renouncing further labor advances and inaugurating the "social truce" urged by the right. It did mean that labor should concentrate on defending gains already made, especially rights within the factory, and on

[2] See the editorial by PCI leader Enrico Berlinguer explaining the vote, in *L'Unità* (Rome), May 30, 1971.

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developing a new general strategy centering on the goals of full employment, above all in the South, and of structural reforms designed to reverse current patterns of investment and consumption.[3] The generally favorable comment evoked from all but the extremes on the left and the right by this set of moves seemed to suggest widespread agreement with the Communists' insistence that if the government was to begin governing seriously, then—as PCI Vice-Secretary (now Secretary-General) Enrico Berlinguer put it—"Parliament must function in such a way as to allow the positive contribution of the opposition of the left in the determination of national policy." [4]

Shifting Political Winds

Revealing though such episodes are, it is more important to try to place the party's overall strategy in the context of the broader trends of Italian political life. The dominant fact of Italian politics during the 1960's was the shift of the political axis to the left, the *"apertura a sinistra"* that brought the Socialist party into the governing alliance and ended the era of centrist or center-right governments. This shift to the left, it should be noted, by no means automatically favored the Communists. Many Italians, including a number of worried Communist leaders, believed that the center-left coalition might well accomplish the historic mission that its architects had in mind of launching a program of moderate and gradual reforms, drawing the Socialists into the mainstream of political life, and thus permanently isolating the Communists and gradually eroding their strength among the working classes. Others found a different scenario more persuasive: Socialist participation in government would serve to erode the ideological and political barriers against the Marxist left as a whole, shift the balance within the Christian Democratic party to the left, and thus pave the way for the eventual participation of the Communists in the government.

Until 1968 proponents of the former view appeared to have the best of the bargain. It was true that a succession of center-left governments had accomplished little in the way of reforms. The political consequence, however, had not been Socialist disillusionment and withdrawal from the government, partly because the strongest dissenters had already left the party in protest to form the PSIUP. On the contrary, the Socialists had become more firmly attached to the powers and perquisites of government, tending to yield on specific reform issues for the sake of maintaining the coalition. The drift of the Socialists to the right reached its furthest point in the ambitious project—inspired and led by the two grand old men of Italian socialism, Pietro Nenni and Giuseppe Saragat—to wipe out nearly 20 years of history by reuniting the PSI and the Social Democrats (Partito socialista democratico italiano —PSDI) in a large social democratic labor party capable of attracting support from moderate forces on both left and right. In the fall of 1966 unification was ratified despite strenuous Communist efforts to sidetrack it by launching a debate on the prospects for an alternative alliance, or even unification, of leftwing parties. It was in this context that Giorgio

Enrico Berlinguer at the March 1972 PCI Congress, where he was elected Secretary-General of the party.

[3] "Il comunicato della Direzione" (Communiqué of the Executive Directorate), *ibid.*, July 9, 1970.

[4] *L'Unità*, July 12, 1970. See also Giorgio Napolitano, "Come ci siamo mossi nella crisi di luglio" (How We Acted During the July Crisis), *Rinascita* (Rome), Sept. 11, 1970. Berlinguer was elected to the top post of the party at the PCI Congress held in March 1972.

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Amendola had earlier made his stunning proposal that a new working class party be created, since neither the Social Democratic nor the Communist alternative had succeeded, after 50 years, in accomplishing a socialist transformation of society.

It looked for a time as though the perennial hope of the Communists for an effective alliance with the Socialists had at last gone aglimmering. Within hardly more than a year, however, the situation had reversed itself and Italian politics entered a distinctly new phase. The decisive political event was the general election of May 1968, which saw both the DC and the PCI modestly increase their proportion of the total vote but brought disaster for the new united socialist party, which managed to win only 14.5 percent of the vote to the Chamber of Deputies, as compared to the 19.9 percent that the two parties had polled separately in the preceding parliamentary elections. This blow, coupled with the frictions resulting from the political, social and organizational incompatibility of the two parties, resulted in mid-1969 in cancellation of the unification. The PSI, now in bitter competiton with the Social Democrats, adopted a more open posture toward the Communists, which found symbolic expression in the ambiguous, untranslatable, and altogether Italian appeal for *"equilibri piu avanzati"* (literally, more advanced equilibria) in government and in society.

The Upsurge of Radicalism

The social context of these political happenings was of decisive importance. Just at this time Italy was experiencing powerful upheavals, first the wave of student radicalism that in 1967 and 1968 brought many Italian universities to a standstill, then the famous "hot autumn" of 1969 in which the working class showed its vitality by virtually paralyzing major sectors of Italian industry in a series of strikes for renewal of contracts and by setting up mass assemblies and councils of elected delegates that challenged old authority structures within the factory. In addition to having vitally important consequences for the trade unions, whose changing relationships with the parties, the government, and the workers themselves will be discussed later, these events appeared to be providing a strong push for a political shift to the left. The need for social and institutional reform had been so powerfully expressed in action that it could hardly be ignored any longer by parliament. Labor began to move rapidly to overcome the split of 1948 and mobilize its united strength on behalf not only of traditional economic claims but of general social reforms as well. Mass labor organizations of the Catholic left such as the Italian Confederation of Workers' Syndicates (Conferazione italiana sindicati lavoratori—CISL) and the Christian Association of Italian Workers (Associazioni christiane lavoratori italiani—ACLI), formerly strongly associated with the Christian Democratic Party, began to assert their autonomy from the party and declared that they would no longer automatically support its candidates for political office. All in all, the Communist Party, the dominant force within the labor movement, seemed to be riding the crest of the wave.

In fact, student and worker radicalism was not an unmixed blessing for the PCI, which soon came to be the principal target for the attack of radicalized intellectuals and workers within and outside its ranks. The party suffered the most serious split in its history in the challenge and expulsion of the Manifesto group.[5] But whatever damage to its credibility as a revolutionary party the PCI may have suffered was more than compensated for by the credit it was gaining to its right, among the parties and groups that have been the natural targets of the party's alliance strategy. Forced, like other established institutions, to defend itself against the political and ideological challenge of the radicals, the Communist Party strengthened its claim to be regarded as an integral part of the political system. The emergence of an extraparliamentary left, for all its potential embarrassment to the Communists, was an almost indispensable aid to the party's long-term effort to create for itself an image of respectability and constructive participation.

The combined effects of these political and social events were deeply destabilizing for the center-left coalition, which finally collapsed following the presidential election of December 1971. As pressures for change had mounted, tensions among and within the coalition parties had grown to the point that successive governments seemed able to hang together only as long as they could continue to avoid taking decisive action.

[5] This refers to a dissident group of Communists who, in June 1969, began to publish a left-wing theoretical journal, *Il Manifesto* (Rome), from within the ranks of the PCI. They were expelled from the party in December 1969, initiated a daily newspaper in April 1971, and have convoked a national congress for the purpose of organizing the group as a formal political party.

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It is conceivable, though not likely, that the results of the general elections scheduled to be held in May 1972 could spell the end of the center-left coalition and provide the impetus for a restructuring of the government formula. Since an Italian government without Christian Democrats is still improbable in the extreme, the most plausible alternatives to the present system are a precarious three- or four-party coalition of the center-right with perhaps some external support from the Fascists, or a more stable coalition of Christian Democrats and Socialists with external support from the Communists. In the former case, the PCI and the PSI would form the core of a powerful opposition—and of a potential alternative government; this option was hinted at by their alliance in the presidential election of December 1971 against a coalition of the DC and the parties to its right. In the latter case, the PCI would almost certainly intensify its role as a constructive and loyal opposition, a candidate for admission into an eventual government representing national unity.

Prediction would be foolish. Let us consider, instead, three general considerations that follow from what has been said here. First, the most significant if least tangible measure of Communist progress over the last decade has been the gradual erosion of the psychological and ideological barriers against acceptance of the PCI as a full and legitimate participant in Italian political life. Communist participation in government, not many years ago widely regarded as unthinkable, is now a possibility being openly and seriously discussed by politicians and political commentators.[6] This shift in attitudes toward Communist participation does not mean that it will happen soon—but it does suggest that the ideological ice is being broken.

Second, by way of corrective, it is equally clear that there remain powerful sources of resistance to change in the present system. Despite the party's best efforts, anticommunism is still an effective rallying point for large sectors of the population. The Christian Democratic Party has maintained its unity, despite an almost incredible level of internal tension and the disintegration of its formerly close links with such mass labor organizations as CISL and ACLI. The cement of power is impressively strong, far more so than religious beliefs, and there is thus no evidence that leftwing factions in the DC might be prepared to relinguish their present access to the levers of authority in the party and the state. The Socialists, similarly, are far from eager to abandon their places in the government bureaucracy and the *"sottogoverno"* (the informal system of patronage, influence, etc.) or to risk splitting their party further and submitting it to an uncertain fate as a subordinate ally in an opposition dominated by a far stronger Communist Party. However distasteful the status quo may be, especially to those groups in the coalition who feel most acutely the need for change, the pressures for maintenance of the system are formidable.

This leads to a third consideration. Despite its strong emphasis on electoral and parliamentary politics, the Communist Party appears to be acutely aware that the routine politics of electoral competition and maneuvering among the parties will not carry them across the threshold of power. The Communists have always rejected the idea that the "Italian road to socialism" could be summed up simply as a "parliamentary road," however important that aspect might be. They insist that something more is required, namely the capacity to mobilize diverse groups in the population behind their strategy of structural change, thereby bringing to bear social pressures sufficiently strong to break through the logic of conventional politics. This "something more" is the essence of the party's social strategy.

The Social Strategy of the PCI

Viewed through the lens of its political strategy, the Italian Communist Party does not look so very different from other parties. Although there are differences in its stated goals and rhetoric, its tactical methods, and its organizational techniques, by and large the interplay of politics in a democratic parliamentary system seems to affect the PCI much as it does its competitors. In this realm, the specifically "Communist" attributes of the PCI are not particularly evident.

The same cannot be said for its social strategy. The very concept, in fact, derives centrally from the Communist tradition. It is of course true that any major party seeking a substantial share of the vote in a complex industrial society tries to appeal to a variety of social, economic or regional groups.

[6] See, *e.g.*, Nicola Matteucci, "La Grande Coalizione, (The Grand Coalition), *Il Mulino* (Bologna), January-February 1971; and the discussion in Arrigo Levi, *PCI: la lunga marcia verso il potere* (PCI: The Long March Toward Power), Milan, Etas Kompass, 1971.

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But the strategy of such "catch-all" parties, to use Otto Kirchheimer's phrase, is essentially electoral in nature: it is *votes* the party seeks to catch. Furthermore, such parties cannot easily articulate broad social and political goals for the society as a whole, since they are not really unified national bodies but are rather coalitions of regional, class, ethnic and other groups with divergent interests and priorities, held together less by programmatic logic than by historical circumstance and a mutual interest in holding or obtaining local and national power.

Such a description would not be utterly out of place for the PCI. It, too, looks for votes among a wide range of social and economic groups, and it has by no means succeeded in forging effective links between the various parts of its constituency —for example, between the industrial workers and the peasantry. And yet at least three crucial distinctions can be made. First, the Communists actively seek to integrate the several dimensions of their social strategy into a coherent approach which, while acknowledging conflicts of perceived interest among different groups, tries to reconcile them through a broad conception of the national interest. Second, as an organizational corollary of the above, the PCI leadership consciously, and thus far quite successfully, strives to prevent the party from becoming a faction-ridden congeries of regional, occupational or other interest groups. Third, the party regards social groups not only as a source of votes but as a source of other kinds of social, economic and political power that can be brought to bear on the system to induce changes in it: the goal is to mobilize citizens as well as to win votes. In sum, the PCI's conception of how social forces should be viewed and used for political purposes is one of the clearest respects in which it differs from other parties and reveals its Leninist origins.

As already suggested, the main premise on which the PCI's social strategy rests is that significant shifts in the political balance are unlikely to result solely from electoral gains and losses or maneuverings at the summit of the political system but must rather arise from more fundamental changes in the attitudes and behavior of social forces and from the mobilization of these forces so as to bring pressure on the parties and other institutions supporting the government. The strategy has an important defensive corollary as well: to neutralize groups on which the DC and its allies might build a conservative bloc of social forces capable of shifting the political axis to the right. Two second-order premises identify the targets of the strategy. The most important and effective social force—actually and potentially—is the industrial working class, whose historic mission is to establish its leadership, or hegemony, over the other classes and strata in the revolutionary process of social transformation. No successful revolution, however, has ever based itself exclusively on the proletariat; the party must therefore work to develop a system of class alliances comparable to the party alliances it seeks to create at the parliamentary level. Since these operational premises are to some extent politically incompatible, they are the source of internal tensions or "contradictions" which lend the party's social strategy a degree of complexity and ambiguity that often distresses its supporters and confuses those who seek to understand its behavior.[7]

Appeals to Other Classes

Space permits only brief mention of the PCI's efforts to build social alliances outside the proletariat, although this is both a fascinating and an increasingly important aspect of its strategy. A convenient distinction can be made between two levels of its activity, one aimed at broad sectors of the population and cutting across class lines, the other focused more sharply on the particular interests of different sectors of the middle class. The party has for many years attempted to appeal to a wide spectrum of Italian opinion by hammering away at certain themes designed to build up its image as a constructive, peace-loving, democratic party. International issues such as Vietnam allow the party to assert itself as a champion of peace and a consistent opponent of American imperialism in Europe and in Asia. Even more effective is the party's leadership in campaigns against fascism, a cause that seemed moribund a few years ago but that has taken on fresh meaning not only for the older generation but for younger people who have recently witnessed the rise of neofascism as an electoral phenomenon, especially in the South, and as an organized, conspiratorial movement that has set off bombs and plotted ineffectual but nonetheless alarming coups d'état. Whereas for many Italians

[7] For a succinct and authoritative discussion of these issues, see Enrico Berlinguer, "'Classe operaia e blocco sociale" (Working Class and Social Bloc), *Rinascita*, Jan. 15, 1971, pp. 5-6.

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the credibility of the PCI's international position is tainted by its association with the Soviet Union, its anti-Fascist credentials cannot seriously be questioned. The legacy of the Resistance is still a powerful asset, one the party works assiduously to maintain and to re-create in the younger generations.

All this is not simply a matter of propaganda, of verbal declarations. What is distinctive and often impressive is that the PCI takes the trouble, and has the capacity, to bring people out into the streets and into public assemblies to demonstrate their support of Communist initiatives. What other political party in a parliamentary system has a comparable capacity to mobilize thousands of people quite regularly in protest against real or alleged threats to democratic liberties? Such occasions are important reminders to the Communist militants and to other political forces that its capacity to mobilize the masses has not been lost. Fully as important, however, and in contrast to the typical mass mobilizations of earlier years, is the fact that today the party works hard and often successfully to include representatives of other groups and parties in its rallies. A demonstration is counted a real success only if Socialist banners and those of left-wing Catholic groups—the DC youth organization, the ACLI, the Worker's Political Movement (Movimento politico del lavoratori—MPL)—are flying alongside those of the Communist Party. In this as in other ways, the social strategy is directly linked to the political.[8]

The second level of the party's attempt to reach beyond the workers is the appeal to various sections of the middle class. This theme, too, has been present throughout the postwar period, but its content has been enriched in recent years. When Togliatti spoke, as he often did, of the importance of the middle class, he tended to think in terms of two large and related goals: to win over the "middle" farmers (who in Italy are largely small-plot renters) as well as the poorest peasants, and to overcome the ideological and political hostility of the Catholic masses. During the past decade or so, paralleling the growing concreteness of the party's attention to the strategy of structural reforms, the middle-class issue has been given more explicit social and economic focus. The PCI is unashamedly eager to win over not only farmers but artisans, small shopkeepers, technicians and industrial white-collar workers, even small and medium industrialists—all those, in short, whom the party classifies as the *productive* middle classes. The current resurgence of neofascism has aroused the party's concern that these groups may be utilized as the mass base of a rightwing movement.[9]

A few examples of the PCI approach to sectors of the population outside the industrial proletariat may illustrate the extent to which the party has overcome ideological constraints in its search for alliances. In a country such as Italy, where the proportion of the labor force employed in agriculture remains around 20 percent, the policy of the party toward the peasantry has obvious significance. Continuing the line adopted in the immediate postwar period, when the party took the lead in insisting on the right of the peasants to occupy the land they till, strategy remains oriented to the interests of the small proprietor. The goal of mobilizing not

FOR A VIGOROUS SOCIAL STRATEGY

The evolution of the center left has gradually destroyed the reformist illusion that it would be possible to make the moderate groups which today control the DC [Democrazia christiana—Christian Democratic Party] accept in a relatively painless manner, bit by bit, a policy of structural renewal. . . . The creation of a governmental alternative means working for a convergence of political forces, but it means above all working to build a bloc of social forces. . . . This requires that the working and popular masses of the left transform the quality of the relationships among themselves and confront openly the objective of common research and activity which will coordinate the contents and various levels of the struggle. This struggle must be realized today in conditions totally different from those of a "popular front," according to a dialectic which no longer tolerates "transmission belts," but which stimulates unity from a continual confrontation of autonomous forces and movements. . . . In the coming months, therefore, we cannot limit ourselves to top-level agreements, nor can we, in the wake of the election, begin to repeat mechanically the political alignments of the last years of the center left.

—From remarks by Pietro Ingrao at the 13th PCI Congress held in Milan March 13-17, 1972; *L'Unita* (Rome), March 17.

[8] See *L'Unità*, Nov. 29, 1971, for the party's account of the most recent anti-Fascist demonstration, which saw an estimated 300,000 persons of diverse political persuasions march in Rome in what the banner headline termed "A massive test of anti-Fascist unity."

[9] For a discussion of strategy and tactics in this realm, see Luciano Barca, "Alleanza col ceto medio: d'accordo, ma quale?" (Alliance with the Middle Class: Certainly, but which [Middle Class]?), *Rinascita*, April 9, 1971, pp. 7-8.

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only the *braccianti* (day laborers) and the "poor peasants," but the entire spectrum of the peasantry behind Communist initiatives is emphasized in party literature.[10] This strategy has assumed concrete form in PCI-backed proposals for a reduction of agricultural rents and for the transformation of the various forms of share-cropping into rent contracts. While such initiatives have been supplemented by demands for fiscal and other incentives to encourage the process of cooperation, the weight of party propaganda in this sphere remains directed to the still unsatisfied "land hunger" of the Italian peasantry.

A similar line has been pursued vis-à-vis the urban middle classes. Increasing efforts are being made to mobilize middle- as well as working-class people around local issues such as transportation, schools, and decentralization of local government. With regard to the strategy of structural reforms (housing, health, education, and the like), the party emphasizes the necessity of involving middle-class groups in the struggle, of making them see themselves not as the target but rather as the protagonists and the beneficiaries, along with the working class, of the proposed reforms. The point is repeatedly stressed that the reforms are intended to strike only large, parasitic incomes, while protecting the savings and property of the petty-bourgeois classes, artisans and small shopkeepers. This commitment was reinforced by PCI support of commercial reform legislation, considered by most commentators to be blatantly corporatist, and by a proposal for suspension of the value-added tax imposed by recent tax-reform legislation. In the interests of "anti-monopolistic development," the PCI also defends small and medium industry against the large monopolies, demanding credit and fiscal concessions on behalf of the former.[11]

Unity of the Working Class

The industrial proletariat, as the natural constituency of the PCI and the largest and best organized social force available to it, has always been the central focus of its social strategy. It is important to note that the PCI's approach even to this core constituency takes the form of an alliance strategy. The industrial proletariat is far from homogeneous socially and economically: great differences of interest, values and experience divide the skilled from the unskilled, the young from the old, the Southern immigrant from the old-time Turin worker. A "working-class strategy," therefore, implies conflicts, ambiguities, difficult choices. Even more salient is the fact that the Italian working class has been sharply divided politically since the onset of the Cold War; and the Communists, while constituting the strongest party of the working class in electoral terms, are nonetheless a minority.[12] The institutional expression of this division has been the split into three major trade union confederations, the aforementioned Catholic CISL, the Communist-Socialist General Confederation of Labor (Confederazione generale italiana del lavoro—CGIL), and the largely Social Democratic Italian Workers' Union (Unione italiana del lavoro—UIL).

From the union split, which dates back to 1948, the PCI salvaged two things: a social alliance with the PSI in the CGIL, and a strong ideological and strategic commitment to the goal of union unification. That the Socialists remained in the CGIL despite the tensions generated by the PSI's entry into the center-left government must be counted a major Communist success. Many internal factors in the PSI favored this outcome, above all the strength of the left-wing Socialists, many of whom joined the PSIUP, and the PSI's fear of losing part of its working-class base. But many concessions in matters of internal organization and policy were made by the PCI and the CGIL in order to maintain unity. If the alliance in the CGIL had collapsed, the PCI's entire political strategy would have been bankrupt. This success, however, like most of those achieved during the two decades after 1948, was largely of a defensive order. The PCI's effective organization enabled it to keep losses among its own base to a tolerable level and to keep alive, however tenuously, the ties with the Socialists that were the prerequisite for any new advance.

The current drive to achieve unification of the three union confederations is of a different order, indicative of the transition through which PCI policy

[10] *E.g.*, Enzo Santarelli, "La mezzadria alla stretta finale" (The Last Throes of the Sharecropping System), *ibid.*, Nov. 12, 1971, pp. 7-8.

[11] Giorgio Ceredi, "Quale strategia nella piccola industria?" (What Strategy for Small Industry?) *ibid.*, Oct. 22, 1971, pp. 7-8.

[12] Calculations by Mattei Dogan based on the 1958 elections attribute 38 percent of the industrial worker vote to the PCI, with the DC and the PSI getting about 25 percent each. Mattei Dogan, "Political Cleavage and Social Stratification in France and Italy," in *Party Systems and Voter Alignments*, ed. S. M. Lipset, New York, The Free Press, 1967, p. 140.

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and Italian politics in general have recently been passing. The trend toward unity has been complex, influenced by many important economic and social developments of the past decade which have strengthened the unions and created a fresh awareness of common interests. Continued economic expansion in the North sharply improved the labor market and strengthened the unions' bargaining power. The heavy migration of unskilled workers from the South exerted great pressure on industrialists and unions alike, since the combined shock of factory life and of desperately poor housing and living conditions made many of the newcomers easy targets for the political agitation carried on by radical students.

The labor force was also being changed by the entry of a new generation of workers, many of whom were indifferent to the unions and relatively untouched by the ideological antagonisms of the late 1940's and 1950's or by the repressions against leftwing unionists that had helped take the starch out of the labor movement during those years. Important strategic lessons had been learned by union leaders, too, in the period of stagnation that had followed the last round of union advances in the early 1960's. They had seen that the government, by its economic and social policies, and the industrialists, by such devices as reorganizing production methods and tinkering with piecework quotas, could effectively negate the effect of wage increases. The unions responded by moving in two directions: first, portions of contracts, previously worked out on an industry-wide basis, came to be negotiated at the individual factory level, thereby introducing into the bargaining issues having to do with the organization of production and the quality of the work environment; second, the unions entered in a new way on the national political scene by pressing for major social reforms such as pensions, housing, and development of the South.

By 1966 the combined effect of these and other developments began to show in the form of joint strike actions and negotiations in certain economic sectors and in the first formal discussions at the confederal level about unification. The process was facilitated by leadership changes in the unions, particularly in the CISL but also in the CGIL, which brought to the top a number of aggressive and highly talented young leaders committed to forcing the pace of unification. A decisive push was provided by the wave of radicalism in 1968-69, which not only gave the labor movement new confidence in its political and economic strength but, by vastly enhancing the power of the rank and file in union decision-making, created something like a *de facto* unity at the base to which the leadership was obliged to respond or risk losing control of the movement.

Negotiations among the three confederations proceeded during 1970-71, climaxing last November in a settlement of outstanding issues and an agreement (qualified on the part of the UIL) to hold congresses in the fall of 1972 to dissolve the confederations, to be followed no later than February 1973 by a constituent congress of the new united union.[13] Some individual categories, like the vanguard metalworkers union, have already unified for all practical purposes and will formalize the arrangement ahead of the confederations.

The PCI's Dilemma

If the unification process manages to survive the assault being mounted against it by conservative trade union and political forces, what is union unity likely to mean for the Communist Party? The positive consequences are fairly clear. As the leading party of the opposition, the PCI undoubtedly stands to gain from an aggressive, united trade union movement able to take the offensive in industry and capable of mobilizing the workers behind the social and economic reforms desired by the party. No other force in Italian society can so effectively serve this function of providing mass support for reformist goals. The problems this situation is likely to create for the government parties, particularly the Christian Democrats, are equally obvious. Conflict between the left and right wings of the DC will certainly not be eased by the existence of a strong united union pressing for reforms. Over time, successful collaboration among Christian Democrats, Socialists and Communists in a united union might pave the way for new coalition patterns in the political system as a whole, by demonstrating in a tangible way the collapse of the ideological barriers that have structured Italian politics for the past quarter of a century. The PCI seems justified in regarding unification, which it has endorsed from the start, as a historic event whose consequences would on balance favor the Communist cause.

[13] *L'Unità*, Nov. 25, 1971.

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The PCI is acutely aware, however, that a price must be paid for unification: effective autonomy of the unions from the parties. In a sense, the Communist have been paying the price for years. The PCI and the CGIL have been working out a new relationship ever since 1956, when the party formally abandoned the classical "transmission belt" principle of union-party relations and began to make organizational and policy concessions to enhance the autonomy of the CGIL and thus to maintain the alliance with the Socialists. A similar measure of autonomy from the DC was being won during this time by the leaders of the CISL.

All involved in these moves recognized, however, that unification would require that more formal steps be taken to break the links between the unions and their respective parties. In 1969 the CGIL and the CISL voted in their congresses that henceforth union officials would not be permitted to accept elective political office or to serve in the executive bodies of political parties. Many in the PCI were reluctant to take this step, including Agostino Novella, CGIL Secretary-General and a member of the PCI Direzione (Executive Directorate, or Politburo) who shortly thereafter resigned his union post and returned to the party bureaucracy.[14] After long and impassioned debates in the ensuing months over the appropriate limits of the principle of "compatibility," as it was called, the PCI and the CGIL have had to make a painful concession for the sake of unification: it has been agreed that any trade unionist serving on an administrative or policy-making body of the union, within the factory or outside, will be ineligible for any elective office and for any administrative or policy-making position in a party. If enforced to the letter, this provision will have major repercussions for the PCI at all levels: union leaders like Luciano Lama, Bruno Trentin, and Sergio Garavini, active and influential members of the Central Committee, will have to resign from that body; and Communist activists will presumably no longer be permitted to serve simultaneously in base-level union organizations in the factory and on the policy committees of their local party organizations or in elected town councils.[15]

[14] See *Rassegna Sindacale* (Rome), June 29, 1969, for the debate at the CGIL Congress on this issue.

[15] Aniello Coppola, "Tempi certi per l'unità sindacale" (A Definite Timetable for Trade Union Unity), *Rinascita*, Nov. 26, 1971, p. 3. The Communists have argued with some justification that to bar rank-and-file unionists from full participation in electoral and party activities is to deny them their civil rights.

It takes only a little imagination and a passing acquaintance with traditional Communist Party ideology and practice to understand the difficult adjustments the PCI is being called upon to make in building a relationship with a genuinely autonomous labor movement. If the party and the unions operated in clearly separate spheres, union autonomy would not be so serious a problem to handle. Not only has this never been the case, but recent events have in fact tended to increase the areas of overlap and thus of potential conflict between the two. The problems that are beginning to arise, and that seem likely to worsen as the process of unification proceeds, can be suggested by a brief look at two areas of controversy, that of general reform strategy and that of the party's presence in the factory.

Potential Pitfalls

PCI discussions of the appropriate role of the unions in Italian society generally stress two opposite dangers. The first is the traditional Communist concern that the unions might become depoliticized, concentrating exclusively on narrow economic and factory issues and leaving the larger questions of politics to others. Although Italian unionism has always been highly politicized, and now seems more genuinely so than ever because of its greater autonomy from the parties, substantial pressures are also at work in the opposite direction. The more conservative and corporatist unions have tended to resist the effort of the confederations to play a national political role, and there may well develop a more general tendency among the unions in the new confederation to focus their energies on issues of more immediate concern to their members. Much will depend on the quality of the relationships that emerge between the confederation and the unions representing the various economic sections, as well as on the state of the economy.

The converse danger, one that has particularly preoccupied the PCI in the political and economic climate of recent years, is that the unions might try to claim too large a political role and seek to usurp the party's function of setting the general strategy of the movement. The problem is not only an ideological one, although the PCI does not hesitate to criticize radical labor leaders like Pierre Carniti, head of the CISL metalworkers federation, when they berate the working-class parties for their conservatism and inertia. The crux of the matter is that the

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PCI wants to be able to choose the priorities for action and to modulate the mass pressures exerted on the system in ways corresponding to its own sense of tactics and strategy. Mobilization of the labor force, whether for political or economic ends, is a delicate matter: if strikes and other weapons are used too often or too bluntly, they will backfire, alienating public opinion and turning moderates and large sectors of the middle class against the workers. The party's primary source of protection against such tendencies within a united labor movement is the Communist trade union leaders. Although the best of them, innovators like Bruno Trentin and Sergio Garavini, frequently differ with party conservatives on specific tactical matters, they can probably be counted on to respect the PCI's general interests and views on the functions of party and union, as long as the autonomy of the union is similarly respected. The Communists face the critical task in future years of raising a new generation of unionists imbued with their ideology on these matters and loyal to the party as an institution. In the environment of a united and autonomous union, this will be no easy task.

Analogous problems exist for the PCI at the factory level. One of the most significant developments of the last few years has been the creation of new mechanisms for worker participation in the life of the factory. During the labor struggles of 1968 and 1969 new institutions and practices sprang up in many factories—assemblies, elected delegates, and workers' councils—which have since become a permanent part of the industrial scene. These were largely unofficial, spontaneous creations, brought into being on the initiative of the workers themselves or inspired by student and other radical groups agitating in and around the factories. In part, the new groups represented a protest against the conservative goals and bureaucratic spirit of traditional working-class institutions. Although many PCI and union leaders instinctively opposed these threatening manifestations of radicalism and spontaneity, the unions managed to regain control and even turn the situation to their advantage by transforming the elected factory councils into base-level union organizations. The unions were revitalized by the active participation of thousands of newly mobilized workers, who in effect realized unification from below before it could be negotiated at the summit.

A high level of activism and participation in the factories is advantageous to the PCI, provided the energies of the workers can be channeled in the desired directions. Countless articles in the Communist press in the past three or four years have insisted that the party belongs in the factory as well as in parliament, that mobilization and education of the workers cannot be left to the unions alone. Passages whose inspiration might well derive from some Leninist text explain that only the organized presence of the party can keep correct political perspectives before the workers, raise the level of their political consciousness, and help them avoid shortsighted actions, whether of a narrow, corporatist or an extremist variety.[16] The PCI has been greatly concerned that actions by the workers not alienate other sectors of the population. In Milan, for instance, the party held meeting after meeting with the factory workers, finally persuading them that they would lose the support of the local population if they insisted on putting up street blockades as part of their strike action.[17] Similarly, during a strike at the Fiat plant in Turin, when the picket lines were being crossed by office employees, the local party representatives apparently managed to avoid violence by spreading the slogan, "Better an employee who's a scab than one whose head has been busted open!" Instilling political consciousness in the working class means among other things learning to respect the feelings—and hides—of the middle classes.

Since 1969 the party has been making great efforts to rebuild its organized strength in the factories by creating new party sections and cells and revitalizing old ones. This is not the first time it has put on such a campaign, and earlier efforts to reverse the downward trend that began in the early 1960's have failed. The party now claims an increasing number of Communists and of party organizations in the factories, but it remains concerned both about numbers and about the more serious question of how the party organizations should function and precisely what they should do. If they are artificial creations, with no more than vague propaganda and educational tasks to perform, they may not long retain their vitality in the face of competition from workers' councils playing a serious decision-making role in the factory. In this as in other areas of Italian life, the PCI is facing a new situation, far more open and unstructured than before. It must take into ac-

[16] See, *e.g.*, Giuliano Pajetta, "I comunisti e le lotte operaie" (The Communists and the Workers' Struggles), *Critica Marxista* (Rome), May-June 1969, pp. 54-63.

[17] Marcella Ferrara, "Il partito in fabbrica" (The Party in the Factory), *Rinascita*, Nov. 7, 1969, p. 5.

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count what Berlinguer has termed "the positive processes of autonomy of the various forces and organizations that operate in social and political life, most particularly the autonomy of the trade union movement."[18]

Perspectives on the Future

Anyone who follows the Italian scene will recognize that many important aspects of the contemporary political and social strategy of the Italian Communist Party have been ignored or touched on very lightly in this analysis. It should also be reiterated that a full appraisal of the party's strategy would require a hard look at its international behavior, particularly its relations with the Soviet Union and its policies toward Western and Eastern Europe.

One of the PCI's great strengths lies in its explicit awareness of the need to stay alert to what is going on in all dimensions of Italian life and to establish its presence, as a party, in all areas that seem open to it. Obviously, there are powerful sectors into which it cannot penetrate and which it can influence only by exerting pressure from the outside—the bureaucracy, big industry, the Church, the army. But its lack of access to such major institutional levers of power impels it to work all the harder to develop an effective system of alliances among the political and social forces that are the natural field of action of an opposition party. All Italian parties are, of course, obsessed with the question of political alliances: the system offers them no choice. Yet only the PCI, among the major parties, has the incentive and the organizational capacity to pursue a conscious strategy of social alliances as well.[19] The working-class parties and groups to the left of the PCI are similarly concerned with social questions, but they lack its effective organization and do not share its determination to reach beyond the industrial and rural working classes in the search for allies. In recent years the Communist Party has been more and more explicit in discussing the need to represent and reconcile the interests of different social and occupational groups within the same strategy—and increasingly often has acted to that end. This national perspective gives the party a breadth of vision and a flexibility in action that is a real source of strength.

But there is another side to the coin. Precisely the breadth of the PCI's reach—the complex effort to build political alliances with and within certain governmental parties while at the same time bringing pressure against the government by building an oppositional coalition of social forces—inhibits the effectiveness of the strategy. The more challenging the party becomes as a force of opposition, the more it may polarize society, frightening away some of those whom it wishes to win over or to neutralize. The more conciliatory it is toward those in power, the more difficult becomes the effort to stimulate and use the forces pressing for change. To be militant and reasonable at the same time is no easy task, but this is what the party's strategy requires.

For most of the postwar period, the balance between the political and the social sides of the party's strategy has strongly favored the former. Until the unexpected radical eruption in the late 1960's, the party's attention was dominated by political preoccupations—elections, alliances, parliament, local governments—and its tactical choices reflected this priority. The social strategy had become predominantly defensive, limited to maintaining positions won by the Communists during the expansive phase of mobilization and organization of the early postwar years. The criticisms aired by the party's left wing from the early 1960's onward were centered on this point—on the danger that the party was becoming simply an electoral machine, capable of operating reasonably effectively in the political system but not of influencing social processes in such a way as to promote revolutionary changes or even to alter the balance of power within the existing framework. The charge had much truth in it, but the left failed utterly to carry its point, not merely because it lacked muscle but because it failed to develop a comprehensible and persuasive alternative strategy. Not until students, workers and frustrated Southern Italians began in the late 1960's to manifest their discontent in collective, radical action did the premises exist for a more aggressive social strategy of mass mobilization. The party responded to the new situation with its accustomed flexibility, displaying a degree of openness toward the student movement, for example, and toward the spontaneous manifestations of radicalism among the workers and other sectors of society that distinguished it sharply

[18] Enrico Berlinguer's speech to the Central Committee, *L'Unità*, Nov. 12, 1971.

[19] While in some sense, the DC also has a social strategy, in that it appeals for votes to a variety of social groups and relies heavily for support on Catholic auxiliary organizations, there is a definite distinction between the PCI and the DC in this respect, as was pointed out in earlier discussion of the characteristics of a "catch-all" party.

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TOWARD A GOVERNING ROLE

Patient unitary effort to open the way to the formation of a new majority, through a transformation of political relationships, must always be guided by consciousness of the goal to be obtained, as a political objective for the *near term:* a shift in the leadership of the state from the old bloc, substantially centrist, which has permitted the DC to maintain its hegemony for over twenty years, to a new bloc of democratic forces, secular and Catholic, in which the PCI must have its place and assume its responsibilities. . . . Not to pose, within a reasonable time span, the problem of the formation of a new majority would be to strengthen the idea that the PCI has accepted a permanent function as an opposition party.

—**From Giorgio Amendola, "La questione della nuova maggioranza e del governo" (The Question of the New Majority and of the Government), *Critica Marxista* (Rome), No. 4-5, July-October 1969.**

from the French Communist Party facing a similar set of circumstances. The new direction was given an official stamp at the Twelfth PCI Congress in 1969, which in effect reversed the defeat suffered by the left, and by its foremost spokesman, Pietro Ingrao, at the previous congress in 1965.

An important question of interpretation arises at this point. The Italian radical left has argued that by 1968 the moment had at last arrived, for the first time since the immediate postwar years, for an all-out assault on capitalist and Christian Democratic bases of power. The radicals have further insisted that no fundamental change has since occurred in the party's attitudes and strategy, that its opening to the left was simply a temporary tactical adjustment to a spontaneous mobilization of the masses which the party could not ignore, but which it sought to absorb and control, not to use for changing the system.[20] Implicit in the structure and argument of this paper is a different point of view. Whereas it is abundantly clear that the PCI has not adopted the approach urged by the Manifesto and other radical groups, it does not follow that there has been no change at all or that the party has now reverted to traditional modes of behavior after a brief, manipulative flirtation with radical social forces. More extensive analysis would be required to develop the point thoroughly, but the attention given here to the party's social strategy has been intended to suggest that some qualitative changes have taken place. What are they?

Basically what is meant is a change of emphasis, not a radical change of direction. Perhaps the single most important strategic question the party has constantly had to face in the postwar period has been how to strike a good balance between the political and the social sides of its strategy. Two things seem to have happened recently: first, the Communists have shifted the balance somewhat in favor of the social aspects of strategy, not at all by downgrading political questions, which remain paramount, but by putting a good deal more energy and attention into the other side of the equation. Second, the party's social strategy has shifted from a largely defensive or conservative posture, concerned primarily with maintaining control over the mass organizations of its own basic constituency, to a more aggressive and many-sided effort to extend its influence over groups, both proletarian and middle-class, which could not previously be counted among its supporters. Once again it is necessary to stress the ambiguous and partly contradictory nature of this process. The attempt to take more explicit and more genuine account of the interests of a more varied clientele sharpens the "inherent contradictions" in the party's image and strategy. The party has always tacitly seen itself as a mixture of opposites: an opposition party, it also claims to be a *"partito di governo,"* a potential "governing party" with attitudes and aspirations appropriate to that vocation; a party of the proletariat, it also wants to be a party of all the people—that is, of the "healthy, productive forces" of the nation; a revolutionary party, it is at the same time a party working for concrete reforms within the existing economic and social structure.

One may respond to such paradoxes in various ways: by accusing the party of betraying its soul and its revolutionary heritage, or by asserting that it is cynically playing both sides of the street for narrow political advantage, or by making witticisms to the effect that only a Marxist party could possibly hope to overcome such a set of contradictions through the magic of the dialectical process. In the writer's view, it would be better simply to accept the reality that the PCI is a many-sided political organization operating in an exceedingly complicated and changing environment that requires it to move simultaneously in different and often competing directions.

Will it succeed? Can the PCI effectively reconcile its competing aims into a strategy that will ultimately allow it to reach its medium-term goal of

[20] See, *e.g.*, Lucio Magri, "Il PCI degli anni '60" (The PCI of the 1960's), *Il Manifesto*, October-November 1970, pp. 6-13.

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entering the government? The best clues to an answer probably lie in two areas which have hardly been touched upon here. The first has to do with the party's organizational capacity. It has yet to be demonstrated that the PCI can respond effectively, on a long-term basis, to the challenge of adapting its organization to the demands of an increasingly complex and pluralist society, in which social groups are acquiring a greater degree of autonomy from political forces and in which new issues of social and economic policy are gradually (though by no means completely) displacing the old ones that have tormented Italian society for so many decades. To operate effectively in this context, the Communists would have to make a prodigious organizational effort on many levels: the leaders would have to make correct choices, above all about the issues around which to try to mobilize the battle for reforms; the intellectuals would have to keep the party alert to the directions of economic and social change and help provide the technical components of reform proposals; party representatives would have to use their positions in local governments, and especially in the newly-established regional governments, to promote reforms and build alliances; and local cadres would have to keep the party alive as a mass organization and find ways to apply resources not only to traditional tasks of organizational maintenance but also to the more sensitive and challenging jobs of winning local allies, mobilizing new strata of the population, maintaining the party's presence in the factories, and so on. The above list is merely illustrative of the variety of things that need doing and only begins to hint at the operational difficulties the party faces.

The other basic question has to do with what happens in Italian society. The activist rhetoric that flows from the pens of the PCI's leaders and publicists should not be allowed to conceal the powerful limitations on its ability to influence events. The PCI is, in the end, an *opposition* party and as such has a limited arsenal at its disposal. The big guns, above all the governmental, industrial and financial institutions, are controlled by others. And even where it can operate most freely—that is, in the social realm—the party is, more than it likes to pretend, the prisoner of circumstance. It can respond more or less intelligently and flexibly to student uprisings but cannot initiate or easily control them. It has better resources for influencing the behavior of the industrial working class, but its chief instrument here is a trade union movement over which the party has lost its former direct control. It can attempt to prevent the neo-Fascists and other rightwing forces from capitalizing on the profound resentments and frustration of migrant workers in the North or unemployed rural and urban groups in the South, but it can neither ease the discontent nor easily channel the forces of protest into its own camp. The party cannot, finally, do a great deal to influence directly developments within the institution whose evolution will, more than any other single factor, determine Italy's political future: the Christian Democratic Party. Over all these forces, political and social, the PCI has only modest leverage—although at a moment of crisis this leverage could be decisive.

It is true that the Communist Party can and does take initiatives in various spheres and directions, and by following a consistent strategy over the long term it may significantly influence the perceptions of individuals and of groups in directions favorable to it. It has, in fact, already done so. Basically, however, the party's strategy has been and is likely to remain substantially a responsive one. Thus judgments about its future cannot be divorced from judgments about the future of Italian society as a whole—a society whose most striking feature today is the lag between great changes occurring in the economic and social spheres and their still meager reflection in the structures and attitudes of the political system.

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Solzhenitsyn: Art and Foreign Matter

By Donald Fanger

VERY SIGNIFICANT and expressive use is made here of the word "abroad," as if it referred to some higher authority whose opinion was very much cherished. . . . I have never been abroad . . . I don't have time enough left in my life to learn about life there. I do not understand how one can be so sensitive to opinion abroad and not to one's own country, to pulsing public opinion here. For my entire life, I have had the soil of my homeland under my feet; only its pain do I hear, only about it do I write.

—Solzhenitsyn, *to the Secretariat of the Union of Soviet Writers*, Sept. 22, 1967.

It is now ten years since Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn entered literature, six years since the last of his works was published in his homeland, and two years since the Nobel Prize recognized "the ethical force with which he has pursued the indispensable traditions of Russian literature." That this most anti-cosmopolitan of writers should continue to be publicly discussed only in the West is perhaps the central paradox of his career, and it has predictably been rich in giving rise to confusions of assessment.

Perhaps the clearest example of such confusion was provided by the *Times Literary Supplement* (London) in its editorial comment on the Nobel award. Solzhenitsyn's books, that journal complained, "have been received by minds vigorously massaged to read them in a way which intensifies their political meaning and focuses an unnatural [*sic*] attention on their author." [1] The ensuing controversy prompted an editorial "clarification": "What we were questioning was not the merit of Solzhenitsyn but the conditions under which the Nobel Prize is given and the way in which Solzhenitsyn has been continually implicated in the hypotheses of Kremlinologists." The editors' own wish was "to see Solzhenitsyn freed as far as possible from these dishonorable accretions and returned to the literary world." He is, they pointed out, "a writer of novels, not a pamphleteer, but the actual quality of his novels has been insufficiently examined in the rush to welcome him as an ideological friend." [2]

"Unnatural attention . . .," "freed . . . and returned to the literary world . . ."—the perspective here is understandable but perverse. Solzhenitsyn's very entrance into literature shows why. *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich* was not sensational; it avoided scenes of violence and brutality, as it avoided politics, to concentrate on "a truth that cannot be forgotten." [3] Yet for this very reason it provided—in the words of the *Novyi mir* reviewer—"that rare instance in literature when the publication of an artistic work rapidly became a *social and political event*" involving even "those who do not ordinarily read stories and novels." [4]

In other words, there could be no question of returning Solzhenitsyn to the literary world, because—like Tolstoy and his other predecessors in the tradition—Solzhenitsyn has never acknowledged a literary world separate or separable from the larger world of human experience. The 19th-century writers

[1] Oct. 16, 1970, p. 1194.

[2] Jan. 15, 1971, p. 68.

[3] *Pravda* (Moscow), Nov. 23, 1962.

[4] V. Lakshin, "Ivan Denisovich, His Friends and Foes," translated from *Novyi mir* (Moscow), No. 1, 1964, in Priscilla Johnson, *Khrushchev and the Arts*, Cambridge, Mass., M.I.T. Press, 1965, p. 275. (Emphasis added.)

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and critics who made this tradition in Russia regarded literature as one side of a dialogue with life, a response that would in turn elicit responses. Because artistic truth and the truth of experience—psychological, social, or religious—were deemed to coincide, either was testable against the other. Artistry as such was not much talked about. How could it be, when it was measured precisely by its effectiveness in transcending the boundaries of art? [5] "The hero of my tale," Tolstoy had written, "the one I love with all the power of my soul . . . is Truth." [6] Aside from Solzhenitsyn, it is hard to think of a major writer today who could use these terms without irony or extensive qualification.[7]

The *Times Literary Supplement* editorialist, while observing quite properly that Solzhenitsyn is a novelist and not a pamphleteer, failed to recognize how directly the principal values in Solzhenitsyn's novels translate into social terms. Yet it would seem impossible to miss, for example, the constant attention in Solzhenitsyn's writing to the nature of literature, good and bad; to the duties of the writer, the needs of the reader, to language itself. In the last case, his work offers an extensive gloss on Mandelstam's belief, voiced in 1921, that "social distinctions and class oppositions pale before the present division of people into friends and enemies of the word." [8] Characteristically enough, one of the criticisms of Stalin that led to Solzhenitsyn's arrest in 1945 was "that his language was primitive"—a point to which the author returned 20 years later in *The First Circle*.

Solzhenitsyn's sole article on the subject of language advocates healthy infusions of popular speech into literary style and gives examples (as does his fiction) of lexical experimentation and new coinages.[9] The experimentation, however, bears little relation to what we think of as avant-garde practice, because Solzhenitsyn's fascination with the world of words has a goal in view: the transmission of experience as freshly and fully as possible to the broadest audience. So, even where he advocates the reintroduction of forgotten words, his purpose is the opposite of antiquarian, the underlying hope being that they may pass through successful literary use back into common speech. The ultimate test is always vividness, the ultimate aim to counter "the whole tendency of modern prose," which Orwell found to be "away from concreteness." [10]

THE TASK OF LITERATURE

. . . I do not believe that it is the task of literature, with respect to either society or the individual, to conceal the truth or to tone it down. Rather, I believe that it is the task of literature to tell people the real truth as they expect it. Moreover, it is not the task of the writer to defend or criticize one or another mode of distributing the social product, or to defend or criticize one or another form of government organization. The task of the writer is to select more universal and eternal questions, [such as] the secrets of the human heart and conscience, the confrontation between life and death, the triumph over spiritual sorrow, the laws in the history of mankind that were born in the depths of time immemorial and that will cease to exist only when the sun ceases to shine.

—Solzhenitsyn, speaking at a session of the Secretariat of the Union of Soviet Writers, Sept. 22, 1967.

[5] Lakshin, at the end of his long review, writes: "Someone may ask us: 'And where is your analysis of the author's craft, of the work's form?' Indeed, we have not spoken separately, as is usually done, about the story's 'distinguishing artistic features,' but we are confident that these were being discussed the whole time, with every mention of Ivan Denisovich, Tsezar, the Commander, of the atmosphere of the 'lucky day' itself, or of the scene at the power plant, because Solzhenitsyn's art does not lie in any external embellishment tacked on to the idea and content for effect. No, it lies precisely in the flesh and blood of the work, its soul. It may seem to the unsophisticated reader that he has before him a piece of life torn straight from its depths and left just as it is—alive, quivering. . . . But such is only the artistic illusion, which is itself the result of great mastery, the ability of the artist to see people as they live, to speak of them in unsullied—so to speak, newborn—words and in such a way that we can be sure that it could not have been said or written otherwise." *Ibid.*, p. 287.

[6] Leo Tolstoy, *Sebastopol*, Frank D. Millett trans., Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1961, p. 110.

[7] The word *pravda* was strikingly frequent in published Soviet responses to Solzhenitsyn's work before the ban on him was imposed. Historically, it implies justice as well. See "Letter from Solzhenitsyn to Three Students" in Leopold Labedz, Ed., *Solzhenitsyn, A Documentary Record*, New York, Praeger, 1970, pp. 125-26.

[8] "Slovo i kultura (Language and Culture)" in Osip Mandelshtam, *Sobranie sochinenii v dvukh tomakh* (Collected Works in Two Volumes), ed. by G. P. Struve and B. A. Filippov, New York, Inter-Language Literary Associates, 1966, Vol. II, p. 265.

[9] "Ne obychai degtem shchi belit, na to smetana" (It is not the Custom to Lighten Cabbage Soup with Tar—For That We Have Sour Cream), in his *Sobranie sochinenii* (Collected Works) Vol. V, Frankfurt, Posev, 1969.

[10] "Politics and the English Language," in *The Collected Essays, Journalism and Letters of George Orwell*, London, Penguin, 1970, Vol. IV, p. 163. *Cf.* Solzhenitsyn's statement to a Slovak interviewer: "*I am convinced that in our literature the riches of the Russian language are insufficiently utilized. In the twentieth century languages are narrowing, are becoming standardized. We are losing many old values.*" "Odin den u Aleksandra Isaevicha Solzhenitsyna" (One Day with Aleksandr Isaevich Solzhenitsyn), *Posev* (Frankfurt), June 1967.

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Nadezhda Mandelstam has written that, from the point of view of the authorities, her husband's poem on Stalin was "a usurpation of the right to words and thoughts that the ruling powers reserved exclusively for themselves" [11]—and this appears to be the attitude of the present Soviet authorities toward Solzhenitsyn's work as well.[12] From the author's point of view, however, what is in question is precisely the *reclaiming* of the right to words and thoughts which the ruling powers had reserved exclusively for themselves—that is, the reestablishment of a language whose only loyalty is to experience, and whose function is to render that experience communal. Solzhenitsyn's high seriousness in this respect recalls Gogol's dictum: "One must treat the word honestly; it is God's highest gift to man." [13] A very 19th-century attitude, and not Solzhenitsyn's only such.

His attitude toward language rests ultimately on a sense of moral responsibility—as does his larger view of the writer's ideal role. "Talent," he told a Slovak interviewer, "involves duty." "The writer should be concerned, should be guided by his artistic memory, should write about what he sees and how he sees." "The basis of literature is the profound experiencing of social processes." One must, however, regard the writer's tasks "not only from the point of view of his duty vis-à-vis society, but also from the point of view of *his most important obligation,* vis-à-vis each individual," because "a human being is a physiological and spiritual entity before he is a member of society." In this connection Solzhenitsyn notes a "special obligation" of the writer at a time when religious influence is waning all over the world: "He must fill more than one vacated place." [14]

These views find a prominent place in Solzhenitsyn's large novels, in part through the attention given to literature in them. Already in his wartime diaries and letters he had written of "the artistic and ideological shortcomings of the works of many Soviet authors and *the air of unreality* that pervades many of them," and this—despite his explicit profession of faith in the victory of Marxism-Leninism—had become part of the case against him.[15] As a writer, he recurs continually and ironically to the banalities of standard Soviet literature. Diomka, in *The Cancer Ward,* turns from geometry to lighter reading—specifically to

> Water of Life *by one Kozhevnikov, recipient of a Stalin Prize. This was A. Kozhevnikov, but there was also an S. Kozhevnikov, and a V. Kozhevnikov besides. Diomka was awed by how many writers there were. In the previous century there had been about ten, all of them great; in this one there were thousands: change one letter and you had another writer. There was a Safronov, and now there was a Safonov—more than one, apparently. And was Safronov the only Safronov? Nobody could manage to read all their books. And whichever you read, it did not seem to matter.*[16]

Examples of this kind of satiric treatment could easily be multiplied. The point is that Solzhenitsyn does not stop at satire but goes on to provide portraits of both the producers and the consumers of such literature. The fullest portrait of the former is Galakhov in *The First Circle,* a writer of outstanding war novels who slips into "spiritual paralysis" with the return of peace. Now,

> *each time he started some large new work, he would take fire, swear to himself and his friends that he would make concessions to no one, that this time he would write a real book. He would sit down to the opening pages with enthusiasm. But very soon he would become aware that he was not writing alone—that the image of the person for whom he was writing had arisen before him, looming more and more distinctly. No sooner would he finish a paragraph than he found himself reading it over with that person's eyes. And that person was not reader, brother, friend, or coeval. Nor was it some abstract literary critic. It was, for some reason, always that celebrated critic-in-chief, Zhabov. . . .*
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> *And so, trying paragraph by paragraph to anticipate the counterarguments of Zhabov and adapt to them, Galakhov would quickly weaken, remove the*

[11] *Hope Against Hope,* New York, Atheneum, 1970, p. 83.

[12] Khrushchev's attitude was more forthright. *The New York Times* of Nov. 22, 1970, quoted the late Soviet leader, who had just read *The First Circle,* as finding that "with the exception of a few details, Mr. Solzhenitsyn had 'told it like it was.' "

[13] N. V. Gogol, *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii* (Complete Works), Vol. VIII, Leningrad, Akademiia Nauk SSSR, 1952, p. 231.

[14] "Odin den u Aleksandr Isaevicha Solzhenitsyna," *loc. cit.* (Emphasis added.)

[15] See USSR Supreme Court Decision No. 4n-083/56 rehabilitating Solzhenitsyn, in Labedz, *op. cit.,* pp. 3-5. (Emphasis added.)

[16] *The Cancer Ward,* Chap. 10. Here and throughout, translations from the novels are my own.—D.F.

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angularities, and the book itself would roll along cravenly, everything falling smoothly into place.[17]

As for the consumers, they are best represented by the odious Rusanov and his family in *The Cancer Ward.* Avieta, the daughter, brings her father a pile of recent books whose "very titles uplift the heart": the poems, *Baltic Spring* and *Kill Him!*; and the novels, *With Us It's Already Morning, Light Over the Earth, Toilers of the World, Mountains in Bloom, Youth is With Us.* And it is she who explains to the bemused Diomka that "sincerity can by no means be the chief criterion" in judging a book, since if the ideas are "wrong" or "alien," sincerity only makes their expression more harmful. "Subjective sincerity can work against a truthful portrayal of life," she says—and that is "dialectics" (Chap. 21).

Solzhenitsyn includes such writers and readers, along with a host of others representing intermediate positions, in order to comprehend them in both senses of the word. And by so doing, he responds to the complaints expressed in both *The First Circle* and *The Cancer Ward* about "a kind of literature that dealt with everything on earth except what one could see with one's own eyes." Elizaveta Anatolevna, in *The Cancer Ward* (Chap. 34), clearly speaks for Solzhenitsyn's ideal readership when, finding Anna Karenina's unhappiness enviable by comparison with her own, she protests: "Why should I reread *Anna Karenina*? . . . Where can I read about us? Will that be only in a hundred years?" The explicit rationale for this kind of truth-telling—which I take to be a central feature of Solzhenitsyn's art—is set forth in the same novel:

If, decade after decade, no one is permitted to tell it as it is, human brains become irreparably skewed, until it becomes harder to comprehend one's own compatriot than a man from Mars. (Chap. 32)

Nadezhda Mandelstam's memoirs, which complement and corroborate Solzhenitsyn's fiction in so many ways, contain strikingly similar statements. For example, in her discussion of the "affliction of memory" from which former camp inmates suffer, she recalls her fear, in listening to them, that "there might be nobody who could ever properly bear witness to the past. Whether inside or outside the camps, we had all lost our memories."[18]

[17] *The First Circle*, Chap. 57.

[18] *Hope Against Hope*, p. 379.

The goal of Solzhenitsyn's writing thus seems to be a kind of social therapy. The self-knowledge won in the fictional microcosm is intended to function actively in the macrocosm—which amounts to a rejoining of life and art in the way that the 19th-century Russian achievement made traditional.[19] All of Solzhenitsyn's major work may be seen as a *recherche du temps perdu,* an attempt to redeem time. It is this goal which explains and justifies the basic, old-fashioned realism of his writing (which even the cinematic and documentary devices of *August 1914* do not significantly alter). To a Western readership accustomed to judging a writer by the novelty he offers, reversion to such an outworn form must seem a drastic limitation in a writer of major gifts. But the Western reader is not the addressee of these works, nor can he be expected to understand the radical novelty they possess within the Russian context by virtue of the literary and cultural discontinuities that characterize it. Arkadii Belinkov summed up the matter at a meeting of the Moscow writers' organization in November 1966, when he acknowledged that "great art is never traditional" and—noting "the apparently traditional nature" of Solzhenitsyn's style—went on to say:

Solzhenitsyn [in fact] creates a new system of Russian prose, because he introduces into the composition of his art new, unknown or forgotten ideas of good and evil, of life and death, and of the relationship between man and society.[20]

It was also Belinkov who observed:

He has told us about what is important for all of us, what we come up against every day and therefore know ourselves. But the difference between him and other writers lies in the fact that the other writers did not write about it, while he did. He did

[19] Compare the picture of Soviet society drawn by an unnamed party official in conversation with K. S. Karol, a Franco-Polish journalist: "Beneath the flat surface of society in Russia, as presented by *Pravda*, a rich and complex life abounds, but it totally lacks any means of expression or communication. We are not a 'one-dimensional' society, as Westerners believe; on the contrary we are a fragmented society. Prevented from communicating with each other, we have almost no common criteria. Everyone takes hold of a piece of the truth from his daily experience and interprets it according to his own lights. The same words have a different meaning for each social group, almost for each individual. In such conditions we just can't make a serious analysis of the real state of affairs. . . ." "Conversations in Russia," *New Statesman* (London), Jan. 1, 1971, p. 8.

[20] Quoted in Labedz, *op. cit.*, p. 76. (Emphasis added.)

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what is possible only for a person of true talent and real courage. That is the significance and the sense of the art of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn.[21]

Ivan Denisovich, as noted earlier, appeared at once as a literary text and a social event—which means that its author appeared simultaneously as an artist and as a potential moral and social force. More than a century before, Gogol had aspired to this role; Turgenev, Tolstoy, Dostoevsky, and (*mutatis mutandis*) Gorky were later to fill it. All furnished examples, in Yurii Tynianov's words, of writers whose personalities were themselves literary phenomena. So, too, Solzhenitsyn: the unlikely permission that made him a public phenomenon could not, it turned out, be effectively withdrawn—



Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn tosses a handful of earth on the coffin of his friend, the editor and poet Aleksandr Tvardovsky, who died in December 1971.

the writer would not cooperate. His rare courage shows in the principled use he persisted in making of his fame and the literally unique position that fame gave him. The astonishing letter he addressed to the Union of Writers in 1967, asking discussion of his proposals that censorship be abolished and that the Union defend the legitimate interests of its members, was one such act of unprecedented civic courage, and its long-term effects cannot be gauged. He might well have borrowed for it the Tolstoyan title, "I Cannot be Silent!" But Solzhenitsyn's own emphasis, in a subsequent discussion of the letter at a session of the Secretariat of the Union of Writers, deserves attention. Those who think the letter is about censorship, he said, have understood nothing.

This letter is about the destiny of our great literature, which once conquered and captivated the world but which has now lost its standing.[22]

Remove censorship, he suggested, and new Russian novels would once more dazzle the world—"the 'new novel' would die down and . . . 'neo-avant-gardists' would disappear." This faith appears even more clearly in the author's letter itself, where he writes:

If the world had access to all the uninhibited fruits of our literature, if it were enriched by our own spiritual experience, the whole artistic evolution of the world would move along in a different way, acquiring a new stability and attaining even a new artistic threshold.[23]

Solzhenitsyn is optimistic about what will follow the repossession of authenticity, but meanwhile repossession is his theme on every level. From Ivan Denisovich, who reflects that "the great thing about a penal camp was you had a hell of a lot of freedom," through the inmates of *The First Circle*, who discover with Gleb Nerzhin "the genuine grandeur of human beings . . . in prison," to the patients of *The Cancer Ward*, preoccupied with the discovery of what men live by, the dialectical lesson is the same: out of unfreedom can come the deepest exis-

[21] *Ibid.*, p. 77.

[22] *Ibid.*, p. 123.

[23] *Ibid.*, p. 84.

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WASTEPAPER OR LITERATURE?

Literature cannot develop in between the categories of "permitted" and "not permitted," "about this you may write" and "about this you may not." Literature that is not the breath of contemporary society, that dares not transmit the pains and fears of that society, that does not warn in time against threatening moral and social dangers—such literature does not deserve the name of literature; it is only a facade. Such literature loses the confidence of its own people, and its published works are used as wastepaper instead of being read.

—From Solzhenitsyn's Open Letter to the Fourth Congress of Soviet Writers, May 16, 1967.

tential freedom—the experience of integrity. This is the knowledge, as he remarks in *The First Circle,* of those "cleansed by the nearness of death"—a soldier's knowledge, ascetic, with no room for emotional luxuries and no use for the trivia of daily life. "In roadside ditches, in washed-out trenches, among the ruins of burned houses," the typical Solzhenitsyn hero learns "the value of a can of soup, an hour of quiet, the meaning of true friendship and the meaning *of life in general.*"[24]

It is the attainment of freedom and not its investigation that Solzhenitsyn writes about. Freedom in his books seldom issues in action. It is itself the goal, and he may more properly be seen as the poet of *liberation.* But the liberation, however profound, is inevitably local, Russian, Soviet. The dilemmas it may bring in its wake, the problematics of freedom, to which so much modern art is directed, are—understandably—beyond his scope. So are the problematics of truth. For him truth is no metaphysical riddle; it is what needs to be substituted for current lies. His area has been clearly marked out for him by the influential silences of the Galakhovs and the Shulubins, the vicious hypocrisies of the Rusanovs, the moral indifferences of the Poddueves.

Something similar can be observed in the area of character. Some fifty years have passed since D. H. Lawrence warned his readers not to look for the "old, stable ego of character," thus signaling an end to the ambiguity that fiction had by and large accepted between ontological status (*being* a character) and ethical status (*having* a character—good, bad or indifferent). Solzhenitsyn's work goes counter to the whole modern trend, in which Freud was a potent catalyst, if not instigator. But Freud may help us understand Solzhenitsyn. If we ignore the familiar scholasticism of Ego, Superego, and Id and think instead of Freud's more appropriately tentative designation of the psyche as consisting of a Self (*das Ich*), something incorporating external standards of conduct (*das Ueber-Ich*), and a darker instinctual component, the It (*das Es*), it becomes clear that Solzhenitsyn's treatment of character emphasizes the first two and pointedly slights the third.

This is why there is so little sex and violence in his books: what interests him is the achievement of authentic, moral selfhood. The obstacles to it are taken for granted; those who cannot surmount them are, in the only important sense, nonsurvivors. Solzhenitsyn's norm is made especially clear in *The First Circle,* where Nerzhin speculates on that sainted abstraction, the people (*narod*). He has met them in the camps and, seeking to learn wisdom from them, reaped only another harvest of lost illusions:

What was lacking in most of them was that individual point of view which becomes more precious than life itself.

All that remained was—to be oneself.

Having suffered through yet another enthusiasm, Nerzhin—whether definitively or not—understood the People in a new way which he had met nowhere in his reading: the People is not everyone who speaks our language, nor is it the elect, marked by the fiery stamp of genius. One joins the people not on the basis of one's birth or the work of one's hands, or on the wings of one's education.

But through one's soul.

Everyone forges a soul for himself, year by year.

One must try to temper and fashion himself such a soul as will make him a human being.

And thereby a particle of his own people.[25]

To be sure, the sexual urge plays a large role in *The First Circle* and *The Cancer Ward*—but as a problem in human relations, not a rebellious imperative of the "It." Solzhenitsyn evinces scant interest in the causes of human complexity, treating irrationality itself as a moral or logical absurdity—perhaps reprehensible, perhaps inevitable, but in either case capable of being transcended. And it is the difficult transcendence that he shows, over

[24] *The First Circle,* Chap. 47. (Emphasis added.)

[25] *Ibid.,* Chap. 61. (Emphasis in the original.)

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and over again. The only fundamental distinction, his hero Vorotyntsev tells the militant Lenartovich in *August 1914*, is between decency and non-decency. Here is the crux of every portrayal in every one of Solzhenitsyn's works. As he himself put it in his letter to three students, "There is nothing relative about justice, as there is nothing relative about conscience."[26]

The writer . . . is a teacher of other people; hasn't that always been our understanding? And a great writer—forgive my boldness, I'll lower my voice—a great writer is, so to speak, a second government in his country. And for that reason no regime has ever loved great writers, only minor ones.

These words, spoken by Innokenti Volodin in *The First Circle* (Chap. 57), clearly fit Solzhenitsyn's case and, properly understood, define his aspirations. The writer must not be confused with a preacher; he teaches by example, both in his works and outside them. What he teaches is personal responsibility, without which there can be no integrity. He can thus be likened to a second government only where government regards itself as sole source and arbiter of truth, in effect as the only audible public voice, obviating and suppressing individual testimony. In this situation—this Russian situation—Solzhenitsyn must be acknowledged a great writer; to argue whether he is a great novelist is another and lesser point.

It is also premature. The monumental work on which he is now engaged, of which *August 1914* is only the first installment, shows him turning for the first time outside his own experience to a non-Soviet theme, though one that joins his previous work as part of the "most fascinating and important task to be performed"—writing about "the fate of Russia."[27] Just as in his long novels of the Soviet period, which he depicts as detours from this original project cherished since 1936, his aim is "to resurrect those years," the better to understand the fate of Russia in the 20th century. As in his earlier work, the mode is documentary (though for the first time no enclosed society—camp, *sharashka* or hospital—serves as surrogate for the large world) and scenic; the point of view, what we might call ethical realism. Like his earlier work, too, *August 1914* displays high intelligence—a quality perhaps insufficiently remarked by commentators on his work—and bespeaks a particular admiration for competence, particularly the competence of the soldier or engineer who knows how to deal, unbemused by abstractions, with the concrete problems of the practical world.

Some claim to see signs, in *August 1914* and elsewhere, of the isolation to which Solzhenitsyn has been subjected—isolation from sources, from honest criticism, from dialogue with his readers. This can hardly be surprising, any more than the defining signs—cultural, artistic and intellectual—of his Soviet Russian-ness. These are, after all, the grounds of his uniqueness and his particular heroism—which lie in his being free not *from* Soviet reality, but *in* it.[28] Born in 1918, Solzhenitsyn belongs to the first purely Soviet generation. Sharing that generation's central experiences of war, the camps, and eventual return to a changed Russia, he became its public witness and—with his talent and conviction that "no one can bar the road to truth"—the best hope of Soviet Russian literature. Edmund Wilson has complained of the monotony with which Solzhenitsyn returns to the theme of endurance, but he fails to credit the way in which endurance is vindicated and transformed by the very existence of this testimony and of the man who bears it. "If, decade after decade, no one is permitted to tell it as it is, human brains become irreparably skewed, until it becomes harder to comprehend one's own compatriot than a man from Mars.": Solzhenitsyn at least has lessened this danger, and that is no small service. Nor is it one which integrity or talent alone could have rendered. Aleksandr Tvardovsky's characterization of Solzhenitsyn's first published work could be applied to the sum of his work to date:

. . . one of those literary phenomena after whose appearance it is impossible to talk about any literary problem or literary fact without measuring it against this phenomenon.[29]

[26] Labedz, *op. cit.*, p. 125.

[27] Interview with a Slovak journalist, in Labedz, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

[28] This point is developed in Father Aleksandr Shmeman's very interesting article, "O Solzhenitsyne" (About Solzhenitsyn), in *Vestnik russkovo studencheskovo khristianskovo dvizheniia* (Herald of the Russian Student Christian Movement), Paris-New York, Fourth Issue, 1970.

[29] Labedz, *op. cit.*, p. 44.

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Political Science in the USSR

By Rolf H. W. Theen

Among the fascinating consequences of de-stalinization has been a significant improvement in the status of Soviet social science. The death, in 1953, of the "greatest Marxist," the "greatest scholar of our epoch," the "greatest man on our planet"—as Stalin had been described during his lifetime—set the stage for a veritable revival of social science in the Soviet Union, a resurgence of interest in empirical social science research, a pronounced shift away from the monistic conception of science characteristic of the Stalin period, and a growing tendency toward differentiation and reorganization among the established divisions in Soviet social science.[1] One aspect of this revival of social science has been the attempt on the part of a number of Soviet scholars to bring about the recognition and establishment of political science as a separate and independent academic discipline, as well as to enlarge the present scope of political research in the Soviet Union. The fate of this effort—seen in the context of recent developments in other Soviet social science disciplines—is instructive about the limitations which have been and are being placed on the emergence of objective inquiry by Soviet scholars into the nature of society in the USSR and elsewhere.

In registering significant advances, Soviet social science has benefited not only from the general atmosphere of the "thaw" in post-Stalin Russia but also from specific developments in the delicate and touchy relationship between the party and the scholarly community. On October 19-20, 1962, the General Assembly of the USSR Academy of Sciences—for the first time in its history—devoted itself to the problem of the social sciences and passed a resolution stressing the crucial importance of "concrete social research"—*i.e.*, empirical social science research.[2] In his report to the 23rd Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in March 1966, General Secretary L. I. Brezhnev emphasized the importance of the social sciences and elevated them to a position of equality with the natural sciences. He proposed to put an end to the notion that the social sciences have "merely propaganda significance" and exist solely to "explain and comment upon practice."[3] In 1967, the Central Committee of the CPSU called for organizational innovation, better coordination, and more effective planning in social science, as well as for improvements in the teaching of social science, in a major decree directed to the USSR Academy of Sciences, the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, the Academy of the Social Sciences, the Higher Party School, the Institute of the Social Sciences attached to the Central Committee, the Ministry of Higher and Secondary Special Education, the State Committee on Science and Technology of the USSR Council of Ministers, and the Central Statistical Administration.[4] In response to this decree and to mounting pressure from within the scholarly community itself, the USSR Academy of Sciences

[1] See René Ahlberg, *Entwicklungsprobleme der empirischen Sozialforschung in der UdSSR: 1917-1967* (Problems of the Development of Empirical Social Research in the USSR: 1917-1967), Wiesbaden, Verlag Otto Harrassowitz, 1968, and Alex Simirenko, Ed., *Social Thought in the Soviet Union*, Chicago, Quadrangle Books, 1969. See also Zev Katz, "Sociology in the Soviet Union," *Problems of Communism* (Washington), May-June 1971, pp. 22-40.

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[2] See M. V. Keldysh in *Vestnik Akademii Nauk SSSR* (Moscow—hereafter cited as VAN), November 1962, pp. 3-6; L. F. Ilichev, *ibid.*, pp. 7-34; and "Postanovlenie Obshchevo Sobraniia Akademii Nauk SSSR" (Resolution of the General Assembly of the USSR Academy of Sciences), *ibid.*, December 1962, pp. 57-62.

[3] *Pravda* (Moscow), March 30, 1966. Significantly the last part of Brezhnev's statement was later deleted: see L. I. Brezhnev, *Leninskom kursom* (In Lenin's Footsteps), Moscow, Izdatelstvo politicheskoi literatury, 1970, Vol. 1, p. 360.

[4] *Pravda*, Aug. 27, 1967.

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established a number of special institutes: (1) an Institute on the United States (*Institut po SShA*); (2) a Far Eastern Institute (*Institut dalnevo vostoka*); (3) an Institute of Concrete Social Research (*Institut konkretnykh sotsialnykh issledovanii);* and (4) an All-Union Institute for Information on the Social Sciences *(Vsesoiuznyi institut informatsii obshchestvennykh* nauk).[5]

These developments within the USSR Academy of Sciences—by far the most prestigious academic organization in the Soviet Union—represent significant advances in the protracted struggle by a number of social scientists, especially younger scholars, to bring about a basic and far-reaching reorientation of Soviet social science and, in the process, to remove some of the more confining doctrinal and institutional fetters of the past. Under the general umbrella of the Scientific Council on Problems of Concrete Social Research (*Nauchnyi sovet o problemakh konkretnykh sotsialnykh issledovanii*) and together with professional organizations, such as the Soviet Sociological Association (*Sovetskaia sotsiologischeskaia assotsiatsiia*), the Institute of Concrete Social Research in the Academy of Sciences has become the chief center and focal point of empirical social science research in the Soviet Union. In at least some of its aspects, therefore, Soviet social science has registered an impressive advance from the Stalinist era—in which, for example, sociology was summarily dismissed as one of the "bourgeois pseudo-sciences" and Soviet social scientists had to labor in virtually complete isolation from Western social science—to a current setting in which the importance of empirical social science research has been reaffirmed. In some academic disciplines and fields of study, *e.g.,* management science and criminology, the process of emancipation from the ideological strait jacket and organizational confinement of the past has gone relatively far. But in the case of political science, in spite of a promising beginning, significant progress has not been permitted.

The study of politics in the Soviet Union has traditionally followed the Marxist precept that law is inseparably connected with the existence of the state as an institution in society, and it has therefore been characterized by a relatively narrow scope and a strong legal-institutional focus.[6] However, as a result of such factors as the party's desire for more accurate information about Soviet society and the rest of the world, the need to cope more effectively with "anti-communism" and bourgeois political science, recognition of the creative and critical impotence of Soviet political science in the aftermath of the *Short Course,* and growing pressures for change within a Soviet academic community which has had increased international contacts both with social scientists of the West and with innovative scholars in Eastern Europe,[7] a movement and organizational effort got under way in the USSR during the early 1960's which aimed at expansion of the scope of political research and designation of the study of politics as a discipline which is distinct from various other established disciplines.

A Soviet Association of Political Sciences (*Sovetskaia assotsiatsiia politicheskykh nauk—SAPN*) was organized as early as 1959 or 1960.[8] Under the auspices of this organization, delegations of Soviet scholars were sent to participate in the congresses of the International Political Science Association (IPSA), annual meetings of Soviet would-be political scientists (and their opponents) were held, and some research on Soviet constitutional law and government was published. The SAPN also served for a period as an important forum for the continuing debate on the merits of creating a separate academic discipline of political science.[9]

In January 1965, a few months after the ouster of N. S. Khrushchev and the installation of a reputedly more pragmatic and empirically-oriented political leadership, the debate was carried before the public by F. M. Burlatsky, a professor of philosophy, a member of the executive committee of the

[5] See *VAN,* September 1968, p. 155, and October 1968, pp. 3-10.

[6] In prerevolutionary Russia the study of politics developed under the influence of what the Germans call *Staatslehre* (state law). The Marxist insistence that the state and law cannot be studied separately, therefore, in a sense reinforced a preexisting orientation.

[7] See László Révész, "Political Science in Eastern Europe: Discussion and Initial Steps," *Studies in Soviet Thought* (Fribourg, Switzerland), Vol. 7, September 1967, pp. 185-210; and David E. Powell and Paul Shoup, "The Emergence of Political Science in Communist Countries," *American Political Science Review,* June 1970, pp. 572-88. The term *Short Course* refers to the "definitive" Stalinist party history which appeared in 1938—*Istoriia Vsesoiuznoi Kommunisticheskoi Partii (bolshevikov). Kratkii kurs* (History of the All-Union Communist Party [bolshevik]. Short Course).

[8] Before 1965, this organization was called the Soviet Association of Political (State) Sciences—*Sovetskaia assotsiatsiia politicheskikh (gosudarstvovedcheskikh) nauk.* In 1965, the parenthetical designation "state" was dropped, but it apparently was restored in 1970. See *Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo* (Moscow—hereafter SGP), January 1971, p. 146. On the history of the SAPN, see B. R. Bociurkiw, "The Study of Politics in the USSR: Birth Throes of a Soviet Political Science," in Simirenko, *op. cit.,* pp. 117 ff.

[9] See for example G. S. Ostroumov in *SGP,* July 1965, pp. 148-51.

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SAPN, and later Deputy Director of the Institute for Concrete Social Research of the USSR Academy of Sciences. In a major article published in *Pravda*, Burlatsky eloquently argued the case for the establishment of a separate academic discipline devoted to the study of politics and pointedly observed that a genuine political science "*presupposes the formulation of questions the answers to which are not known in advance.*"[10] The campaign for official recognition of political science as a unique discipline apparently reached its zenith at the annual meeting of the SAPN the following month, where Burlatsky again argued the case for the establishment of a new branch of knowledge whose focus would be the study of politics, broadly defined. A number of scholars endorsed his views and tried to circumvent the difficult problem of delineating the boundaries of the proposed new discipline by suggesting that the subject matter of political science could simply be defined as the study of "the totality of political relations [and] political activity in all of its manifestations." However, the meeting ended inconclusively, with proposals to let the Institute of State and Law of the USSR Academy of Sciences take the initiative in the coordination of political research and to establish a commission in the Institute of State and Law "to work out the problems of the *political sciences*." V. M. Chkhikvadze, the Director of the Institute of State and Law and an opponent of Burlatsky's proposal to create a single and independent discipline for the study of politics, was elected president of the SAPN; Burlatsky himself was elected as one of six vice-presidents of the Association.[11]

During the following months, the debate continued in the pages of *Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo* and other legal journals. In June 1965, *Pravda* published a follow-up editorial summarizing the responses to Burlatsky's January essay. While generally endorsing the recognition of political science as a new branch of knowledge, the newspaper proposed a narrower scope for the new discipline, as well as a more orthodox and conventional approach to the study of politics.[12] Although the editorial concluded with an implicit recognition of the desirability of creating scientific research institutes specifically concerned with the study of "the management of society" (*upravlenie obshchestvom*), it urged scholars not to wait for the establishment of such institutes and to broaden the scope of political research within the confines of existing faculties at universities and other institutions of higher education.

The *Pravda* editorial terminated for a time the public debate on the establishment of an independent discipline of political science in the Soviet Union. Paralleling the virtual disappearance of discussions of the "master science" from the pages of Soviet legal journals, there seems to have been an eclipse of the significance and level of activity of the SAPN. Its last reported annual meeting took place in February 1966, and since then its main functions seem to have been limited to sponsorship of delegations to IPSA congresses[13] and to occasional participation in the publication of political research.[14]

Nevertheless, within the scholarly community discussion of the legitimacy of political science as an academic discipline has continued —albeit in a more discreet manner. In 1968, for example, a number of articles on the topic of political science in bourgeois countries and the subject matter of that discipline appeared.[15] The immediate reason (or pretext) for these discussions seems to have been the previously mentioned 1967 Central Committee decree on the social sciences. Then, in 1969, the first book-length study of American political science was published in the Soviet Union by V. G. Kalensky. Although adorned with the requisite ideological perspectives and cloaked in the mantle of a critique of "bourgeois" political science, Kalensky's study was, in fact, a subtle and cautious plea

[10] *Pravda*, Jan. 10, 1965. (Emphasis added.)

[11] Ostroumov, *op. cit.*, pp. 149 and 150. (Emphasis added.)

[12] The June 13, 1965, editorial made it clear that the politics of socialist countries are to be studied separately from the politics of capitalist countries and discouraged any suggestion of possible affinities or similarities between Communist and capitalist politics.

[13] Members of the SAPN participated in the IPSA Congress in Beirut, Lebanon, April 22-25, 1968 (see *VAN*, September 1968, pp. 119-20). V. M. Chkhikvadze led a delegation of 16 SAPN members to the IPSA Congress of September 1970 in Munich. Chkhikvadze presented a paper disputing the Western origins of political science and arguing that modern political science owes its scientific basis to Marxism-Leninism and in particular to Lenin, "whose political ideas in terms of influence and authority are without equal in the 20th century" (see Tumanov, *op. cit.*, pp. 146-49).

[14] Thus, for example, a collection of essays dealing mainly with Soviet constitutional law was published in English translation under the joint auspices of the Institute of State and Law of the USSR Academy of Sciences and the Soviet Political Science Association [sic] (V. M. Chkhikvadze, Ed., Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1969).

[15] See V. E. Chirkin in *SGP*, January 1968, pp. 128-32; G. V. Maltsev, *ibid.*, pp. 137-38; G. S. Ostroumov, *ibid.*, February 1968, pp. 23-31; and B. A. Shabad, *ibid.*, August 1968, pp. 82-89.

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for the establishment of an empirically-oriented political science in the Soviet Union.[16]

In a major study published in 1970, F. M. Burlatsky returned to the matter of political science. Basing himself on extensive study of social science literature published in the West and in Eastern Europe, the author argued that the time had come to recognize the "materialist theory of politics" as an independent discipline and special branch of knowledge whose function it is to serve the needs of politics in practice and to make possible the scientific direction of society. In addition to citing the demands of practical politics, Burlatsky asserted that the establishment of such a discipline would be completely natural and in conformance with the intrinsic developmental laws (*zakonomernosti*) of Marxist-Leninist social science, *viz.*, further differentiation and simultaneous integration. Endorsing—unlike Kalensky—such Western political science techniques as systems analysis and functionalism, Burlatsky once again stated the case for a broader scope of political research in the USSR, especially in such areas as international relations and comparative politics, and emphasized the need for a more adequate conceptual apparatus, more sophisticated methodology, and the development of middle-level theoretical propositions about politics.[17] At a meeting jointly sponsored by the Soviet Sociological Association and the Institute of Concrete Social Research of the USSR Academy of Sciences in June 1970, Burlatsky discussed "various aspects of the Leninist treatment of politics as an independent branch of scientific research" and proposed that the materialist theory of politics be regarded as a "middle-level theory combining the most general categories of Marxist-Leninist sociology with concrete investigations." [18]

Clearly, Burlatsky has not yet given up the fight for the recognition of political science as a legitimate and independent academic discipline. However, it should be noted that the guarded nature of his argumentation in 1970 stands in sharp contrast to the remarkable open-mindedness and candor of his 1965 *Pravda* essay. The stakes in the debate, it seems, have changed; the quest is no longer for a science which is free to pursue objective truth, one which is not designed merely to confirm tenets revealed *a priori* by party doctrine. Instead, Burlatsky in his latest work explicitly acknowledges the principle of "party spirit" (*partiinost*) and claims that only Marxism-Leninism can provide a scientific theory and methodology for the study of politics—thus he echoes the party's viewpoint that genuine science presupposes the correct ideological perspective.[19] Moreover, Professor Burlatsky now clearly separates the study of politics in capitalist countries from the study of politics in socialist countries, arguing that the first deals with societies which are rent with antagonistic contradictions while the latter deals with harmonious and nonantagonistic societies.[20] Faithful adherence to such an ideological perspective, one suspects, would do more to impede the growth of objective political science in the USSR than any organizational inadequacies which may now exist within the structure of Soviet social science.

One can take the position that because of the party's unyielding insistence on *partiinost* and on Marxism-Leninism as *the* "theoretical and methodological foundation of all social sciences" the basic preconditions for the birth of a genuine political science (or any other social science) do not exist in the Soviet Union. If one adheres to this view, the remarkable efforts of Burlatsky and others in the early 1960's to create a new discipline devoted to the study of politics can be dismissed as symptoms of a condition akin to pseudocyesis or false pregnancy—*i.e.*, fruition was never a live possibility. On the other hand, one can argue that—though far from ideal—the essential and requisite conditions for the "conception" of political science as a new and independent academic discipline did exist in the Soviet Union during the early 1960's. If one takes this view, one has to conclude that there has been an interruption in the gestation process, that the "pregnancy" has, in effect, been terminated. While there is still talk about a political science

[16] See V. G. Kalensky, *Politicheskaia nauka v SShA: Kritika burzhuaznykh kontseptsii vlasti* (Political Science in the USA: A Critique of Bourgeois Conceptions of Power), Moscow, Yuridicheskaia literatura, 1969, and Rolf H. W. Theen, "'Political Science in the USSR: 'To Be, Or Not to Be.' Some Reflections on the Implications of a Recent Soviet Critique of American Political Science," *World Politics* (Princeton), July 1971, pp. 684-703.

[17] See F. M. Burlatsky, *Lenin, gosudarstvo, politika* (Lenin, The State, and Politics), Moscow, Izdatelstvo Nauka, 1970, especially pp. 150-69.

[18] *VAN*, October 1970, p. 90.

[19] For example, at the 14th International Congress of Philosophy in 1968, P. N. Fedoseev, Vice-President of the USSR Academy of Sciences, stated: "Scientific ideology . . . not only does not contradict the principles of science but fully accords with them, and there can be no advanced science without an advanced ideology." *Voprosy filosofii* (Moscow—hereafter VF), January 1969, p. 132.

[20] This separation was suggested by *Pravda* in its follow-up editorial to Burlatsky's original *Pravda* essay.

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within some segments of the Soviet academic community, it has become increasingly clear that the quest is no longer for a science free "to pose questions the answers to which are not known in advance." The change in Burlatsky's public position, the stunted development of the SAPN, the persistent refusal of the authorities to allow the publication of a yearbook or other organ devoted specifically to political research, the complete oversight of political science in the 1967 Central Committee decree on the social sciences—all these developments suggest that the drive for the recognition of political science for the time being has failed. Moreover, in view of recent trends in Soviet social science, it seems highly unlikely that political science will be accorded recognition as a full-fledged academic discipline in the near future.

The limitations which have been placed on the development of political science in the USSR apply, to greater or lesser extent, to other disciplines in Soviet social science. Despite considerable flux and uncertainty concerning the ultimate organizational structure of various disciplines,[21] there are indications that the CPSU has already moved to set definite limits on the emancipation of social science from its thralldom to historical materialism. The Soviet scholarly community has been served clear notice that neither political science nor any other discipline will be allowed to develop into a rival of historical materialism.[22]

Enlightening in this regard is the case of the sociologist Yu. A. Levada, whose lectures on sociology at the Faculty of Journalism of Moscow State University were published as an experimental textbook in 1969 under the auspices of the Institute for Concrete Social Research of the USSR Academy of Sciences and the Soviet Sociological Association.[23] Levada's attempt to accord sociology recognition as an independent science met with stiff resistance from party authorities. At a meeting of the staff members of the Academy of the Social Sciences and the Higher Party School (both attached to the Central Committee of the CPSU) during November 20-24, 1969, Levada's book was subjected to harsh criticism. A similar meeting was organized by the Scientific Council of the Faculty of Philosophy at Moscow State University on December 29, 1969. Among the charges made against Levada were: (1) he failed to recognize historical materialism as the "general-sociological" theory; (2) he conceived of sociology as a "neutral" science; (3) he attempted to counterpose sociology as an empirical science to philosophy—and thus ultimately to historical materialism; (4) he abandoned the principle of *partiinost,* as shown by his failure to develop the proper class perspective as the point of departure for his research, as well as by his uncritical attitude toward bourgeois sociology.[24] The stern critique of Levada is symptomatic of the party's efforts to reestablish strict controls over the social sciences and to set limits to their emancipation from the all-encompassing theory and methodology of historical materialism. The CPSU, no doubt, is fully aware that a scientifically-based sociology could generate a powerful momentum for reform at all levels of Soviet society.

In the field of philosophy, too, the party has shown its concern over "sociologization" of such leading professional journals as *Voprosy filosofii* and *Filosofskie nauki* and has time and again reaffirmed the role of historical materialism as *the* integrative theory and all-encompassing methodological foundation of all knowledge. Elevating *partiinost* to the position of "the most important principle of philosophy," an unsigned article published in the theoretical journal of the CPSU Central Committee in February 1970 acknowledged the potential contribution of empirical social science research, but warned that such research could be methodologically sound and theoretically significant only if it were based on historical materialism.[25] More recently, TASS has announced the establishment of the "Philosophical Society of the USSR" by "scholars and specialists in the social and natural sciences, as well as party

[21] Thus, for example, the organizational future of psychology within Soviet social science has remained undecided (see M. V. Keldysh in *VF*, June 1971, p. 20). The same state of flux is noted in the editorial in the September 1971 issue of *Voprosy filosofii*, which spoke of "'far-reaching changes taking place in the whole system of the social sciences with which historical materialism is connected" (p. 14).

[22] See *ibid.*, p. 15; P. Kopnin and I. Frolov in *Pravda*, Jan. 22, 1971; and G. Glezerman, V. Kelle, and N. Pilipenko in *Kommunist* (Moscow), No. 4, 1971, pp. 60-70.

[23] Yu. A. Levada, "Lektsii po sotsiologii" (Lectures on Sociology), in *Informatsionnyi biulleten nauchnovo soveta AN SSSR po problemam konkretnykh sotsialnykh issledovannii, Sovetskoi sotsiologicheskoi assotsiatsii, Instituta konkretnykh sotsialnykh issledovanii AN SSSR* (Moscow), No. 20-21, 1969.

[24] See *Vestnik Moskovskovo Universiteta: Seriia Filosofiia* (Moscow), No. 3, 1970, pp. 95-96, and B. E. Kozlovsky and Yu. A. Sychev in *Filosofskie nauki* (Moscow), No. 3, 1970, pp. 178-85. For recent developments in Soviet sociology see Borys Lewytzkyj's article in *Osteuropa* (Aachen), April 1971, pp. 265-72.

[25] *Kommunist*, No. 3, 1970, p. 71.

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workers." According to remarks delivered by Academician P. N. Fedoseev, Vice-President of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, at the constituent congress of the new society on December 24, 1971, the purpose of the new organization is to "unify the collectives of philosophers." [26] The importance which the newly-established organization has in the eyes of the party is suggested by the participation of high-ranking officials in its establishment.[27]

In the past, similar organizations have been used to control the professionals and academics through the inclusion of party workers in the membership. There is reason to believe that the newly-founded Philosophical Society of the USSR has precisely this purpose. On January 5, 1972, Academician F. V. Konstantinov, who was elected President of the Society, outlined the "militant tasks of Soviet philosophers" in a major *Pravda* article. He described the Philosophical Society as a "voluntary scientific-social organization, . . . attached to the USSR Academy of Sciences," whose membership would consist of both "collective and individual members, . . . [including] citizens of the USSR engaged in scientific, pedagogical and propaganda work in the area of philosophy [and] scientific communism." In typically Soviet fashion, Konstantinov's praise of the accomplishments of Soviet philosophy was followed by an important "*odnako*" ("however," *i.e.*, caveat). He called for better organization and more demanding standards in research and "more business-like discussion of the merits and deficiencies of every future book manuscript." *Inter alia,* he called on Soviet philosophers to "undertake basic research on the theory of the dialectic as an *integral science,* to create something in the way of a materialist analogy to Hegel's *Science of Logic.*"

An all-Union conference of the heads of the social science faculties of institutions of higher education, held December 21-23, 1971, provides further evidence that the entire spectrum of the social sciences has been under close party scrutiny in recent months. Addressing this conference, M. Suslov, member of the Politburo and Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, explicitly defined the parameters and spirit of Soviet social science in a speech which abounded with references to *partiinost* and *zakonomernosti.* "Marxist-Leninist party spirit," he said, "is the consistently developed principle of a scientific, objectively true analysis of social phenomena." He spoke of the "social responsibility of the scholar," the necessity to develop the correct class perspective, the need to reinforce the ideological "tempering" (*zalkalka*) of Soviet students, as well as the need "to strengthen the connection between the social sciences and practical party and state work." [28] In a lengthy exposition of "The Tasks of Social Science Faculties at Institutions of Higher Education," V. Yeliutin, USSR Minister of Higher and Secondary Special Education, made it clear that "historical materialism [is] the methodological basis of all the social sciences" and that concrete social research cannot and must not be carried out "in isolation from class [and] party positions." [29] Similar warnings were sounded by Academician P. Fedoseev in a recent article dealing with the basic directions of current Soviet social science research.[30]

These developments in academic life do not augur well for the future of Soviet social science. While the emphasis on "concrete social research," which has become such an important aspect of the current social science scene in the Soviet Union, is likely to continue,[31] there is increasing evidence that empirical social science research will be allowed to develop only within the framework of limitations imposed by the normative goal of "building a Communist society." In the case of political science, this probably means the possibility of using more sophisticated methods in a somewhat larger scope of research. In all likelihood, however, "political science research" in the Soviet Union will continue to be confined to the examination of relatively powerless institutions in Soviet society. Moreover, it is unlikely that in the foreseeable future the curriculum of Soviet institutions of higher education will be amended to include teaching and academic training in political science. Thus, political science may suffer the fate of its sister discipline, sociology, which has existed for some time without academically-

[26] *Pravda,* Dec. 25, 1971.

[27] These included S. P. Trapeznikov, Head of the Section for Science and Educational Institutions of the CPSU Central Committee; V. P. Yeliutin, Minister of Higher and Secondary Special Education of the USSR; B. I. Stukalin, Chairman of the Committee on Publication attached to the USSR Council of Minister. *Ibid.*

[28] M. Suslov in *Kommunist,* No. 1, 1972, pp. 18-30.

[29] *Ibid.,* pp. 78-92. See also *Pravda,* Feb. 12, 1972.

[30] P. Fedoseev in *Kommunist,* No. 1, 1972, pp. 56-77.

[31] Summing up the tasks of the USSR Academy of Sciences in light of the 24th CPSU Congress, Academy President M. V. Keldysh emphasized the importance of "concrete social research." *VF,* June 1971, p. 20.

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trained sociologists.[32] The available evidence suggests that recognized academic disciplines now involved in the study of politics—*i.e.*, the sciences of the state and law and of scientific communism—will expand their scope to accommodate the new methods and approaches. The latter discipline, created in 1962 when M. A. Suslov officially proclaimed that the political theory of communism would henceforth be known as "scientific communism," is still very much in a state of flux,[33] but there is reason to believe that this relatively young field of study may become the "home" for political science.[34]

Such a solution is not a happy one, but it will have to suffice until there is a more fundamental dissolution of the syncretistic conception of science which continues to prevail in the Soviet Union, *i.e.*, until Soviet historical materialism, with its claims to be a universal science, is replaced by a number of separate analytical sciences. Some observers would argue that Soviet social science is indeed already in the throes of the development which in Western sociology was initiated by Emile Durkheim, Max Weber, and Georg Simmel at the turn of the century.[35] However, while such a transformation process may in fact be inevitable, there is increasing evidence that at present the pendulum is swinging back toward firmer adherence to historical materialism. Thus Soviet social science continues to face the unresolved dilemma: how does one link empirical social science research with an *a priori* theory of society and human development which purports to explain everything?

The attempt to confine empirical social science research to the realm of methodology rather than to allow it to bring into question fundamental aspects of Soviet society is fraught with danger. This reality has been recognized by a number of Soviet scholars and is probably also no secret to party officials charged with maintaining control over philosophy and social science. Some Soviet scholars have suggested that the basic categories of historical materialism be translated into the terminology of empirical research. Leaving aside the question of feasibility, this suggestion, if anything, would probably tend to accelerate the dethronement of historical materialism as the only valid and universally applicable social theory. For this very reason it is unacceptable to many orthodox Soviet scholars and to the political leadership. Other Soviet scholars have argued that "the conception of various levels of social science permits the fusion of historical materialism with concrete (*i.e.*, empirical) research in such a way that historical materialism does not lose its methodological universality and empirical research receives a theoretical base in the form of the Marxist general-sociological methodology." [36] Whether in the long run historical materialism can survive even this circumscribed "impregnation" with empirical social science and continue to function as the basic theory and methodology of socio-economic, historical, psychological, and political research in the Soviet Union, without fundamental revisions in its dogmatic value system, remains to be seen.

The available evidence suggests that the present Soviet leadership has embarked upon a major effort to turn back the clock, *i.e.*, to undo and reverse the process of emancipation of Soviet social science from Marxism-Leninism. In the case of political science, clearly, the drive for an independent discipline has—at least for the time being—come to a halt: the "pregnancy," as it were, has been terminated. This should not come as a surprise, considering the fact that political science, like sociology and psychology, has a strong and natural propensity to destroy the types of myths which the Soviet leadership has, in the course of many years, created about itself and about Soviet society, as well as about *homo Sovieticus*. As Marx correctly recognized in *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* (1852), the tradition of all past generations can weigh "like a nightmare on the brain of the living." [37] The same can be said of the claims and demands of an ideology, especially one as outdated, narrow and rigid in its perspectives as Marxism-Leninism.

[32] See the essay by V. Perevedentsev in *Literaturnaia gazeta* (Moscow), No. 12, 1970, p. 12, in which a plea is made for the training of sociologists. There is some evidence of a small start in this direction: see W. A. Fisher, "On Soviet Sociology," in *Problems of Communism*, November-December 1971, p. 81.

[33] A unified council of the faculties of scientific communism was set up at Moscow State University by an order of the USSR Ministry of Higher and Secondary Special Education, dated June 19, 1969. Its functions are: (1) to promote the development of scientific communism as a science, and (2) to promote the development of scientific communism as an academic discipline. See *Vestnik Moskovskovo Universiteta: Seriia XIII, Teoriia nauchnovo kommunizma* (Moscow), March-April 1971, pp. 80-83. A proposal by Ts. A. Stepanian in November 1969 to set up a special institute for scientific communism within the USSR Academy of Sciences was turned down. See *VF*, March 1970, p. 138.

[34] On recent developments in scientific communism, see *VF*, July 1971, pp. 3-24, and August 1971, pp. 142-47.

[35] Ahlberg, *op. cit.*, pp. 191 ff.

[36] Glezerman *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 68.

[37] Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, *Werke* (Works), [East] Berlin, Dietz Verlag, 1969, Vol. 8, p. 115.

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Books

Soviet Dilemmas in the Middle East

By Robert O. Freedman

AARON S. KLIEMAN: *Soviet Russia and the Middle East.* Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1970.
WALTER LAQUEUR: *The Struggle for the Middle East. The Soviet Union in the Mediterranean.* New York, Macmillan, 1969.
MOHAMMED S. AGWANI: *Communism in the Arab East.* Bombay, Asia Publishing House, 1969.

THE FAILURE OF the Communist-supported coup d'état of July 1971 in the Sudan, which led to the execution of a number of prominent Sudanese Communists (including a Lenin-prize winner) and to a consequent sharp deterioration in the hitherto warm relations between the Soviet Union and the Sudanese government, came as a welcome indication to Western observers that Moscow was still far from converting the Middle East into a full-fledged Soviet sphere of influence. Although the Russians, in a process dating back to Khrushchev's famous arms deal with Nasser in 1955, have endeavored to maximize Soviet influence in the Middle East through extensive diplomatic, military and economic assistance to a number of states in the region (including the Sudan), they have frequently come into conflict with the local nationalist leaders. The heated confrontation between Khrushchev and Nasser following the Iraqi revolution of 1958, Abdul Karim Kassem's manipulation of both the Soviet Union and the Iraqi Communist party between 1958 and 1963, Syrian General Hafiz Assad's exploitation of the Sino-Soviet rift in 1969, and Sudanese Premier Jaafar Nimeri's confrontation with the USSR in 1971—all these episodes attest to the difficulties the Soviet leaders have encountered in their endeavor to make the USSR the dominant power in the Middle East.

Both Aaron Klieman and Walter Laqueur, in their respective studies of Soviet policy in the Middle East, see geopolitical considerations at the heart of the Soviet drive into the region, although they differ on the ability of the nations of the area to withstand Soviet pressure. Klieman's book seems primarily designed to give undergraduate students a historical overview of Tsarist and Soviet policies in the Middle East and makes a number of useful observations regarding the difficulties the Russians have faced in trying to attain their objectives. Since the author looks at Soviet policy especially in the context of the volatile politics of the area, he tends to be far more skeptical of the Russians' ability to control developments there than scholars who focus primarily on the shaping of policy in Moscow.

One of the most serious obstacles to Soviet ambitions in the Middle East stems from the abundance of intraregional conflicts which often have the potential of forcing the Russian leaders to choose between two nations with whom they would like to increase their influence. In 1963, for example, the Russians suffered a major loss of influence in Morocco as a consequence of siding with Algeria against Morocco in the brief border war between those two North African nations. Similarly, Moscow today faces a difficult choice as a result of the conflict between Iraq and Iran, with the Shah of Iran cleverly exploiting the Russians' desire for improved relations with his country in order not only to obtain extensive Soviet economic assistance but also to strengthen Iran's position in its struggle with Iraq for control of the Persian Gulf. Besides their conflicts with one another, moreover, many of the nations of the Middle East are plagued by serious internal conflicts, and these, too, have often posed a difficult problem of choice for the Russians. The vacillating nature of the Soviet attitude toward the Kurdish minority's drive for autonomy in Iraq, for example, has been an obstacle to close relations between the USSR and the Iraqi government.

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In addition to these difficulties, Klieman further points to the heavy costs the Soviet Union is having to shoulder, in terms of economic and military assistance to the Arab states, in support of its bid for dominant influence in the Middle East. "In return for enabling the Soviets to claim influence," he writes, "the Arabs expect Moscow to supply loans, weapons, technical advice, diplomatic support and favorable terms of trade . . ." (p. 78). Indeed, projecting ahead the almost limitless needs of the nations of the area, Klieman even raises the question of who is really exploiting whom in the Soviet-Arab relationships. And it is a question which a number of Soviet commentators have also begun to ponder.

IN CONTRAST TO Klieman's broad overview of Russian policy in the Middle East, Walter Laqueur's book is considerably more detailed. The author is the dean of scholars writing on Soviet policy in that part of the world, and his earlier *Communism and Nationalism in the Middle East* (1956) and *The Soviet Union and the Middle East* (1959) remain important reference works for students of Moscow's Middle Eastern policy since the Russian Revolution.

In his current study, Laqueur not only updates his earlier works to mid-1969 but also presents a functional analysis of the main components of Soviet policy toward the Middle East. Thus, besides tracing the course of Soviet policy toward Turkey and Iran (the so-called "Northern Tier"), Israel and Zionism, and the Arab states (excluding those of North Africa), he also provides separate chapters on Soviet trade and economic aid, the evolution of Soviet strategic thinking, and oil as a factor in Soviet policy. Laqueur's narrative and analysis take up aproximately half the book, the remainder consisting of a number of documents from Soviet, Arab and Arab-Communist sources on various aspects of Soviet Middle Eastern policy.

The central theme that runs through the entire book is the author's concern over the shifting balance of power in both the Middle East and the world. He fears that as a consequence of neo-isolationist trends in the United States, US attention—and the necessary American counterpoise—may be drawn away from the Middle East. Should this happen, he warns, then the region could become an exclusive Soviet sphere of interest, and this would "decisively shift the balance of power and have incalculable consequences all over the world" (p. 189). Turkey and Iran, in Laqueur's opinion, could be among the first to feel these consequences. Over the past decade, the Soviet Union has been willing to grant major concessions and extensive economic aid to these two states in an effort to induce their leaders to adopt a more neutralist policy; however, if the Middle East and world balance of power were to change in favor of the USSR, the author warns, the Russians might no longer "be satisfied with mere neutrality" (p. 42).

Laqueur shows little confidence in the ability of the Arab states to withstand the embrace of the Russians. Although he acknowledges that such states as Egypt and Syria are not yet in a position comparable to that of the Soviet-dominated states of Eastern Europe, he argues that their military and economic weakness has rendered them heavily dependent on the Soviet Union. Yet Soviet assistance has not brought the economic progress hoped for by the leaders of the recipient countries, nor has it produced the "showcases of communism" that Moscow may have aspired to create.

When Laqueur completed his book in 1969, events in the Middle East seemed to be moving in the direction he indicated. Nasser was becoming increasingly dependent on the Soviet Union because of his "war of attrition" against Israel, and coups d'état in

Reviewers in this Issue

ROBERT O. FREEDMAN—Assistant Professor of Political Science at Marquette University (Milwaukee); author of *Economic Warfare in the Communist Bloc,* 1970, and of a forthcoming book about Soviet Middle East policy.

JANOS HORVATH—Professor of Economics at Butler University (Indianapolis) and currently a Senior Fellow at the Research Institute on Communist Affairs, Columbia University (New York); editor (with Kenneth E. Boulding and Martin Pfaff) of *The Grants Economy in International Perspective,* 1972.

HARVEY FIRESIDE—Associate Professor of Politics at Ithaca College; author of *Icon and Swastika: The Russian Orthodox Church Under Nazi and Soviet Control During World War II,* 1971.

ANDREW J. NATHAN—Assistant Professor of Political Science at Columbia University (New York); contributor of articles on Chinese politics to *Current Scene* and the *Far Eastern Economic Review.*

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the Sudan and Libya appeared to move the governments of both those nations closer to Moscow. In the last two years, however, Arab leaders have shown considerably more independence and political adroitness than many Western observers gave them credit for. Nasser's successor, Anwar Sadat, has consolidated his position by removing a number of Egyptian leaders closely associated with the Soviet Union. Libya's new ruler, Muammar al-Qaddafy, has turned out to be a militant anti-Communist, and the Sudan's Jaafar Nimeri, who narrowly survived an attempted Communist coup d'état in July 1971, has publicly attacked the USSR with the result that Soviet-Sudanese relations, once excellent, have seriously deteriorated. Even Syria's General Hafiz Assad has begun to move away from close dependence on the USSR by taking steps toward improving relations with the West. At the same time, the United States has made some major moves in the Middle East with its successful initiative for a ceasefire on the Israeli-Egyptian front and its strong demonstration of support for King Hussain of Jordan when that country was invaded by Syria in the fall of 1970. Whether these countertrends will continue is a matter of debate, but it is clearly premature to write off either the Arab states or the region as a whole as "lost" to Soviet domination.

Another main theme of Laqueur's study is the Russians' cynical indifference to ideological considerations in their dealings with the Middle Eastern states. In the author's view, "the end of ideology" has already occurred in the Soviet Union, and the Russians have shown themselves quite willing to sacrifice the interests of the local Communist parties in the Middle East if these interests stand in the way of Soviet efforts to cultivate relations with the national leaders of the region. Yet Soviet rivalry with China and the Russian leaders' need to give minimal lip service to Communist doctrine for reasons of domestic legitimacy have kept the Soviets from completely disregarding the Middle Eastern Communist parties, and the reluctance of some of these parties to follow Soviet wishes—as in the case of the Sudanese Communists' refusal to support the Sudan's entry into a Russian-approved Arab federation —has proven acutely embarrassing to Moscow.

THE SHIFTING FORTUNES of the Middle Eastern Communist parties and the difficulties inherent in their relationship with the Soviet Union are also themes dealt with by Mohammed Agwani in *Communism in the Arab East*. Unlike Klieman and Laqueur, who are Western scholars, Agwani is an Indian professor who presents an Asian perspective on Middle Eastern developments. He shares the anti-Western outlook of a number of the region's current national leaders, as well as their view that communism is basically alien to the social and political fabric of the Middle East.

By Agwani's definition, the "Arab East" consists of Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and Iraq, and he does not deal with the Communist parties of North Africa, the Sudan, or the Arabian peninsula. After giving a brief historical review of the development of communism in these Arab states (and Palestine) up to the end of World War II, he proceeds to describe the postwar ideological and tactical convolutions of the local Communist movements as they tried to steer a difficult course between the demands of the Arab nationalist leaders, the realities of Soviet foreign policy, and their own assessments of their chances of seizing power in the fluid politics of the Arab states. Looking back at the contradictions inherent in Soviet, Arab nationalist, and Arab Communist policies in Egypt, Syria and Iraq, one cannot but agree with Agwani's conclusion that "the Soviet Union's close alliance with Nasser in Egypt, with the radical nationalists in Syria, and with Kassem in Iraq was a millstone around the neck of Arab communism" (p. 214).

Agwani's best chapter is that in which he analyzes the changing tactics and fortunes of the Iraqi Communists from the time Kassem came to power in 1958 until he was overthrown and the party was decimated in 1963. The other sections of the book are not as strong and reflect the author's general tendency to overestimate the power of the local Communist parties. Agwani's chapter on the impact of the Sino-Soviet conflict is particularly disappointing, completely overlooking the extensive economic competition entered into by the two Communist states to win over the Arab nationalist leaders to their respective sides prior to the abortive "Second Bandung" conference which was to have taken place in Algeria in 1965.

All in all, each of the three books makes a useful contribution to the growing literature on the Soviet involvement in the Middle East. Perhaps the most salient point that all three studies serve to drive home is the extent of the difficulties facing the Soviet Union in its attempts to gain hegemony over such a complex and volatile region of the world.

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The Cost of Soviet Aid

By Janos Horvath

JAMES R. CARTER: *The Net Cost of Soviet Foreign Aid.* New York, Praeger, 1971.
ROBERT O. FREEDMAN: *Economic Warfare in the Communist Bloc.* New York, Praeger, 1970.

THE MEANS WHEREBY the Soviet Union wields its technological superiority and enormous economic power to influence countries of the Third World as well as its fellow socialist states has been the subject of countless studies. Yet the two volumes under review—by James R. Carter and Robert O. Freedman—do provide a fresh perspective on these matters.

The first of these, Carter's *The Net Cost of Soviet Foreign Aid*, attempts to draw a balance between the Soviet Union's highly publicized commitments to provide large sums of economic aid to less developed countries and the actual cost of this program to the USSR. The author's analysis reveals that despite public commitment of $6,296 million in economic aid from 1955 through 1968, Moscow actually incurred the astonishingly low net cost of $681 million. Professor Carter arrives at this estimate by analyzing four factors that reduced the actual costs: (1) actual aid deliveries came to less than half the commitments; (2) there is the reasonable expectation of sizable repayments; (3) the USSR has benefited from price discrimination, *i.e.*, overvaluation of aid deliveries and undervaluation of goods delivered in repayment; and (4) the Soviet Union has derived certain benefits from expanded trade with recipient countries. Summing up the author's findings (pp. 98-102), we get the following picture of Soviet foreign aid in 1955-68:

The Cost of Soviet Foreign Aid
($ million)

Commitments		6,296
Cost reductions		5,615
Of which:		
Not delivered	3,195	
Expected repayments	1,940	
Price discrimination	465	
Expansion of commerce	15	
Net cost of aid		681

The methods used by Professor Carter in determining the ways in which the Soviet Union has reduced the cost of its extensive aid program are both logical and novel. No one is likely to argue with his calculation of the discounted present value of expected aid repayments. However, his proposition that a substantial gain accrued to the Soviet Union because of price discrimination in its aid and trade operations is sure to raise eyebrows. It has been widely thought that one of the principal appeals of Soviet aid to less developed countries is the possibility of repayment with locally-produced goods. This "soft-currency" repayment concession enjoys popularity because it eases pressures on the balance-of-payments position of developing states. Now Carter casts a shadow on this idyllic picture:

[*Between 1958 and 1965*] *the less developed countries paid an average of at least 15 percent, and possibly as much as 25 percent, more for the commodities they purchased from the Soviet Union than the countries of the industrial West paid for the same commodities. . . .* [*Moreover*] *. . . between 1955 and 1968 the Soviet Union probably paid an average of 10-to-15 percent less for its imports from the less developed countries under its bilateral trade arrangements than it would have paid had these commodities been purchased at world market prices.* (pp. 39-41)

Specifically, in examining the Soviets' export of 43 commodities to the less developed countries in 1958, the author calculates the actual cost to the USSR at 135.3 million rubles. He observes:

If these same exports had been sold to the less developed countries at the average unit prices charged countries of the industrial West, they would have cost the less developed countries only 117.8 million rubles, or 14.9 percent less. . . . In addition, if only Soviet exports of machinery and

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equipment and manufactured goods are examined, the degree of price discrimination is even greater. (pp. 37-38)

The final element in the author's calculations is the estimated benefit derived by Moscow from expanded trade with recipient countries attributable to but not specifically associated with the Soviet aid program. The author considers several possible areas of benefit to the USSR from this trade: specialization of production, economies of scale, changes in terms of trade, changes in efficiency under the impact of foreign competition, and increases in the rate of Soviet economic growth. While each of these has probable validity, Professor Carter notes the unavailability of adequate data by which to measure the concrete benefits brought by these factors. Instead, he falls back on the concept—noted above—of the 15-percent price advantage accruing to the Soviet Union in its trade with recipient nations. This he applies to the "increased volume of *normal* commercial trade" and arrives at a Soviet gain of $15.2 million (p. 97, emphasis added).

In examining Professor Carter's calculations of the net cost of Soviet foreign aid, one is impressed by the striking effectiveness of the program. Stretching out over 14 years the sacrifice of less than $700 million—or about 11 percent of reported aid commitments—the Soviet Union has derived remarkably favorable publicity and, presumably, leverage in international affairs. The reader should be reminded in this context that he is in all likelihood dealing with a "positive-sum game," *i.e.*, that the recipients of Soviet aid have in fact derived more economic benefit from the program than it actually cost the Soviet donor. Thus, Soviet loans, even if ultimately repaid, may enable less developed countries to launch self-sustaining economic activities, and it would be folly to assume that the benefit of Soviet aid to these countries was only 11 cents on the dollar.

While welcoming Professor Carter's useful new focus on Soviet foreign aid activities, one must also note several minor shortcomings. In the first place, the author is imprecise in listing some aid magnitudes. He states that Turkey received a $210-million Soviet aid commitment in 1967, while in fact the commitment was for $200 million and was announced in 1964. Also, he understates Soviet aid to Pakistan and substantially overstates Soviet aid to Afghanistan.[1] A second problem concerns Carter's drastic departure from other analysts on the matter of the comparative rate of discount. It is commonly accepted that aid donors sacrifice the opportunity to invest aid funds domestically for a return ranging from 6 to 10 percent per annum. It is indeed questionable whether, by investing its foreign aid funds domestically, the Soviet Union could achieve a return of 15 percent, as suggested by the author. This methodological issue is also of analytical significance, for the choice of an unduly high comparative rate of discount would result in an overstatement of the true grant elements involved in any aid transaction.

WHEREAS Carter's study provides useful insights into Soviet aid programs both outside and within the socialist camp, Robert Freedman's study of *Economic Warfare in the Communist Bloc* is more narrowly focused—providing a penetrating inquiry into Soviet economic policies vis-à-vis Yugoslavia, Albania, and the People's Republic of China. Freedman demonstrates that Moscow, in its dealings with these socialist confreres, has eschewed much of the restraint and good faith evidenced in Soviet economic relations with some 40 less developed countries of the non-Communist world. (One need only recall the forbearance shown by the Soviet Union in the face of domestic upheavals in Ghana, Iraq, Indonesia, Ceylon, Sudan, and the United Arab Republic—disorders which often required the Soviet government to abandon Communist comrades in the target countries.) The present case studies dispel the notion propounded by Soviet apologists that among socialist states international relations of a progressive new type have come into being. On the contrary, within the Communist world the Soviet Union has behaved as a typical hegemonic power attempting to discipline smaller countries within its power sphere. It has resisted the development among its socialist dependents of a "parasitical understanding of the principles of proletarian internationalism" [2]—*i.e.*, the expectation of getting something for nothing, and has warned its Communist dependents that aid is something "from which only true friends and brothers have a right to benefit." [3]

The Soviet leaders were overly optimistic at the outset about the efficacy of economic instruments

[1] See Janos Horvath, "Economic Aid Flow from the USSR: A Recount of the First Fifteen Years," *Slavic Review* (Columbus, Ohio), December 1970, pp. 613-32.

[2] Freedman, pp. 116-17, quoting from *Kommunist* (Moscow), No. 18, October 1963.

[3] Freedman, p. 78, quoting *Zeri i Popullit* (Tirana), March 25, 1962.

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for controlling deviation within the Communist camp, but they have gradually been forced into awareness of the limitations of economic pressure. Professor Freedman's meticulous presentation of a rich storehouse of material underlines this leitmotif, *i.e.*, that even a superpower cannot simply convert the economic dependence of other nations into political obedience and subservience. In an era when the disintegration of a bipolar world has been attended and abetted by disunity within the Communist camp, economic warfare has often proved an ineffective or even counterproductive policy for Moscow to follow. Thus, in the case of Yugoslavia and Albania, Soviet economic pressure hardened the resolve of the challenged regimes to remain independent and helped them rally popular support by appeals to national integrity. Instead of gaining control of the target governments, members of local pro-Soviet factions found themselves eliminated from power. Stalin, in enforcing the Soviet-bloc embargo against Yugoslavia, succeeded only in eventually forcing Tito to lean more to the West. Albania, instead of buckling under the pressure of Soviet economic boycott, moved closer to China. In contrast to the above cases, Khrushchev applied economic pressures to the People's Republic of China in the form of aid cancellation and trade reduction but never resorted to an embargo. (The Brezhnev-Kosygin leadership has become even more circumspect, employing only minor forms of economic pressure against Romania and Cuba.[4])

In documenting the evolution of Soviet relations with Yugoslavia, Albania, and the PRC, Freedman offers a very comprehensive picture of the milieu but may give excessive credence to public complaints of recipient countries. Chinese resentment is amply illustrated by the May 24, 1969, communiqué from the PRC government:

> *At present, the Soviet government is everywhere perpetrating acts of aggression and plunder against the peoples of other countries under the signboard of "assistance."* (p. 152)

Or by the complaint of the *Peking Review* addressed to Soviet officials at the same time:

> *You have insisted on providing large amounts of goods which we do not really need or which we do not need at all, while holding back or supplying very few of the goods which we need badly.* (p. 131)

But should one accept such claims at face value? Could the Chinese ever be duped to such an extent? Certainly the author's own description (p. 106) of the bargaining carried on by Mao Tse-tung in Moscow in early 1950 suggests no such gullibility. While I do agree that Chinese grievances are genuine and important, the question of whether the USSR actually engages in "imperialist exploitation" is susceptible of economic analysis and need not rely on the excesses of declamatory passages.

One such diatribe, aired by Radio Peking on November 5, 1967, and quoted by Freedman, raises an interesting question about the economic relationship between the USSR and its European allies:

> [*The Soviet government*] *has secured control over the industries of other Comecon*[5] *member countries. . . .* [*They*] *have to import raw materials from the Soviet Union, turn out products to Soviet requirements and specification, and then sell them to the Soviet Union.* (p. 6)

Such a claim invites examination of Soviet-East European economic relationships in the light of the controversial Prebisch thesis. As adumbrated in the literature and numerous economic policy conferences (with the hearty approval of delegates from the USSR and the People's Republic of China), this theory argues that the dynamics of economic development around the globe tend to redistribute income in favor of advanced capital-intensive industrial countries and against the raw-material supplying countries. This allegedly happens because of deterioration in the terms of trade, to the disadvantage of the raw-material supplier who also must purchase industrial products abroad. Yet it is precisely the Soviet Union which furnishes raw materials for East European processors and which purchases the finished industrial output. If the Prebisch thesis has objective validity, one might expect the terms of trade to turn against the Soviet Union and to benefit the relatively more industrialized Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia. I hasten to note that the existence of such a theory-implied phenomenon has not been empirically tested thus far, if only because of the prevalent consensus among Western observers that the USSR preempts the price-fixing prerogatives in its relations with other Comecon

[4] For a quantitative analysis of postwar transfers, see Janos Horvath, "Grant Elements in Intra-Bloc Aid Programs," *ASTE Bulletin* (Washington, DC), Fall 1971, pp. 1-17.

[5] Council for Mutual Economic Assistance.

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countries. But an application of the Prebisch thesis to inter-socialist economic relations might prove quite interesting, especially should it disprove the complaints of the USSR's Communist trade partners that they have suffered at the hands of Moscow.

Freedman also quotes the 1967 Chinese complaint that

". . . far from being grants, Soviet aid to China was rendered mainly in the form of trade, and that it was certainly not a one-way affair. China has paid and is paying the Soviet Union in goods, gold, or convertible foreign exchange for all [Soviet deliveries] including those made available on credit plus interest. (p. 107)

Thus, we have returned to the need, suggested by Professor Carter's innovative approach, for a more suitable analytical framework within which to judge economic relationships between donor and recipient countries. The reviewer has discussed elsewhere the concept of "grants economics" and its examination of the impact of such complex factors of aid programs as low interest rates, payment moratoriums, the tying of aid to purchases in donor countries, and the acceptance of repayment in soft-currency shipments.[6] As the art of "grants economics" advances, one can address the topics treated so ably by Professors Carter and Freedman with even greater sophistication and confidence.

[6] See my "On the Evaluation of International Grants Policy," *Public Finance* (Saarbruecken, West Germany), No. 2, 1971, pp. 379-93; Janos Horvath and Donald P. Minassian, "International Grant Erosion and Gains Due to Trading Stipulations," *American Statistical Association 1971 Proceedings* (Washington, DC), Business and Economic Statistics Section (forthcoming); and Kenneth E. Boulding, Janos Horvath, and Martin Pfaff, Eds., *The Grants Economy in International Perspective,* Belmont, Cal. Wadsworth, 1972.

Analyzing Soviet Affairs: Methods and Myths

By Harvey Fireside

JOHN RESHETAR, JR: *The Soviet Polity: Government and Politics in the USSR.* New York, Dodd, Mead & Co., 1971.
JOHN W. STRONG, Ed.: *The Soviet Union under Brezhnev and Kosygin: The Transition Years.* New York, Van Nostrand-Reinhold Co., 1971.

IN 1922 Walter Lippmann's *Public Opinion* criticized the pervasiveness and obduracy of sterotypes, the "pictures in our heads" that follow laws of psychological economy to make deceptively simple sense out of the buzzing incoherence of social forces and that ultimately serve as "defenses of our positions in society."

Lippmann proved a prophetic guide in the case of American public opinion on the Soviet Union from the 1930's onward. Specifically, the public's picture of Stalin underwent quantum changes as the pre-World War II Byzantine despot was replaced by benevolent Uncle Joe on wartime magazine covers, to be supplanted by the postwar image of a kind of cosmic sorcerer stirring up subversive sandstorms to erode the peacetime settlements. It is more difficult, however, to detect any movement toward Lippman's rationalist corrective—his hope for "a political science" that would instruct public opinion before it congealed into oversimplified slices of reality, as well as his faith in the ability of "experts" whose counsel would induce legislators to deal with complex social issues by means of individual, non-standardized responses.

The impact of stereotyped thinking on the state of US studies of the Soviet system during the 1950's was demonstrated over a decade ago by Daniel Bell in *The End of Ideology,* in his chapter entitled "Ten Theories in Search of Reality: The Prediction of Soviet Behavior." Bell's *tour de force* debunked the then current expositions of Soviet politics as ideological forays no longer suited, in the thawing season of the Cold War, to the refractory

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circumstances of emergent factions and interest groups. The scholarly furor aroused by Bell seemed to put him in his place as a faulty diagnostician of academic myopia for having, at the least, prematurely described the withering of ideology in both East and West. Bell was scored by his critics for having read the destalinization symptoms of the early Khrushchev era as portents of systemic change, rather than as cosmetic spots on the same old totalitarian beast, soon to be sitting in committee.

Bell's critique, nonetheless, appears to have inspired scholars to concoct a series of new "models"—a more recondite term than just plain theories—to supplement the old line. These streamlined versions were stripped of the obvious ideological trappings that had drawn Bell's ironic fire. By fitting them out with elements that had been studied closer to home (such as bureaucracy, technocracy, and pressure groups), their designers sought to launch them on the modern highways of comparative studies. A survey of the treatises in vogue in the past decade does not show them to have roadtested much better than the old Model T. A close look at one representative recent work, John Reshetar, Jr.'s *The Soviet Polity: Government and Politics in the USSR*, which describes and applies a half-dozen existing models in eclectic array, indicates that the net effect of this approach on analysts may be serial rigidity rather than discovery of the processes of genuine change in Soviet society. As Lippmann pointed out, "The lawmaker does not arrive at a true picture of the state of the union by putting together a mosaic of local pictures."

Five basic design flaws appear to have marred the new models:

(1) In attempting to create a "true picture of the state" of the Soviet Union, the model-makers became so absorbed with their high-sounding theoretical constructs that they did not really examine the experiences of the several Soviet institutions that have been shaken by post-Stalin cycles of reform and reaction. At such rarefied heights, all manner of "data" could be fed by circular logic into preset conclusions. Thus, for Reshetar the thesis of a peculiar Russian genius for the worst form of government is buttressed by the following: Geoffrey Gorer's "swaddling" hypothesis, in which the peasant custom of coverall diapering is held to account for adult feelings of impotence in the face of authority; Nicolas Berdyaev's intuitive discovery of an anarchist Russian character that subsides into passivity after having expended its revolutionary energies; and Karl A. Wittfogel's "hydraulic" rationale for Oriental despotism, whereby legions of corvée labor were commandeered for gigantic public works projects (an application to Russian history that Wittfogel himself rejected).

(2) Overly abstract models of the Soviet system have tended to stress basically static features, to discount sectors of change, and to disparage new trends in terms of *"plus ça change . . ."* or of Spenglerian visions of eventual decline and dissolution. Reshetar, for instance, chooses simply to omit events that have altered the life of the post-Stalin generation in such key fields as the consumer economy, the schools, the courts, and the collective farms. In considering prospects for reform, he asserts that "such change is limited by the system's parameters"—a phrase which gives us no idea of the scope or nature of such mystical limits and thus in no way disproves the possibility of major change.

(3) Despite their pretenses of "social-scientific" objectivity, the new models have barely concealed an ethnocentric bias. The old totalitarian evaluation implied a scale on which US democracy stood unquestioned at the farthest remove. The new bureaucratic view sees all of Soviet life enmeshed in a tangle of red tape from which most sectors of American life are presumably still free. Commentaries on Soviet technocrats and pressure groups have generally been explicit in ascribing subsidiary roles to these forces of rationality and pluralism, again in self-laudatory fashion. Even the latest of the line, the "developmental model," has assumed that the Soviets are stumbling several leagues behind "advanced societies" up the slopes of progress.

(4) When the bad fit of the new models has sooner or later become evident to their designers, they have invariably reverted to belief in the existence of a totalitarian substratum beneath the veneer of reform. This sort of mechanistic recoil marks Reshetar's chapter, "Soviet Political Culture and the Russian Political Tradition." According to his deterministic formula, "the Communist ruling class . . . provides a collectivized modern counterpart to the Russian tsars." In this compressed view, the forced deportation by Ivan III of the Novgorod citizenry who resisted him in the 15th century becomes the prototype of Stalinist nationality practices. Simple costume changes propel the reader from Ivan to Brezhnev and Kosygin.

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(5) The promises of the models —enhanced by their derivation from macro-economics—to engender interdisciplinary research, as well as the promises of authors like Reshetar to attempt "to relate the Soviet polity to other political systems," have far exceeded their delivery. Such studies tend to focus on the uniqueness of their subject and of the arcane Kremlinological art required to fathom it—an art, incidentally, at which Reshetar himself is a master, witness his analysis of career patterns of the *apparatchiki.* Yet it is difficult to accept that excursions based on a Machiavellian fascination with court intrigue can get at the essentials of the ordinary Soviet citizen's life—his family, education, work, welfare, leisure activities, etc.—let alone find ways to compare these aspects of life in different societies.

Fortunately for the student of Soviet politics, US and Canadian scholars have been producing seminal monographs on just such essential themes during the past few years, although too often only leading up to, and not yet crossing, the comparative bridge. So-called "case studies" of persons occupying particular roles (like that of factory manager or of litigant in a Moscow criminal court) and of institutions (like the Procuracy or the USSR Academy of Sciences) have pinned down on a small scale the reality that so far has eluded the model-builders. The modest hypotheses of such studies have allowed them to interpret data in an open-ended fashion, without being boxed in by models, and to convey the practical manner in which Soviet youth or creative artists have dealt with problems in terms increasingly irrelevant to the dogmatic designs of the old guard in the Politburo.

A typical sampling of such scholarship is contained in *The Soviet Union under Brezhnev and Kosygin,* which presents the contributions of 14 participants in a Carleton University symposium that took place in mid-1968. Ironically, it is the sort of work that meets a challenge once posed by Reshetar—in a 1955 essay on "Problems of Analyzing and Predicting Soviet Behavior"—better than his own later effort. He inveighed at that time against the shallowness of "monistic explanations," such as those which concentrated exclusively on Marxist ideology or Russian national character. He also belittled the "privileged few" who had been allowed to visit the Soviet Union in the preceding decade, whose reports have been "exaggerated out of proportion to their significance." Yet his text 16 years later reassembles a number of monistic theories and does not draw upon the observations of recent visitors and exchange students. By contrast, many of the scholars in the Carleton symposium are able to dispense with all-inclusive models in observing some conflicting trends in specific areas of Soviet life.

For example, Joseph Berliner does not seek to find a common denominator in the uneven record he discerns in the implementation of Soviet economic reforms: he simply offers the cautious assessment "that after 50 years the society is still searching for a proper form of organization of its economic system." A like sense of balance marks John Hazard's account of the legal profession's uphill struggle for procedural guarantees, George Roseme's analysis of the differential adaptation to political controls by Soviet writers, and Alexander Dallin's succinct résumé of evidence on the "fragmentation of world communism."

In these presentations, the student can also witness the appealingly human phenomena of "experts" admitting that data do not add up to simple conclusions, disagreeing on what the basic data are, and failing to foresee incipient shifts in Soviet policy. Thus, Abraham Brumberg, describing the fall of Khrushchev, and Frederick Barghoorn, sketching possible future developments, confess their bafflement as to what is really happening within the Soviet regime and concede the extremely speculative nature of Kremlinology. As if to underscore the point, Yaroslav Bilinsky's reconstruction of Khrushchev's fall assumes a Central Committee session of October 1964 that Myron Rush doubts ever took place at all. It is interesting, too, that most of the attendant specialists on military and foreign affairs—including Thomas Wolfe, Richard Lowenthal, and Samuel Sharp—did not anticipate the later breakthroughs in disarmament negotiations and in the pending treaties on the two Germanies and on Berlin.

Since the symposium participants were free to speak their minds without subscribing to a common premise, there were inevitably some who could not resist the lure of the old models or the urge to tinker with new ones. The totalitarian thesis underlies Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone's discussion of current Soviet nationality policies, which she states are "largely reminiscent of the old Stalinist pattern"; Bohdan Bociurkiw's review of antireligious measures: and Gleb Struve's evaluation of Soviet literature as essentially sterile because it has produced so few creative nonconformists. Robert V. Daniels presents some-

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thing called a "circular flow of power" model, to denote the shift after Khrushchev from one-man rule to collective leadership. It leads him onto some rather thin theoretical ice when he goes so far as to see bureaucrats and technocrats locked in "a new Soviet class struggle . . . the stuff revolutions are made of."

This brings us full circle to the centralist, self-validating concepts of Reshetar. They are based on a persistent treatment of the party as a "secular priesthood" and "a small minority of the population," despite the surge of membership beyond the 14 million mark and what this figure portends in terms of expanded civic participation. They go on to repeat the totalitarian refrain concerning a system that "makes an unlimited claim on man," without considering the growing numbers who have been resisting that claim, or the extent to which its very stridency reveals the insecurity of the current leadership. They conclude with a token nod at the regime's broadening of "inputs in the form of interests, demands, values, and expectations" to achieve "more effective outputs." But they imply that genuine change or reform cannot take place within the existing system; all that can happen, in Reshetar's words, is that "a system that adopts enough policies and reforms . . . may undergo a qualitative change, so that in 'maintaining' itself it actually becomes a different system."

For this kind of categorical analysis the student might wish to substitute the skeptical attitude of John Strong, editor of the Carleton papers. His is a call for the recognition of the Soviets' "pragmatic realism" — haltingly and unevenly though it has emerged—as the hallmark of the recent period. Stereotypes seem particularly ill-suited to the essential flux of these "transition years" in the perplexing evolution of the Soviet system.

Models of Conflict in Chinese Politics

By Andrew J. Nathan

JOHN WILSON LEWIS, Ed., *Party Leadership and Revolutionary Power in China.* Contemporary China Institute Publications. Cambridge, England, Cambridge University Press, 1970.
JOHN M. H. LINDBECK, Ed., *China: Management of a Revolutionary Society.* Seattle, University of Washington Press, 1971.
FRANK N. TRAGER and WILLIAM HENDERSON, Eds., *Communist China, 1949-69: A Twenty-Year Appraisal.* New York, The New York University Press, 1970.

THESE THREE BOOKS comprise 35 articles on Chinese politics and policies, inspiring the observation that in the last five or six years the study of Chinese politics has enjoyed a remarkable leap forward. Not only has this advance altered the composition of our reading lists; it has also raised the level of our understanding of China a distinct notch. Although the Cultural Revolution was helpful in shaking up old interpretations and providing new sources, the advance in understanding has resulted mainly from the inherent maturation of the field. These books, for example, show us not only senior scholars but also a new wave of junior scholars making important contributions to the field, and earlier studies now provide a basis from which both older and younger specialists are moving forward.

The Lewis volume is the product of the 1968 Ditchley Conference organized under the auspices of *The China Quarterly.* This conference focused on the Chinese Communist Party—its history, its internal dynamics, and its relations with other political and social forces such as the army, the intellectuals, the peasants, the state, and Chairman Mao. The resulting articles are highly useful, particularly for their cumulative insights into the Mao-party relationship and into the forms of political conflict in the system—themes to be discussed in a moment. One must carp, however, at the editor's failure to notify the reader that all but two of the articles, by this reviewer's count, have been published in *The China Quarterly* (the new pieces are Philip Bridgham's

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"Factionalism in the Central Committee," and John Gittings' "Army-Party Relations in the Light of the Cultural Revolution").

The Lindbeck volume is the second in a series on Chinese politics stemming from conferences sponsored by the Joint Committee on Contemporary China. In this case, the conference, held in Cuernavaca in 1969, dealt with what might broadly be called "administration" in China. Most of the articles analyze the policy-making process and fluctuations in specific policy areas. Others discuss the nature of the relationship between the government and the masses. A short concluding essay by Gabriel A. Almond evaluates how far China studies have come, and how far they still have to go, from the viewpoint of the discipline of political science. Most of the chapters in this book are weighty, original and interesting contributions.

The third collection, edited by Trager and Henderson, was sponsored by the American-Asian Educational Exchange, an organization dedicated to "creating a broader understanding between the peoples of the United States and the independent nations of Asia" (p. iv). The book suffers slightly from a split personality. An excellent article by William W. Whitson on the military role in policy-making and a piece by Richard C. Thornton on Sino-Soviet relations are, despite the absence of elaborate footnoting, essentially reports of scholarly research; however, most of the other articles in the book constitute, in keeping with its title, "appraisals" of the performance of the Chinese government during its first 20 years in such areas as the provision of order, economic growth, education, literature and art, and foreign relations. The predominant theme of the assessments is that the government has failed to solve the problems that have confronted it. Some authors go so far as to suggest that the present "regime" cannot last. (Tottering or not, the People's Republic of China "poses an unlimited threat to American interests in Asia," say Trager and Henderson in their concluding essay [p. 317].) Despite the intrinsic interest of the book's subject, it is not clear to the reviewer who will want to read the volume. Most of the articles in it seem too specialized for the general reader, yet the majority of them are obviously not aimed at specialists either (a typical footnote on p. 219 identifies Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and Hu Shih as "prominent modern Chinese intellectuals and scholars").

TO DO JUSTICE to the wide-ranging and often excellent work contained in these volumes, one would have to discuss each article separately; nevertheless, certain themes do seem to emerge with particular force. The first is that Mao, by instituting the Cultural Revolution, set himself above the party as a source of legitimacy and a standard of rectitude; in so doing, he revealed the belief—the roots of which can in retrospect be traced to earlier periods of CCP history—that the party is, in Stuart R. Schram's phrase, "merely one instrument among others." This point is most fully explored in Schram's contribution to the Lewis volume, "The Party in Chinese Communist Ideology." It is enriched by several other pieces in the same volume: Benjamin I. Schwartz's "The Reign of Virtue," which sheds new light on Mao's thought by comparing it with that of Rousseau; Leonard Schapiro and John Wilson Lewis' "The Roles of the Monolithic Party under the Totalitarian Leader," which compares Mao's struggle against the CCP with Stalin's subjugation of the CPSU; and William F. Dorrill's "Transfer of Legitimacy in the Chinese Communist Party," which shows how some episodes in party history were revised to create an "aura of legitimacy" around the person of Mao.

Such a proposition represents an important new insight. It provides the key with which we can go back (as these authors do) before the Cultural Revolution and open the "black box" of "the party" or "the regime" to reveal the processes of political conflict going on inside. Instead of a consensual or monolithic elite, whose shared tempering in the fires of Kiangsi and Yenan produced a single political instrument with no cracks or flaws, we now perceive Mao and Liu, and by implication others, fighting and compromising from the 1940's to the 1960's. Suddenly, as in Schram's article, certain hitherto obscure phrases in the writings of Mao and Liu become meaningful. But new mysteries arise. What analysis of the Chinese political process can we bring forward to replace the formerly accepted view—most influentially delineated by Franz Schurmann—of shifting "opinion groups," with no "organized force" behind them, operating within a basically consensual Politburo? [1]

This problem—basically, what sorts of alignments have characterized Chinese Communist politics—forms a prominent area of inquiry in these volumes. The answers are tentative, unsystematic,

[1] Franz Schurmann, *Ideology and Organization in Communist China*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1966, pp. 55-57.

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and often implicit, but they show some clear convergences. First, a number of the authors believe in a "Mao-in-command" model of the Chinese political system. According to this model, Mao has both defined and settled the important issues of Chinese politics since 1949, and other elements in the system have made their influence felt only by structuring Mao's perceptions and alternatives or by evading or bending his decisions. Those who have tried to go further have been crushed. This view receives what may become its classic statement in Michel Oksenberg's "Policy Making Under Mao, 1949-1968: An Overview," in the Lindbeck volume, an article which is based upon 15 or more case studies that have accumulated over roughly the last 10 years. It seems to be shared by Schram and by Schapiro and Lewis, who, despite their focus on the conflict between Mao and the party, see Mao as bringing the party to heel at the moment of his own choosing when it had ceased to serve his purposes. Even Philip Bridgham—although the title of his article, "Factionalism in the Central Committee," suggests independent power centers rather than Maoist control—ends by depicting the three episodes of top-level conflict in the Chinese elite since 1949 as cases where Mao simply crushed those who stepped out of line. One wonders, however, whether the "Maoist myth" ("of Mao's invariably correct and victorious leadership") that Dorrill identifies within the CCP has not given rise among China scholars to another kind of Maoist myth—a myth of Mao's invariably predominant and controlling role within the Chinese elite. This is clearly an area that demands further study and concerning which one may hope for new materials to be released in the future. We may eventually move toward a more complex view which, without derogating Mao's political genius, concedes considerably more power to his colleagues and opponents over the years.

IN ADDITION TO the Mao-in-command view, one sees in many of the articles the emergence of an interest-group model of Chinese politics (the two models are not necessarily in contradiction and can be used either separately or together). It is developed most explicitly and consistently in William W. Whitson's "The Military: Their Role in the Policy Process," in Trager and Henderson. Whitson uses a distinction among four "functional elites"—the career military commanders, the party administrators, the civilian ideologues, and the military commissars—to explain alignments in controversies over military and foreign policy. Ellis Joffe, in an excellent article on "The Chinese Army Under Lin Piao: Prelude to Political Intervention" in the Lindbeck volume, attributes certain views on military and foreign policy to "the officer corps" (*e.g.*, pp. 354-55). Victor H. Li, writing on "The Evolution and Development of the Chinese Legal System" in Lindbeck, analyzes the conflict between "the legal specialists" and "the new cadres" in the political-legal system (p. 233). In the same book, Donald W. Klein's "The Management of Foreign Affairs in Communist China" discerns in the career patterns of top foreign-affairs officials a "process of professionalization" (p. 317) which, although Klein does not say so, might be expected to lead to a vested interest in certain policies. Also in Lindbeck, Frederick C. Teiwes, in "Provincial Politics in China: Theme and Variations," searches for signs that provincial officials have represented provincial "interests" to the center (he finds that the available evidence does not permit this hypothesis to be upheld).

The interest-group model is certainly an attractive device for explaining alignments in Chinese politics, and it is almost always stimulating and suggestive. There are pitfalls, however, connected with it. The analyst can always identify a group in his own mind ("the intellectuals," "the managers," "students," "biologists," "cultural commissars"), and that group will, by definition, have distinctive "interests" in the abstract. But this analytic construct only explains alignments if the members of that group do in fact identify themselves as a group with special interests. Since it is impossible that all imaginable analytic "groups" actually "exist" in this sense, it is incumbent upon the analyst to persuade us that in the given case the group has political life, either through a formal organization or through some informal network of communication and action. The analyst also needs to argue that group membership has more explanatory power for political alignments than other possible bases of alignment (ideology, personal ties, opportunism, and so forth). While, as always, the data we have on China are inadequate to resolve such issues definitively, they can be marshaled more or less persuasively to deal with possible objections.

A third possible model for explaining alignments in Chinese politics is adumbrated by John Wilson Lewis in the Introduction to *Party Leadership and Revolutionary Power,* though the model

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is not employed in his or any other articles in the three volumes. Official propaganda and formal command structures, Lewis writes,

distort the analysis of leadership and power by making formal organizational patterns seem more important than they are. As seen in the rivalries exposed in the Cultural Revolution and also in the make-up of the Ninth Central Committee, informal groupings are crucial to the flow of decisions, indeed to the whole conduct of Chinese political life. . . . It may well be that at present there is no single well-integrated political system for all China and that, as Mao has sometimes insisted, there are a number of different centres or even 'independent kingdoms.'

Such a model—of personal factional groupings operating somewhat disconnectedly at various levels of the political system—would indeed be a departure from our pre-Cultural Revolution image of reasoned debate in the Politiburo.

The emergence of these various models of political conflict affords a welcome sign of increasing empirical and theoretical sophistication in the China field. At the same time, it creates new challenges—to clarify the implications of each model, to determine the degree to which they are mutually compatible or exclusive, and to review the explanatory power of each in various political periods, arenas, and issue areas. As students of Chinese politics refine, revise and perhaps expand the number of their models of conflict, they will both sharpen our understanding of China and begin to contribute more substantially to the comparative study of politics.

Romania and a Theory of Progress

By R. V. Burks

KENNETH JOWITT: *Revolutionary Breakthroughs and National Development. The Case of Romania, 1944-1965.* Berkeley, University of California Press, 1971.

THE PROCESS OF modernization —how it occurs, and whether or not it can successfully be hastened—is one of the more intriguing theoretical puzzles of our time. Professor Jowitt has written in the hope of broadening our comprehension of this process; he wishes to clarify the relationship between Marxism-Leninism, on the one hand, and nation-building, on the other, and to illustrate, demonstrate and augment his clarification by means of a case study.

Modernization, or nation-building, as Professor Jowitt conceives it, takes place in two giant steps. The first of these is a revolutionary breakthrough in which the traditional social order and the interest groups associated with it are either destroyed or pushed aside. The essential requirement of revolutionary breakthrough is a revolutionary party made up of expendable cadres and possessed of a transnational ideology that releases its supporters from lesser commitments. Professor Jowitt considers at some length whether a reformist, representative or coalition party might not be able to engineer a breakthrough but emerges with a negative response: reformist movements, *e.g.*, the Indian Congress Party, operate by making commitments to various constituencies, and these commitments end by becoming an insuperable obstacle to structural change.

The weakness of the Leninist Party, as no doubt of all other revolutionary organizations, is that its reliance on violence tends to produce a counterparty in the form of the security police or the guerrilla army, and to end in the use of terror. Professor Jowitt carefully distinguishes between reprehensible terror (*e.g.*, the brutal waste of slave labor in the Romanian Communists' unsuccessful project to streamline the Black Sea-Danube canal, which he calls a "very remarkable instance of the irrational use of violence") and indirect "violence" or coercion, such as that embodied in government allocation of newsprint, of which he seems to approve.

Once a decisive breakthrough has been made, the way is prepared for the second of the two

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great stages of modernization, that of community-building. The second stage, Professor Jowitt promises, will be the subject of another volume.

This approach to the problem of modernization is imaginative and useful, but to many students of the subject it will appear as insight bought at the expense of oversimplification. The line between direct and indirect coercion has always proved to be a very thin one, if we are to judge from the history of Marxist-Leninist regimes, and seems bound to remain so whenever a small minority attempts to impose its will upon a vast and reluctant majority. Nor will it be as clear to many as it is to Professor Jowitt that nation-building is most effectively accomplished in a brief span by the systematic use of violence. Quite apart from the high cost in human suffering, there is always the question of the structural choices of the revolutionaries. After 44 years of forced-draft industrialization, the USSR is still unable to compete in world markets with its manufactures, and for the most part its socialist-bloc allies fare no better. Professor Jowitt seems unaware of this aspect of the problem; at any rate, he cites the increase in Romanian exports of finished industrial products (from two percent of total exports in 1938 to 19.6 percent in 1956) without appearing to realize that Romanian manufactures are marketable only in other socialist countries. Unsympathetic readers will be inclined to consider Professor Jowitt's theory of revolutionary breakthrough an apologia for Marxism-Leninism.

Moreover, when it comes to the Romanian case study, to which the author devotes four-fifths of his text, the theory sometimes appears to interfere with the facts. Thus Professor Jowitt asserts that Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej condemned Josip Broz-Tito in 1948 because the Yugoslav Marshal was abandoning the policy of revolutionary breakthrough. Yet the most extreme period of Yugoslav radicalism, including the forcible collectivization of agriculture, came *after* the breach with the Cominform. That Dej was so sharp in his denunciation of Tito has usually been interpreted as an effort on Dej's part to compensate for his involvement in Tito's scheme for Balkan federation.

Similarly, Dej's purge of Politburo member and First Vice-Premier Miron Constantinescu in 1957 is attributed by Professor Jowitt to differences over the personnel and the attitudes needed for breaking through, as well as to an alliance between Constantinescu and the Soviet leader Georgi Malenkov. There are others, however, who would argue that Constantinescu (and Iosef Chisinevsky, a Central Committee Secretary and Politburo member who was purged with him) were Khrushchev's men in the Romanian leadership, and that Dej took the precaution of removing these two at the same time that Khrushchev acted to consolidate his own position in the Soviet hierarchy through the 1957 purges.

THIS BRINGS US to the problem of pinpointing the origins of the Romanian national deviation—a subject to which Professor Jowitt devotes considerable attention, although the relationship of this deviation to his theory of breakthrough is nowhere developed. Both the date of origin and the causes of the deviation have been a matter of some controversy. There are those who trace it as far back as 1955, the year when the Romanian Workers' (Communist) Party first began to claim exclusive credit for Romania's wartime switch to the side of the Allies, implying their early independence from the Soviet Union. Jowitt, however, is inclined to a later date—the year 1962. He argues that until 1962, when the regime finally collectivized agriculture in order to mobilize national resources in support of across-the-board industrialization, the Romanian Communists were only doing what Khrushchev had proclaimed all parties in power should do—namely, pursuing their own road to socialism. He asserts further that until that point in time Khrushchev and Dej enjoyed a friendly and cooperative relationship, nourished by their mutual working-class background and their proclivity for orthodoxy on the domestic front. Many—including the reviewer—would question this argument on the basis that destalinization was scarcely compatible with orthodoxy, domestic or otherwise, while across-the-board industrialization, which Dej sought but Khrushchev opposed for Romania, was a sacred cow of Stalinism. In point of fact, Dej never followed Khrushchev's example in the matter of destalinization; indeed, Jowitt himself makes clear that the Romanian security police continued to hold their hatchet over the party throughout Dej's reign, until his death in 1955. Khrushchev's reaction to such resistance is clearer in other cases than in the Romanian; with respect to Bulgaria, for instance, it is a known fact that the Soviet leadership undertook to remove Vulko Chervenkov because of his refusal to destalinize, replacing him with the more subservient Todor Zhivkov. It is

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also suspected that Khrushchev attempted to replace the party dictator of Czechoslovakia, Antonin Novotny, with the reputedly revisionist *apparatchik,* Rudolph Barak, for the same reason. As for the Romanian case, besides the implications of the purge of Constantinescu and Chisinevsky in 1957, there were reports—albeit unsubstantiated—of a Soviet-inspired conspiracy against Dej in the fall of 1962, involving the party leader Emil Bondaras. However tenuous the evidence, all these factors point to the likelihood of tension, rather than cooperation, in the Khrushchev-Dej relationship.

The reviewer would suggest, moreover, that five substantial developments argue for 1958, rather than 1962, as the year of origin of the Romanian deviation. First, 1958 was the year in which Bucharest began to place major reliance on material incentives in its dealings with the Romanian public. Second, as John Montias has shown in his study, *Economic Development in Communist Rumania,*[1] 1958 was also the year in which Bucharest must have resolved to shift a substantial proportion of its trade to the capitalist West. Third, 1958 was the year in which the last Soviet troops were withdrawn from Romania and the last Chinese troops from North Korea (an interesting case for the role of Chinese pressure in the Soviet withdrawal is made in Stephen Fischer-Galati's *The New Rumania: From People's Democracy to Socialist Republic.*[2]) Fourth, according to a number of specialists, it was in 1958 that the Sino-Soviet quarrel reached the point of no return. Finally, it was in 1958 that the Soviets put forward the notion of the simultaneous transition of all bloc members to communism, an obvious sop to those parties (primarily the Chinese) which were disappointed with the extent of Soviet aid they were getting. Added together, these developments suggest a decisive turning point in the Romanian situation. To be sure, the differences between Moscow and Bucharest did not surface for a good while longer, but it is typical in the Communist world for quarrels to become public only when they are quite out of control. In the case of Romania, the surfacing of the deviation can be dated to the Central Committee plenum of November-December 1961, when the Romanian leaders publicly denounced an "unnamed" foreign party for consistent and malevolent interference in their country's affairs over a period of 40 years.

PROFESSOR JOWITT's analysis of Romanian politics, once independence was achieved, is more appealing. This is a subject which he knows from personal observation, including the interviewing of important participants. While what he has to offer on the politics of independent Romania is not particularly congruent with his theory of revolutionary breakthrough, it constitutes, in the reviewer's opinion, the major and by no means inconsiderable contribution of this, his first work.

The Romanian leadership is currently faced with a set of thorny and interrelated problems, according to Professor Jowitt. The priority problem is that of maintaining national independence, which is best accomplished by pressing for a redefinition of "socialist unity"—one which downgrades the imperialist threat, broadens the socialist movement to include all anti-imperialist forces and not just those led by Communists, and proclaims the strength of the movement to reside in the ability of each national party to cope with its own local situation. National parties, in the Romanian view, have the right to independence because they alone have the ability to deal with national diversity.

This is another way of saying that Communist regimes should depend for their existence not upon Soviet power but upon the loyalty and support of their own populations. Carrying the proposition further, Jowitt believes that the Romanian Communists' stress on diversity in the international movement must necessarily be complemented by a drift toward pluralism internally. If the party wishes Moscow to accept diversity in the world movement on the argument that only in this fashion can the bloc be stabilized, then the party must be willing to countenance diversity within its own national framework in order to stabilize its own rule. Moreover, just as pluralism within the movement requires a new relationship among parties, so pluralism within the individual state requires a new kind of party, one based on persuasion rather than coercion, on collegial decision-making rather than democratic centralism, on the new middle class of skilled professionals (itself a byproduct of the breakthrough process) instead of on the new class of faceless *apparatchiki.* If breakthrough is to be decisive, in other words, the Leninist revolutionary party must be replaced by a reformist party of a new type.

[1] Cambridge, Mass., The MIT Press, 1967.
[2] Cambridge, Mass., The MIT Press, 1967.

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Notes & Views

Correspondence

NOTE: Readers are welcome to comment on matters discussed in this journal. Letters should be addressed to the Editors, *Problems of Communism*, US Information Agency, 1776 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Washington, DC, 20547.

THE SOVIET COURTS

TO THE EDITORS: In the September-October 1971 issue of your periodical, Prof. Harold J. Berman of Harvard published an essay-review of Prof. John N. Hazard's *Communists and Their Law* and Mr. Samuel Kucherov's *The Organs of Soviet Administration of Justice*.

In a final passage of his review, Prof. Berman reproaches the authors for not having mentioned a characteristic feature of Soviet law, the educational role of the Soviet courts. I know that the subject is a favorite one of the learned critic: indeed, he has devoted a chapter to it in his enjoyable book, *Justice in the USSR*. It is a twin of the "paternalistic character of the Soviet law," equally a favorite item of Prof. Berman.

While it is alright to mention that Soviet statutes and writings *say* the Soviet courts have an educational role, I object to this "educational role" being treated as a fact of life.

The educative role of Soviet law, or for that matter of any law, would depend in the first place on the courts' activities and decisions being communicated to a large number of people. In a number of countries this condition is fulfilled. Take England, for example: There is hardly any decision of some importance of the courts which is not recorded in *The Times* of London, and to a lesser extent in other daily papers. Moreover, anybody who wants to know more about the decisions of the courts can study several sets of law reports in a large number of legal libraries. In addition to official sources, English literature, past and present, from Dickens to Galsworthy, and from Herbert to Cecil, is full of detailed descriptions of court proceedings, making the English courts an integral part of the thoughts and conversations of the public. I could go on to describe a similar approach, though probably on a lesser scale, in other countries, such as the USA, France, Holland, and prewar Hungary.

What is the situation in the Soviet Union? We are informed of the decisions of the Supreme Courts of the USSR and the RSFSR in two law bulletins published in a total of 18 issues a year (6 for the USSR, 12 for the RSFSR), containing altogether about 500 pages. Of this a part is occupied by matter other than law reports. The USSR law bulletin usually starts with a somewhat tedious account of a plenary session of the Supreme Court, at which the several members of this august body pay homage to decisions of the "nth" Congress of the Communist Party and the leader of the day, entertain the reader with statements to the effect that socialist legality must be strengthened, and speak at length about how certain types of cases must be paid greater attention, how the courts do their best but still make serious mistakes . . . etc., etc. In the two bulletins together, about 400 cases are reported a year, less than in the official court reports of Holland (*Nederlandse Jurisprudentie*). Several of the reported decisions deal with quite simple errors or misreadings of the law by lower courts; much space is also taken up with the record of the three to six lower court rulings which precede each Supreme Court decision. In the latter, the facts are usually stated with utmost brevity—as is the explanation of how the law has been applied. I do not mention this as a criticism; the Cour de Cassation of France, for example, also endeavors to be succinct. The point is that this method of formulating judgments does not bring the law nearer to the public. Moreover, I challenge Prof. Berman to say whether he thinks that, outside of professional lawyers, there are more than 50 people in the Soviet Union who read these bulletins.

Now to the "popular" reporting of law. Anyone may get acquainted with such reportage from translations in the *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*. I have not made a study of it, but I should judge that law reports in the Soviet press amount to no more than five percent of the trial reports in *The Times* of London. I make an exception in the case of reports on the show trials of '36-'38 and again recently; I am sure Professor Berman does not have these in mind when he writes about the educational role of Soviet decisions (nor, for that matter, could he mean the idiotic commentaries which have been published in recent years concerning the writers' trials). For the rest, the cases that are reported involve conspiracies to steal or embezzle state property, bribery, and the like. Unless one thinks that any story which shows that crime does not pay teaches a lesson, I do not see any "educative" merits in these accounts.

Perhaps Prof. Berman is thinking of the speeches which judges in the USSR and all over the world—especially in England—like to address to the accused upon conviction. This is not the place to discourse on the value—the educational role—of such sermons. They might be useful in some cases, but they seem to have little effect in general, and they are slightly comical when addressed to professional criminals. Such personal judgments aside, the few "live" reports we have of sessions of Soviet courts (*e.g.*, G. Feifer's *Justice in*

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Moscow, Amalrik's *Unwanted Journey to Siberia,* and Konstantinowsky's *Soviet Law in Action*) do not suggest that Soviet judges are very good at such sermons.

What remains, then, of the "educational role of the Soviet courts"?

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PROF. BERMAN REPLIES: Prof. Szirmai is right, of course, in saying that the official reports of Soviet court decisions have only a very limited value in educating Soviet citizens. He may also be right—though here my impressions differ from his—in saying that compared with England, very little attention is given to court proceedings in the Soviet press. (There are surely a great many articles on legal subjects generally.) However, to restrict the concept of the educational role of the court to the publicizing of court decisions is to overlook its most important aspects.

Soviet courts are not only required to, but actually do, in appropriate cases, hear evidence of the causes and conditions that have facilitated the commission of the crime or breach of civil obligation, and issue special rulings to directors of enterprises or other appropriate persons concerning such causes and conditions. Representatives of social organizations (the "collective" of the factory, neighborhood, etc.) may and often do participate in judicial proceedings, both criminal and civil, involving their individual members. Soviet courts may and often do hold criminal and civil trials in the clubrooms of factories, apartment houses, and the like. Soviet judges not only seek to influence the attitudes of the accused through the kinds of "sermons" to which Professor Szirmai refers, but more important, consciously conduct the trial (whether criminal or civil) in such a way as to influence the attitudes of all who are present in court, including the spectators. Also Soviet judges are required to, and do, give talks periodically to the public about cases that have come before their courts. Many other examples could be given to show that the educational (*vospitatelnaia* — literally, "'nurturing") role of the Soviet court is, in Professor Szirmai's phrase, "a fact of life."

The educational role of the court is only part of the "parentalism" (it has "'maternal" as well as "paternal" aspects) of the Soviet legal system as a whole. I criticized the books under review not for failing to mention, but rather for failing to discuss at length, what Professor Hazard in his book rightly describes as the role of socialist law in "mobilization for total social involvement" and in the creation of the new "socialist man."

Of course, every legal system has educational and parental functions; and the emphasis upon these functions has substantially increased in the 20th century in many countries, including the United States. However, leaving China aside, I doubt that any country has placed so great a stress as the Soviet Union—both in theory and in practice—on the "nurturing role" of law; and this, I believe, not only explains many of the distinctive features of Soviet law but also helps to explain and characterize the Soviet legal system as a whole.

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ANTI-TITOISTS IN 1948

TO THE EDITORS: In the interests of historical accuracy, Vladimir Petrov's use (*Problems of Communism,* September-October 1971) of the word "exterminate" in reference to Cominformists in Yugoslavia in 1948 must be questioned. Reviewing Dedijer's book, *The Battle Stalin Lost,* Mr. Petrov says Tito ". . . swiftly and ruthlessly *exterminated* [my emphasis] thousands of suspect 'Cominformists.' " (Why, incidentally, put the word in quotes? They were known and real enough.)

"Exterminated"? Hardly. I was there at the time, arriving in Belgrade from Prague (June 1948) the day following the Czechs' pre-embargo publication of the Cominform resolution. I stayed through that summer and returned the following year.

Two things can be said of the Cominformists:

1. They were never more than a small minority—small indeed—within the party. Only two members of the Central Committee—Zujovic and Hebrang—were removed from the leadership for taking Stalin's position; and, at the Party Congress of July 21, 1948 (with 2,344 delegates present), none of Tito's close associates received more than nine *adverse* votes to their re-election amid remarkable scenes of unanimity and resolve to stand up to the Russians.

2. Some thousands of party members outside the Central Committee — lower officials and rank-and-file members, as well as some army officers —were rounded up and detained, with many of them then interned on two islands in the north Adriatic. These camps were scarcely "a home away from home," but it may be said that the internees' living conditions were little worse than those of the vast majority of the Yugoslavs at the time, even in winter.

Could — or should — Tito have acted differently in the circumstances of the time? Looking back on what was at stake—national survival—it still is remarkable that there were no "exterminations." The only physical victims among the pro-Stalinists were Arso Jovanovic — then the army Chief of Staff — and a group of three or four of his cohorts who were caught by border guards in an attempt to go over to the Russians in Romania. Arso Jovanovic was killed in the ensuing exchange of shots. Another general, Petricevic, and a colonel, Vlado Dapcevic, were tried for treason and sentenced. Both were later amnestied, an act of clemency which Dapcevic acknowledged later by levanting into Albania to direct anti-Titoist propaganda from there. It might be added that the response from Yugoslavs to more recent efforts to lure them back into the Stalinist fold was nil. This is hardly surprising from a people which has achieved a remarkably tolerable and tolerant, materially comfortable way of life within a uniquely relaxed style of Communist government—all resulting from that determined "No" to the Kremlin 23 years ago.

The sequel might have been quite otherwise had the Cominformists—relatively few that they were—not been locked up. Here it might also be observed that Stalin's forbearance from military intervention certainly was due in part to the mistaken advice of his ambassador in Belgrade that the "healthy elements" would soon oust Tito and take over the party. However, Stalin's decision was also due to the fact that in the summer of 1948 the Soviet Union still was insufficiently recovered from the war to risk involvement with

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the Western powers in a breach of wartime agreements—in this case the "50-50" understanding about Yugoslavia. Stalin had declined, earlier, to support Tito in his desire to grab Trieste for the same kind of reason.

The West, at the time of the Tito-Stalin break, certainly shed no tears over the former's isolation; but an overt military intervention would have created another situation, and Stalin did not then know—as his successors afterwards learned in 1956 and 1968—that the West would not interfere. Tito reacted "swiftly and ruthlessly" to render a potential "fifth column" harmless. But without "extermination." The Cominformists lived to be "rehabilitated." Even Zujovic returned to party life and served many years on the administration of the party newspaper before retiring on pension.

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MR. PETROV REPLIES: If Eric Bourne's objections were limited to my using the term "exterminated" in reference to Tito's action against the Cominformists, I would merely apologize and suggest that the term "put out of circulation" would be more appropriate. But he addresses himself to a larger issue, namely that of the necessity of dealing harshly with those who were presumed to be Stalin's agents in Yugoslavia in 1948-49. He also suggests that their treatment wasn't really harsh, that they were only "rounded up and detained, with many of them then interned on two islands in the north Adriatic."

Personally, I have no issue with Mr. Bourne. I was not in Yugoslavia at that time and have no independent knowledge of the facts. Vladimir Dedijer, however, still was an intimate friend of Tito and presumably knew what was going on. He states (p. 304) that "several thousand" were arrested; at another point (p. 329) he gives the figure of "ten thousand." The camp on the island of Goli Otok, according to him, was "a miniature model of Siberian camps under Stalin [and] was introduced by security people trained in Russia after the war." To Dedijer, the later rehabilitation of the Cominformists was irrelevant: they were politically finished.

Was this purge necessary? In my opinion, it probably was, although there is no way of proving it. But Dedijer, an idealist and humanist, and a friend of Djilas, questions this necessity, and explicitly condemns Tito's security police for their methods and for the sweeping nature of the purge. Many good people, he insists, perished without cause.

Thus the issue is between Eric Bourne and Vladimir Dedijer, and the readers of *The Battle Stalin Lost* are free to draw their own conclusions. There is no question that today's Yugoslavia has a "uniquely relaxed style of Communist government." It does not follow, however, that this has always been the case.

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A DOCTRINAL ISSUE

TO THE EDITORS: Allen S. Whiting's review of Lucien Bianco, *Origins of the Chinese Revolution, 1915-1949* (March-April 1972 issue) perpetuates a remarkably tenacious error on the subject of Marxism and the peasantry.

After all that has been said on Marxist peasant policy (by Karl A. Wittfogel, David Mitrany, Lazar Volin, and many others), one wonders how Professor Whiting can still refer to Marx's alleged "failure to foresee the revolutionary potential of the peasants" and accept Bianco's description of Mao as " 'The creator of the peasant strategy. . . .' "

A few quotes from Marx and Engels seem to be in order: Although describing the peasants as politically ambivalent and organizationally weak, Marx expressed in 1856 his desire to "back the proletarian revolution by some second edition of the Peasants' War" (letter to Engels, April 16, 1856). In 1874 Engels described Russia as ". . . an oriental despotism whose arbitrariness we in the West simply cannot imagine; . . . Here all the conditions of a revolution are combined, of a revolution which, started by the upper classes of the capital, perhaps even by the government itself, must be rapidly carried further, beyond the first constitutional phase, by the peasants. . . . This revolution is surely approaching" (Engels, *On Social Conditions in Russia*). Having aged and mellowed, Engels later still claimed that, "even in France the Socialists are realizing more and more that no lasting victory is possible for them, unless they first win the great mass of the people, that is, in this case, the peasants" (1895 Introduction to Marx's *The Class Struggles in France, 1848-1850*).

Other passages abound, all of which demonstrate that the founders of Marxism did not fail to foresee the revolutionary role of the peasants. Mao deserves credit or blame, depending on one's point of view, for applying their ideas to his peasant compatriots under guidance from the Comintern, but he did not create the peasant strategy which he employed. Bianco deserves some credit for moderating Peking's silliest claims on behalf of Mao, but neither Bianco nor Professor Whiting restores enough "reality" to Mao's image in the West.

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